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Abstract
In the second half of 2008, after a series of bankruptcies of large financial institu-
tions, the U.S. Treasury poured capital infusions into domestic financial institutions
under the Capital Purchase Program (CPP), thus helping to avert a complete collapse
of the U.S. banking sector. In this article the effectiveness of the Capital Purchase
Program is analysed in terms of restoring banks’ loan provisions. The relative impacts
of liquidity shortages (which negatively affected banks’ willingness to lend) and the
contraction in aggregate demand for bank loans are examined. The empirical evidence
on the effects of capital shortages supports the theory. Banks that have a higher level
of capitalisation tend to lend more both during the crisis and in normal times. More-
over, it is found that bailed-out banks displayed higher growth rates of loans during
the crisis than in normal times (before 2008) as well as higher rates compared with
non-bailed banks during the crisis, with a one percentage point increase in the cap-
ital ratio. In addition, bailed-out banks that repurchased their shares from the U.S.
Treasury provided more loans during the crisis than those banks that did not.
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Re´sume´
Dans la seconde moitie´ de 2008, apre`s une se´rie de faillites de grandes institutions
financie`res, la Re´serve Fe´de´rale ame´ricaine a re´agi au manque de liquidite´ a` travers
la garantie obligatoire des preˆts et des recapitalisations bancaires principalement dans
le cadre du Capital Purchase Program (CPP) pour les banques commerciales pour
afin e´viter l’effondrement du secteur bancaire ame´ricain. Dans cet article l’efficacite´ du
CPP est analyse´e en termes de restauration d’octroi de cre´dits bancaires. Les impacts
relatifs du manque de liquidite´ (qui a ne´gativement affecte´ la volonte´ des banques a`
preˆter) et de la baisse de la demande globale pour les preˆts bancaires sont examine´s. La
preuve empirique sur les effets du manque de liquidite´ soutient la the´orie. Les banques
avec un niveau de capitalisation e´leve´ ont tendance a` octroyer plus de cre´dits au cours
de la crise et en temps normal. En outre, les banques renfloue´es ont affiche´ des taux de
croissance des preˆts plus e´leve´s au cours de la crise qu’en temps normal (avant 2008)
ainsi que des taux plus e´leve´s par rapport aux banques non-renfloue´es pendant la crise,
avec une augmentation d’un point de pourcentage du ratio de capital. De plus, les
banques renfloue´es qui ont rachete´ leurs actions aupre`s du Tre´sor ame´ricain offraient
plus de preˆts au cours de la crise que les banques qui ne l’ont pas fait.
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1 Introduction
The well-functioning banking sector is often said to play a crucial role in cultivating
business activity. Indeed, financial distress as well as the lack of confidence that undermined
banking activity during the crisis of 2007 immediately affected the real economy. Govern-
ments had to undertake conventional and ad hoc measures offering liquidity in the form of
bailout packages. The main program that provided liquidity to U.S. commercial banks was
the Capital Purchase Program (CPP). The goal of these interventions was to stabilise the
financial system by providing capital to viable financial institutions (see details in Isyuk,
2013a). However, there is still no clear evidence of the efficacy of public (as opposed to
market-based) capital injections for sustaining bank loan growth.
Empirical studies show that loan provisions to the private sector tend to slow down during
banking crises (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Eichengreen and Rose, 1998; Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt
et al., 2006). There can be several reasons for that. On one hand, the literature focuses on
the vulnerability of banks’ balance sheets and their sensitivity to liquidity shortage. That
transmission channel of credit supply to the real economy is investigated in Black and Rosen
(2009); Hirakata et al. (2009); De Haas and van Horen (2010); Berrospide and Edge (2010);
Brei et al. (2011). It is confirmed that the bank’s balance sheets position greatly affects the
bank’s credit offer to enterprises and individuals.
On the other hand, credit growth can decelerate not only due to the financial conditions
of the bank and its willingness to lend, but also due to the deterioration in demand for bank
products and services. The same adverse exogenous shocks that triggered the problems with
bank’s liquidity can induce the decline in the aggregate demand (Dell’Ariccia et al., 2008).
The overall decline in economic activity negatively affects the willingness of the individuals
and firms to borrow, both for consumption and investments. Besides, as highlighted in
Dell’Ariccia et al. (2008), the credit cycle effect a` la Kiyotaki and Moore (Kiyotaki and
Moore, 1997) can occur during the crisis. In that case, even creditworthy borrowers see the
value of their collaterised assets (as well as their balance sheets) to deteriorate, which leads
to a decline in the credit offer, even by healthy banks.
Thus, there is a link with the literature focusing on disentangling the relative impacts of
demand and financial shocks (Tong and Wei, 2009b; Claessens et al., 2012). These authors
suggest several indexes for measuring the sensitivity of the nonfinancial firms to demand
shocks that could be also applied to the financial sector.
This paper uses the methodology of Brei et al. (2011) in order to estimate the impact of
bank capital, other bank balance sheet characteristics, and sensitivity to demand shocks on
bank lending. That framework allows for the introduction of structural changes in parameter
3
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estimates for the period of the crisis and for normal times, as well as for bailed-out and non-
bailed banks. While Brei et al. (2011) focus on the data regarding 108 large international
banks, in this paper the focus is on the U.S. commercial banks and the role of the CPP in
resuming bank lending.
This paper contributes to the literature on the efficacy of public capital injections during
the crisis. It provides the framework in which the sensitivity of the bank’s credit offer to
financial distortions and its sensitivity to decline in aggregate demand are separated from
each other1. The relationship between bank balance sheet characteristics, sensitivity to the
demand shock, and bank credit growth is analysed for the banks that received CPP funds
and the banks that did not participate in the CPP in normal times and during the crisis.
Moreover, the same relationship is also investigated for the subsample of the financial firms
that received the CPP funds in order to distinguish between the banks that repurchased
their stake from the U.S. Treasury and the banks that did not repurchase their stake by July
of 2012.
The great deal of this paper is focused on pre-testing the models and selecting the ad-
equate instruments for the estimators with instrumental variables. The full version of this
paper (Chapter 4, Isyuk, 2013b) includes six types of estimators that prove to be to some
extent more and to another extent less advantageous when dealing with particular economet-
ric issues. The detailed results are presented only for Mundlak-Krishnakumar and Blundell-
Bond system GMM models, while the summary results for all estimators are presented in
section 4.3. I start with fixed effects estimator that, however, does not allow us to obtain the
parameter estimates for the time-invariant variables (such as bailout or repayment dummy).
Besides, as the model is dynamic, the fixed effects estimator is inefficient and might lead to
inconsistent estimates. The Mundlak-Krishnakumar model (Mundlak, 1978; Krishnakumar,
2006) is then conducted and, on one hand, provides the estimates for time-invariant variables
and, on the other hand, following Chatelain and Ralf (2010), is used as a pre-test estimator
that helps to select instrumental variables for further estimations. The Hausman-Taylor
estimator (Hausman and Taylor, 1981) enables the separation between exogenous and en-
dogenous time-variant and time-invariant variables. With regard to the endogenous nature
of the bailout dummy, it is expected to obtain consistent and efficient estimates using that
method.
The logit regression from Isyuk, 2013a is then used as a first-stage in the Two Stage
Least Squares (2SLS) model based on instrumental variables (IV). The bailout dummy is
1In most of empirical studies, demand factor is proxied by changes in the GDP of the country. It means
that they do not take into account heterogenous reactions of the financial institutions to the changes in
aggregate demand (see Berrospide and Edge, 2010; Brei et al., 2011).
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instrumented using the proxy for systemic risk (beta) and the share of mortgage-backed
securities in a bank’s total assets. The fitted values of bailout dummy are then plugged into
the second stage regression. The final models are Arellano-Bond first-difference (Arellano
and Bond, 1991) and Blundell-Bond estimators (Blundell and Bond, 1998) that use Gener-
alised Method of Moments-style (GMM) instruments and are often referred to as one of the
most efficient estimators when working with large number of observations and small-time
dimension datasets and when fitting the dynamic model.
The empirical evidence on the effects of capital shortage supports the theory. Banks
with a higher level of capitalisation tend to lend more both during the crisis and in normal
times. This result is in line with that of Francis and Osborne (2009), who use data on U.K.
banks and report that better-capitalised banks are more willing to supply loans. The same
is confirmed by Foglia et al. (2010), who also find that this effect is intensified during the
crisis.
Moreover, during the crisis, bailed-out banks exhibited higher growth rate of loans than
in normal times (before 2008) and higher than that of non-bailed banks during the crisis,
with a one percentage point increase in capital ratio. This means that liquidity provisions
to the banks during the recent crisis supported bank lending. Besides, these results extend
those from Isyuk (2013a) suggesting that bailed-out banks were also the ones that could
contribute to a larger extent to the rise in credit offer. It also seems that the banks that
were characterised as specialised in commercial and industrial lending and that exhibited
higher probability of receiving CPP funds (see Isyuk, 2013a for details) were also the ones
that contributed to a larger extent to the growth rates of loans (thus, mostly commercial
and industrial loans, as they were specialised in that type of lending).
The same results also show that during the crisis, more capital is required for the non-
bailed banks to sustain the growth of credit supply on a pre-crisis level. In tough times,
additional capital is not that easily translated into extended credit offers by the banks that
did not benefit from the CPP program, as they prefer to keep a substantial part of it for
their internal needs.
It seems that the banks that repaid CPP funds by July 2012 were the ones that received
enough additional capital to support their operations during the crisis and to continue provid-
ing credits to enterprises and individuals. In their case, the recapitalisation scheme worked
efficiently, providing them the possibility to repurchase their stake from the Treasury and to
translate additional capital into more lending.
It is also in line with the results of Brei et al. (2011), who argue that the banks-recipients
of CPP funds start to translate additional capital into greater lending during the crisis
once their capitalisation exceeds a critical threshold. That critical threshold should also
5
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account for the commitment to reimburse the CPP funds. The bank that is not capable
of repurchasing its stake from the Treasury cannot be expected to expand the credit offer
to enterprises and individuals. It is more probable that such a bank will adjust its assets
portfolio to meet the capital requirements by cutting the number of newly issued loans.
The rise in aggregate demand contributes to the increase in bank lending in good times.
However, during the crisis, the situation changes, especially for different types of loans. For
instance, since 2007, the demand factor has had no impact on the growth rates of real estate
mortgage loans for non-bailed banks. With the collapse in housing markets and generally
unstable economic situation, consumers were less willing to take new mortgages.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the description of the
model, estimators, econometric issues related to endogeneity bias as well as the selection
procedure of the optimal instruments for system GMM. The data and the construction of
variables are explained in section 3. Section 4 reviews the detailed results for Mundlak-
Krishnakumar and Blundell-Bond system GMM models as well as summarizes the results
from other estimators in section 4.3. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model and estimation methodology
2.1 Model
In this empirical model, bank lending between 1995 and 2011 is explained by two core
factors: banks’ financial constraint (or, in other words, the level of capitalisation) and their
sensitivity to the shocks on aggregate demand. However, the period between 1995 and 2011
includes intensive growth (2001-2006), recession (2007-2009), as well as the period of sluggish
economic growth following the recession (after 2009). Besides, substantial liquidity injections
into the banking sector under the CPP took place during the recession in 2008-2009.
Such particular conditions during the analysed period cannot be ignored. They represent
significant structural changes that may have affected the relationship between bank-specific
factors and bank lending.
Thus, the parameter estimates are allowed to change for two states of economy: crisis
and normal times. Besides, the parameters shift for the banks-beneficiaries of the CPP funds
relative to the banks that did not receive the funds. Moreover, the subsample of the banks-
recipients of CPP funds is analysed in order to check for differences in the same relationship
among the banks that repurchased their stock from the U.S. Treasury in short notice (before
July 2012) and the ones that did not.
The differential behaviour between the periods of time and banks is introduced in the
6
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model via dummies and their interactions with individual financial bank characteristics and
sensitivities to changes in aggregate demand.
The first full specification of the dynamic panel regression following Brei et al. (2011)
and Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez (2011) is the following:
∆Ln(Lit) = φ0 + φ1Ct + η∆Ln(Li,t−1) + χ1Zt−1 + [χ+ χ
∗Ct]Bi
+ [δ + δ∗Ct + (ω + ω
∗Ct)Bi]BSCi,t−1 + αi + ǫit (1)
where
• ∆Ln(Lit) is the growth rate of lending at the bank i during the year t ;
• BSCi,t−1 are lagged bank-specific characteristics associated with financial and demand
constraints of commercial bank i ;
• Zt−1 are lagged macroeconomic controls (real GDP growth, change in Federal Funds
interest rate);
• Ct is the dummy that distinguishes between the crisis period and normal times;
• Bi indicates the banks that received the CPP funds relative to those that did not;
• αi represents random bank effects; and
• ǫit are observation-specific errors.
This model is estimated using fixed effects, Mundlak-Krushnakumar, Hausman-Taylor,
Instrumental Variables (IV), Arellano-Bond first difference, and Blundell-Bond system GMM
estimators. Each of these estimators transforms Equation 1 in a particular way in order
to obtain efficient and consistent estimators. Clearly the estimators that are based only
on within-transformation of the variables do not allow for the estimation of time-invariant
variables, such as the bailout dummy. Hence, when using fixed effects and Arellano-Bond first
difference estimators, the bailout dummy as well as the interactions between bank-specific
variables and the bailout dummy are omitted from model 1, described above.
Another group of regressions is run on a subsample of 252 banks-recipients of CPP
funds. The cofficients similar to those from the previous regression are marked herein with
a subscript b. Here the differential relationship is allowed for the banks that redeemed their
stake from the Treasury and those that did not:
7
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2014.62
∆Ln(Lit) = φb0 + φb1Ct + ηb∆Ln(Li,t−1) + χbZt−1 + [χb + χ
∗
bCt]Ri
+ [γ + γ∗Ct + (κ+ κ
∗Ct)Ri]BSCi,t−1 + αbi + ǫbit (2)
where Ri specifies the banks that reimbursed the CPP funds before July 2012 and the banks
that did not pay anything (in the subsample of banks-recipients of CPP funds).
The same estimators as for model 1 are used to estimate model 2. Ri is the time-invariant
repayment dummy, and thus, it is also omitted when using fixed effects and the Arellano-
Bond first difference estimator.
Individual bank-specific characteristics BSCi,t−1 include balance sheet indicators that
account for supply factors that influence a bank’s decision regarding the offer of the loans.
The bank’s financial constraint is mainly associated with its level of capitalisation. During
the crisis, for instance, a bank’s capital ratio is expected to worsen due to the bank’s losses
in subprime mortgage-related assets (it can also be any other adverse capital shock or even
change in banking regulation). If the bank does not have enough capital buffer and cannot
raise equity2, it is expected that the bank will tend to adjust its capital ratio by cutting the
number of newly issued loans.
In the literature, this question is often referred to as a trade-off between the marginal
costs of issuing equity and the marginal cost of cutting back on lending. The results of the
study conducted by Kiley and Sim (2010) suggest that the banks respond to a capital shock
through a mix of financial disintermediation and recapitalisation. Besides, instead of just
including macroeconomic controls on the country level (as was done, for instance, in Brei
et al., 2011), the individual levels of sensitivity to changes in U.S. real GDP are computed.
They account for heterogeneous reactions of commercial banks to expansion or contraction
of the aggregate demand. These bank-specific sensitivities to changes in GDP are introduced
as proxies for the impact of demand factors on the bank’s lending activity.
The basic idea of parameter estimates for interactions between crisis, bailout, and repay-
ment dummies with sensitivity to GDP growth and balance sheet characteristics is similar.
The estimation of the models described above results in the set of coefficients for any bank-
specific factor (both balance sheet characteristic or sensitivity to demand shock), presented
in table 1.
These various coefficients allow us to explore the impact of supply and demand factors on
loan growth and to see how it changes (i) in the period of crisis compared to normal times;
(ii) between the banks that received CPP funds and the banks that did not participate in
2That is the case, for instance, when the bank is not approved for the CPP funding.
8
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2014.62
Table 1: Resulting set of coefficients for the bank-specific characteristic BSC1 and its inter-
actions with dummies from models 1 and 2
Banks/Periods No Crisis Crisis
All banks
No Bailout δ1 δ1 + δ
∗
1
Bailout δ1 + ω1 δ1 + δ
∗
1 + ω1 + ω
∗
1
No Repayment γ1 γ1 + γ
∗
1
Repayment γ1 + κ1 γ1 + γ
∗
1 + κ1 + κ
∗
1
the CPP; and (iii) between the banks that repurchased their stake from the Treasury by
July 2012 and the banks that did not. The fact of the bank bailout means that the bank
applied for CPP funds, was approved by the U.S. Treasury and accepted the final conditions
by providing required documentation. Conversely, there are two possible reasons that the
bank did not to receive the bailout: either the bank did not apply for CPP funds (because it
had access to alternative sources of financing or did not require recapitalisation during the
crisis), or the bank’s application for participation in the CPP was rejected by the Treasury
(for more discussion on that topic, see Isyuk, 2013a).
The coefficient δ1 shows the short-term impact of the change in variable BSC1 on bank
lending at non-bailed banks in normal times (Bi = 0; Ct = 0). The long-term effect is given
by δ1
1−η
for model 1 or by δ1
1−ηb
for model 2. When the coefficient δ∗1 is significant, it means
that the relationship between the underlined variable BSC1 and bank lending is significantly
different in crisis time compared to normal times for non-bailed banks. The full impact is
then calculated as δ + δ∗. Other coefficients are interpreted in a similar way.
In tables with results individual coefficients δ, δ∗, ω, and ω∗ for model 1 and γ, γ∗, κ,
and κ∗ for model 2 are reported with stars identifying their level of significance, while the
coefficients measuring the full impact (δ + δ∗, δ + ω etc.) can be found in square brackets.
2.2 Endogeneity bias
Dynamic panel models 1 and 2 presented in section 2.1 allow for, on one hand, empirical
modeling of dynamic effect through the lagged dependent variable (past behaviour affect-
ing current one); on the other hand, individual-specific dynamics. When estimating these
models, however, several econometric issues related to endogeneity bias may arise. They are
described below followed by the proposed solution in form of the alternative estimator.
• Correlation between the lagged dependent variable Li,t−1 and individual random effect
9
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ǫit. Nickell (1981) reports that standard methods of estimation such as within estimator
and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) can lead to seriously biased coefficients in dynamic
models (often referred to as ”fixed effects Nickell’s bias”). This issue is particularly
important in case of panel datasets with large number of individuals and small number
of time periods. It is said that within autoregressive parameter bias is larger when
the number of time periods T is small (less than 10), negligible when T is larger
than or equal to 30. In the full sample of banks examined in this paper the average
number of available time periods is 10.1, while the maximum number of periods is
16 (annual data between 1995 and 2011), suggesting that the coefficients obtained
via within estimator (presented in the following section) can be biased. The models
that deal with autoregressive bias and that are designed for short time dimension and
large entity dimension datasets are those based on Generalised Methods of Moments
Estimator (GMM).
• Endogeneity of time-invariant variables Bi and Ri due to their correlation with
individual-level random effect. This issue can be treated using the Hausman-Taylor
estimator (Hausman and Taylor, 1981). That estimator assumes that some of the ex-
planatory variables are correlated with the individual-level random effects, but that
none of the explanatory variables are correlated with the idiosyncratic error. Endoge-
nous bias of time-invariant variables is corrected using internal instruments. In that
sense Hausman-Taylor estimator improves over Fixed Effects (because it allows to es-
timate the parameters for time-invariant variables) and over Mundlak-Krishnakumar
estimator (that does not deal with the endogeneity of time-invariant variables).
• Endogeneity of time-varying indicators (such as bank-specific variables). That bias
may arise due to correlation with individual random effects. Within transformation or
first-differencing both permit to avoid that problem and obtain consistent parameter
estimates.
• The presence of reverse causality. Loans growth rates are assumed to be endogenous;
however, causality may run in both directions: bank-specific characteristics influence
the growth rates of loans while the growth rates of loans affect bank-specific character-
istics (for instance, capital ratio). Besides, the bailout dummy is endogenous as it is
the consequence, on one hand, of the particular bank’s decision (as the bank chooses
to apply or not for the Capital Purchase Program and later accepts or not the final
conditions attached by the Treasury), on the other hand, of the Treasury’s decision
(acceptance or refusal of the bank’s application for CPP funds, more on that see in
10
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Isyuk, 2013a. In that case, the method of Instrumental Variables is efficient as it pro-
vides unbiased coefficients for endogenous regressors through the two-step estimation
procedure.
• Dealing with endogeneity bias using the instruments that are too many and weak.
That is the issue that often arises when applying Arellano-Bond (Arellano and Bover,
1995) and system GMM (Blundell and Bond, 1998) estimators (see section 2.5). The
proper instruments have to satisfy the conditions of validity (exogeneity) and relevancy
that is not always the case. GMM estimators are supposed to deal with most of
the endogeneity issues presented above, however, the consistency of the parameters
obtained for time-invariant variables is not investigated so far.
2.3 Mundlak-Krishnakumar estimator
One of the estimators that allows to gauge the effects of time-invariant variable (as op-
posed to the estimators such as fixed effects that only use information on within variance
of covariates, ignoring the between variance) is Mundlak estimator (Mundlak, 1978), later
extended by Krishnakumar (2006). This estimator not only helps to estimate the impact
of time-invariant variables but also, when used as a pre-test estimator, to decide which
time-varying variables are endogenous and which are not(Chatelain and Ralf, 2010). This
information will be then useful in Hausman-Taylor, IV and GMM estimators that require
distinguishing between exogenous and endogenous variables and selecting appropriate in-
struments.
The basic methodology of Mundlak-Krushnakumar estimator is presented below. The
model 1 contains both time-series cross-section data and time-invariant variables and can be
rewritten in the following simplified form:
yit = βxit−1 + γbi + αi + ǫit (3)
where yit is dependent variable; xit−1 are lagged time and individual varying explanatory
variables; bi are time-invariant explanatory variables (or dummies); αi are individual random
effects, and β and γ are coefficients to be estimated for time-varying and time-invariant
variables, respectively. The error term ǫit is assumed to be uncorrelated with xit−1, bi and αi.
As there is no theoretical evidence yet on the adequacy of Mundlak model with autoregressive
variables, lagged dependent variable yit−1 is removed from the model.
The difficulty of estimation of that model is the potential correlation of individual effects
αi with xit−1 and especially with time-invariant variables bi. Mundlak (1978) proposes to
use an auxiliary regression to account for such a relationship:
11
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αi = πxi◦ + φbi + α
M
i (4)
where xi0 is average over time for each individual of time-varying variables, π and φ are
coefficients to be estimated for these averages and time-invariant variables, respectively.
Combining auxiliary regression with initial regression yields the following equation:
yit = βxit−1 + (γ + φ)bi + πxi◦ + α
M
i + ǫit (5)
Applying Generalised Least Squares (GLS) model to estimate the last equation, Mundlak
(1978) showed that
β̂GLS = β̂W (6)
π̂GLS = β̂B − β̂W (7)
γ̂GLS = γ̂B (8)
where β̂B and γ̂B are between estimators, while β̂W is a within estimator
3.
For each time-varying variable xi◦ Mundlak-Krishnakumar regression tests the null hy-
pothesis β̂B− β̂W = 0 (Equation 7). Thus, the smaller and the closer to zero is the estimated
parameter π̂GLS, the more exogenous variable xi◦ is. Later these exogenous xi0 variables
can be used as instruments in Hausman and Taylor (Hausman and Taylor, 1981) and other
estimators (Chatelain and Ralf, 2010).
2.4 Two-step system GMM estimator
In this paper the system GMM is preferred to difference GMM as it allows to include
time-invariant regressors into the model as well as to account for heteroscedasticity of model
errors.
System GMM is the augmented version of the difference GMM estimator. Initially it
was developed to improve the difference GMM estimators as lagged levels were often poor
instruments for first-differenced variables4. Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and
Bond (1998) modified the difference GMM estimator by adding the original level equation to
the system. The instruments for the variables in levels are their own lagged first-differences.
3Mundlak also proved them to be best linear unbiased estimators (BLUE).
4Especially if the variables are close to a random walk
12
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The larger number of instruments allows to increase the efficiency of the estimator.
Two-step system GMM provides an algorithm for computing the feasible efficient two-step
GMM estimator, where residuals from the first step are used to form the optimal weighting
matrix. The efficient GMM estimator is then estimated using that matrix. Therefore the two-
step GMM estimates are robust to the presence of heterescedasticity and serial correlation.
The cost of the increased efficiency of system GMM estimator is a set of additional
restrictions on initial conditions. Basically it requires first-differences to be uncorrelated with
unobserved group effects. Another disadvantage of applying the system GMM estimator is
an important rise in the instrument count. In case the lag range is not restricted and the
instrument matrix is not collapsed, each instrumenting variable generates one column for
each time period and each lag available in that time period. As highlighted in Roodman
(2006), the number of instruments is then quadratic in T.
Often referred to as ”too many instruments” problem, it can lead to, first of all, over-
fitting of endogenous variables which could bias coefficient estimates toward those from
non-instrumenting estimators. Second, high instrument count could become the reason of
imprecise estimates of the GMM optimal weighting matrix and, consequently, downward
biased standard errors (see Roodman, 2008 for more details).
The bias and the standard errors can be lowered by using the Windmeijer correction
(Windmeijer, 2005) for the two-step efficient GMM. The solution for the former problem
requires keeping the number of instrument lags low. The choice of instruments and their lags
is described in the next section following the strategies in the literature on the performance
of the IV and GMM estimators (Chatelain and Teurlai, 2001; Donald et al., 2009; Mehrhoff,
2009). Additional tests on relevancy and validity of the instruments are presented in section
2.5.
2.5 Choice of instruments for system GMM
2.5.1 Limiting the number of moment conditions
If the number of instruments is too large, GMM estimator becomes inconsistent. In case
the number of instruments is not constrained, each instrumenting variable generates one
column for each time period and lag available in that time period (Roodman, 2006). In
this section 23 variables are treated as endogenous or predetermined for full specifications of
models 1 and 2:
• six main variables (lagged dependent variable and 5 bank specific characteristics
(BSCit));
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• interaction of five BSCit with crisis dummy;
• interaction of five BSCit with bailout (or repayment) dummy;
• interaction of five BSCit with both crisis and bailout (or repayment) dummies;
• bailout (or repayment) dummy and its interaction with crisis dummy (two in total).
The equation is said to be exactly identified when there are at least as many instruments
generated as included endogenous variables. On the other hand, the optimal weighting ma-
trix of the GMM estimator has a rank of N (number of banks) at most. This matrix becomes
singular and the two-step estimator cannot be computed when the number of instruments
exceeds N (Soto, 2009). As the sample contains information on almost 550 financial insti-
tutions, the number of generated instruments in system GMM should not exceed 550.
In case the count of moment conditions is not reduced, the standard instrument set
provides T (T−1)
2
= 105 moment conditions for a single lagged dependent variable, (T−2)(T−1)
2
=
91 moment conditions for each endogenous variable and T − 1 = 14 moment conditions for
each exogenous variable (Mirestean and Charalambos, 2009).
To reduce the instrument count two main techniques are used:
• Limiting the lag length is based on the selection of the lags to be included in the
instrument set. Baum et al. (2002) advises to constrain the lags between the second and
the fifth. In that case the number of moment conditions will be equal to the number
of instrumented variables (exogenous, endogenous or predetermined) multiplied by the
number of lags used.
• Collapsing the instrument set also allows to make the instrument linear in T.
The columns of the original instrument matrix are ”collapsed” reflecting the fact that
orthogonality condition has to be valid for each lag but not any more for each time
period.
Some additional transformations can be applied on the instrument set. For instance
Mehrhoff (2009) proposes to apply the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to the instru-
ment set. The transformation matrix becomes then stochastic rather than deterministic.
After performing Monte-Carlo simulations the author finds that factorised instruments pro-
duce the lowest bias and standard errors, while recommends to collapse the matrix prior to
factorisation.
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2.5.2 Selection of the optimal instruments
It is not only the instrument count that influences the choice of the instruments for GMM
estimations but also the ”quality” of these instruments. There exists two criterias for proper
instrumental variables in linear IV and GMM regressions. The ”good” instruments have to
be:
• correlated with endogenous regressors;
• orthogonal to the error process (or, in other words, exogenous);
In the literature the first condition is often referred to as the ”relevancy” of instruments,
while the second one referred to as the ”validity” of instruments. Instruments are said to be
weak and the system to be weakly identified, if the instruments are weakly correlated with
endogenous regressors (Stock et al., 2002; Bun and Windmeijer, 2010).
There are several methods to deal with the problem of instrument relevance. In this
article the correlation coefficients between the set of instruments and endogenous variables
are first analysed for each equation. Thus, the correlation tables that report the correlation
coefficients between lagged variables in levels (dependent and explanatory variables until the
fourth lag) and differenced variables Yit − Yit−1, Yit−1 − Yit−2, Xit−1 −Xit−2 are constructed
for the first-difference equation. Accordingly such tables are constructed for the variables
from the equation in levels but reporting the correlation between lagged first-differences and
variables in levels Yit, Yit−1 and Xit−1 (see Appendix A).
The deeper lags of level variables (for the first difference equation) and those of first
differences (for the level equation) have a larger probability of being weaker instruments, i.e.
being weekly correlated with endogenous regressors5. However, the first lags of instruments
might be highly correlated with the dependent variable Yit and its first difference Yit− Yit−1
which may cast a doubt on the orthogonality between instruments and errors. As mentioned
above, the deeper lags might be preferred to the lower ones because they provide a higher
probability of instrument independence from unobserved error process. Thus, when selecting
the instruments, the trade-off between the level of weakness of the instruments and their
exogeneity is taken into account.
Besides, the corresponding moment conditions can be tested if the system of equations is
overidentified6. It can be done via Hansen statistic in the presence of heteroscedasticity or via
Sargan statistic under the assumption of conditional homoscedasticity. Heteroscedasticity is
detected in these regressions, so it is the Hansen statistic that is reported in the resulting
5That is why the lags deeper than the fourth lag are not analysed.
6Overidentification here means that there is a surfeit of instruments.
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tables. The null hypothesis of the test implies that the instruments satisfy the orthogonality
conditions required for their employment (Baum et al., 2002), and that all together they are
valid instruments.
In order to additionally check the orthogonality of some instruments or subset of instru-
ments, the Difference-in-Sargan/Hansen statistic (or C-statistic) is analysed. That statistic
basically measures the difference in Sargan/Hansen statistics computed, on one hand, for
the regression with the full set of instruments, on the other hand, for the regression with a
particular (tested) set of instruments removed from the full one. The null hypothesis is that
of the valid subset of instruments.
The two-step robust regressions that normally produce asymptotically more efficient es-
timators are conducted7. It makes the estimators consistent in the presence of any pattern
of heteroscedasticity or autocorrelation.
2.5.3 Testing for underidentification and weak instruments
Empirical tests of overdientifying restrictions are often criticized for having a low power.
Besides, as highlighted by Bazzi and Clemens (2013), multiple instruments do not allow the
detect the possibility of the most valid instruments to be the weakest and the strongest to
be the the least valid.
Besides, the first stage regressions where endogenous variables are regressed on the full set
of instruments are examined. The Bound et al. (1995) F-statistics and ”partial” R2 as well as
the Shea’s partialR2 (which is is more relevant as there is more than one endogenous regressor
in the model) are analysed for several instrument subsets in order to choose sufficiently
relevant endogenous regressors.
The Bound et al. (1995) F-statistic allows us to measure the significance of a particular
instrument by excluding this instrument from the regression. It is the ”squared partial
correlation” between the excluded instrument or a subset of instruments and endogenous
regressor that is in question, RSSI1−RSSI
TSS
, where RSSI1 is the residual sum of squares in the
regression instrumented with I1, RSSI is the residual sum of squares in the regression with
the full set of instruments (see Baum et al., 2002 for more details).
However, it is not an efficient measure of the fit of regressions, if there are multiple
endogenous regressors in the model. The intercollerations among the regressors need to be
taken into account. The Shea’s partial R2 is a more consistent measure of the regression’s
fit in that case.
Thus, additional tests for identification and weak instruments are applied in the paper
7A finite-sample Windmeijer correction to the two-step covariance matrix is applied to correct otherwise
downward biased standard errors.
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following Bazzi and Clemens (2013); Stock and Yogo (2002). The strength of identifica-
tion is tested via the test of the rank of a matrix based on the Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rk
statistic. The test allows to check whether the equation is identified, i.e., that the excluded
instruments are correlated with the endogenous regressors. The null hypothesis of the test
is that the equation is underidentified, meaning when partialling out exogenous covariates
and other cross-correlations with endogenous variables and instruments, the weakest correla-
tion between an instrument and one of the endogenous variables does not contribute enough
variation to add a rank of the instrument matrix (Bazzi and Clemens, 2013). A rejection of
the null indicates that the matrix is full column rank and, thus, that the model is identified.
The p-values for the Kleibergen-Paap rk statistic under the assumption of heteroscedasticity
are presented in tables.
Another group of statistics includes Cragg-Donald Wald and Kleibergen-Paap Wald
statistics and allows to test for weak identification. In case of weak identification the corre-
lation between endogenous regressors and excluded instruments is small. However, Cragg-
Donald Wald statistic is only valid under the assumption of identically and independently
distributed errors (i.i.d.). Thus, it is mostly the second one Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistic
that is reported.
Following Stock and Yogo (2002), the definition of weak instruments in terms of the
relative bias is adopted. A group of instruments is weak if the bias of the IV estimator,
relative to the bias of ordinary least squares (OLS), exceeds a certain threshold (5%, 10% or
30% are reported). Relevant critical values for Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistic (thus, for
the case with robust standard errors) have not been tabulated. However, it is advised in the
literature (for instance, by Baum et al., 2007) to apply though with caution the Stock and
Yogo critical values initially tabulated for Cragg-Donald statistic. Stock and Yogo critical
values are not tabulated for cases with more than three endogenous variables. As in the
regressions from this paper there are mostly more than three endogenous variables entering
the regressions, the critical values are reported for the case of three endogenous variables,
an ultimate available number of instrumental variables and 5%, 10% and 30% maximal
bias of the IV estimator relative to OLS. Another way is to follow the original Staiger and
Stock (1997) rule-of-thumb that states that the F-statistic should exceed 10. Under the null
hypotheses the instruments are weak, and in order to reject the null hypothesis the calculated
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistic should exceed the critical value.
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3 Construction of the variables
3.1 Data description
To construct the sample of firms, U.S. domestically controlled commercial banks were
selected in DataStream. These financial firms operated on the U.S. market in U.S. dollars
and were still active in December of 2009. After selecting the variables needed for estimation
for the period between 1995 and 2011, around 600 commercial banks were left in the sample.
The data on bailouts (promised amount, actual disbursed amount, the date of entering
the program) and bailout reimbursement (amount repaid, date of repayment) is obtained
from the Treasury’s Office of Financial Stability.
The data from these two sources is merged. Bailouts under CPP were provided to
domestically controlled banks, bank holding companies, savings associations, and savings
and loans holding companies. Only actual disbursed amount is considered as a fact of the
bank bailout.
After outlier cleaning 550 banks were left in the sample.
3.2 Dependent variables
• Total loans (TL) growth rate ∆Ln(TL)it
The lending activity of the banks is measured through, first of all, the growth rate
(change in logarithms) of total loans (futher referred to as TL) to enterprises and
individuals. The data on volumes of loans was obtained from DataStream. Table 2
presents descriptive statistics for total loans growth rates during the crisis and normal
times. The annual means are reported in that table together with medians and stan-
dard deviations that are shown in brackets, respectively. Total loans growth (as well as
REML and CIL growth rates) is winsorised at 1% level to remove the effect of outliers.
Table 2 demonstrates the drop in average growth rates of lending between normal times
and the crisis of 2007. Across all banks from the sample average growth rate of total
loans dropped from 13.75% (10.54%)8 in the pre-crisis period (from 1995 to 2007) to
2.49% (1.41%) during the crisis (after 2007).
At first sight the fact of disbursement of CPP funds does not affect the growth rates
much. Nevertheless, it looks like the bailed-out banks exhibited higher average loan
growth rates before the crisis (14.81% (11.51%) relatively to 12.85% (9.69%), column
3, table 2) while smaller loan growth rates starting from 2008 relatively to the loan
8Median is reported in brackets.
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Table 2: Summary statistics on growth rates of loans
Bank 1995-2011 No Crisis Crisis
1995-2007 2008-2011
Growth rates of TL
All banks 10.81 (8.46;16.18) 13.75 (10.54;15.96) 2.49 (1.41;13.72)
Obs 8061 5958 2103
Bailed-out banks 11.38 (9.14;16.23) 14.81 (11.51;15.73) 2.00 (0.84;13.71)
Obs 3726 2727 999
Non-bailed banks 10.33 (7.87;16.12) 12.85 (9.69;16.11) 2.94 (1.96;13.73)
Obs 4335 3231 1104
Bailed-out banks that REPAID CPP
funds
11.70 (9.14;15.51) 14.63 (11.34;15.13) 3.63 (2.11;13.60)
Obs 2360 1732 628
Bailed-out banks that DID NOT RE-
PAY CPP funds
10.81 (9.17;17.40) 15.13 (11.81;16.72) -0.76 (-2.43;13.47)
Obs 1366 995 371
Growth rate of REML
All banks 12.08 (8.49;24.45) 15.08 (10.94;24.75) 3.67 (1.74;21.48)
Obs 7935 5849 2086
Bailed out banks 12.37 (8.77;24.49) 15.76 (11.35;24.50) 3.17 (0.53;21.97)
Obs 3686 2693 993
Non-bailed banks 11.84 (8.26;24.42) 14.51 (10.44;24.94) 4.13 (2.36;21.02)
Obs 4249 3156 1093
Bailed-out banks that REPAID CPP
funds
12.47 (8.99;24.06) 15.29 (11.26;24.25) 4.76 (2.46;21.75)
Obs 2343 1717 626
Bailed-out banks that DID NOT RE-
PAY CPP funds
12.18 (8.38;25.23) 16.58 (11.58;24.93) 0.47 (-2.35;22.11)
Obs 1343 976 367
Growth rate of CIL
All banks 11.79 (9.35;30.24) 15.59 (12.30;30.10) 1.40 (0.73;28.77)
Obs 7487 5482 2005
Bailed out banks 11.66 (9.81;27.49) 16.45 (13.20;27.56) -0.93 (0.09;24.25)
Obs 3554 2575 979
Non-bailed banks 11.90 (8.93;32.58) 14.82 (11.06;32.22) 3.62 (1.41;32.54)
Obs 3933 2907 1026
Bailed-out banks that REPAID CPP
funds
12.15 (9.71;25.24) 16.17 (12.77;25.79) 1.29 (1.18;21.26)
Obs 2287 1669 618
Bailed-out banks that DID NOT RE-
PAY CPP funds
10.78 (9.93;31.23) 16.96 (14.29;30.64) -4.71 (-4.07;28.58)
Obs 1267 906 361
Average annual growth rates (means) are presented in table; median and standard deviation are reported in brackets.
REML stands for Real Estate Mortgage Loans; CIL stands for Commercial and Industrial Loans.
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growth rates of non-bailed banks (2.00% (0.84%) relatively to 2.94% (1.96%), column
4, table 2).
Figures 1, 2 and 3 plot median TL, REML and CIL loan growth rates over time,
respectively, for the banks (i) that did not receive CPP funds; (ii) that received CPP
funds and repaid them totally by July 2012; (iii) that received CPP funds but did not
repay anything by July 2012.
They show that bailed-out banks that did not redeem their stocks from the Treasury
on average supplied more loans than other banks in the period between 2001 and 2008.
Banks that did not receive CPP funds on average exhibited the lowest total loans
growth rates in the period before 2008. However, the situation changed after 2008.
Bank that did not repurchase their shares from the Treasury exhibited the lowest
growth rates of loans, while loan growth rates started to rise at the banks that did not
receive CPP funds and those that repaid their CPP funds.
Figure 1: Median annual total loans growth rates
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This observation might be interpreted on a way that the banks with the highest loan
growth rates before the crisis were the ones applying for the CPP funds, not repaying
them and notably cutting lending during the crisis. At the same time, the banks that
repurchased their stakes from the Treasury managed to restore their acitivities and to
increase loan supply after 2009 (after 2010 in case of mortgage loans, table 2). Thus, it
looks like the lending pattern differs significantly during the crisis between non-bailed
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Figure 2: Median annual REML growth rates
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Figure 3: Median annual CIL growth rates
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banks and banks that received the CPP funds and repaid them totally, and banks that
did not repurchase their shares from the Treasury by July 2012.
The same trend is detected when analysing the summary statistics in table 2. The
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banks that did not repurchase their stakes from the U.S Treasury exhibited an average
negative loan growth during the crisis period, while those that repaid the CPP funds
had a positive but relatively small loan growth (-0.76% (-2.43%) compared to 3.63%
(2.11%), same table).
This may be due to the fact that the banks which did not repay the CPP funds
experienced larger financial problems than other banks and did not succeed in restoring
their lending activity partly because they might have been constrained by the need of
the future CPP funds repayment.
Overall this statistics confirms that, first of all, the lending pattern changes in a sig-
nificant way for the banks that participated in the CPP program and that did not,
especially when distinguishing between the pre-crisis and crisis periods.
• Real Estate Mortgage Loans (REML) growth rate ∆Ln(REML)it
REML represent the loans made to finance construction or to purchase real estate. It
includes residential, construction, commercial and other types of mortgages. The same
tendencies as for the total loans growth rates can be found in the detailed statistics
for the REML growth in table 2. Non-bailed banks are found to have higher average
growth rates of REML during the crisis (4.12% relatively to 3.17%, table 2), which is
the opposite in the pre-crisis period.
In crisis period the average growth rate of total loans at the banks that repaid the CPP
funds is more than three times smaller than in the pre-crisis period (4.76% relatively
to 15.29%, same table), while it is more than thirty five times smaller for the banks
that did not repay the CPP funds (0.47% relatively to 16.58%).
• Commercial and Industrial Loans (CIL) growth rate ∆Ln(CIL)it
Commercial and Industrial Loans (further referred to as CIL) are the loans made to
business and industry and include consumer, installment, financial and institutional
loans. This is the group of loans that experienced the largest reduction in its growth
rates during the crisis comparing to TL and REML. The CIL growth rate at bailed-out
banks becomes negative. It dropped from 16.45% to -0.92% (columns 3 and 4, table 2)
between the pre-crisis and crisis period. Non-bailed banks on average offered a smaller
amount of credit in the pre-crisis period but substantially larger amount of CIL after
2007 (the CIL growth rate is 14.82% and 3.62%, respectively).
This large decline in commercial and industrial lending among the bailed-out banks
was due to the very low lending activity of the banks that did not repay the CPP funds.
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The average CIL growth rate for them equals -4.71% in the crisis period comparing to
1.29% growth rate at the bailed-out banks that repaid CPP funds. Thus, the banks
that did not provide refund to the U.S. Treasury were the banks that cut their lending
the most during the crisis, especially in commercial and industrial loans (figure 3).
3.3 Individual bank-specific characteristics
3.3.1 Balance sheet characteristics
Bank balance sheet characteristics are financial statement variables that are often used to
evaluate the financial situation or status of the banks. These are the variables that are often
used in the literature on bank lending channel, determinants of bank’s financial fragility and
probability of default models such as Moody’s RiskCalc v3.1 U.S. Banks model (Dwyer et al.,
2006). Several main indicators included in the regressions capture the level of capitalisation
of the banks, their size, liquidity and overall financial health.
All individual bank-specific characteristics are demeaned. That means that the annual
averages across all banks are subtracted from each bank-specific characteristics BSCit −
BSCt. That is done following Brei et al. (2011) in order the parameter estimates of Models
1 and 2 to be interpreted as the impact on the average bank. The correlation coefficients
between the within-transformed dependent variables Yit − Yi and within-transformed main
lagged regressors (BSCit − BSCi) as well as their interactions with dummies are presented
in tables 4-6.
• Altman’s Z-score
Z-score indicator that represents the level of distress of each firm is calculated herein.
Altman’s Bankruptcy model suggests an index based on the five main financial ratios
where weight of each variables defined using discriminant analysis:
Z = 0.012X1 + 0.014X2 + 0.033X3 + 0.006X4 + 0.999X5 (9)
where X1 is the ratio of difference between current assets and current liabilities to total
assets; X2 is the ratio of retained earnings to total assets; X3 is the ratio of earnings
before interest and taxes (EBIT) to total assets; X4 is the ratio of market value of
equity to total liabilities; X5 is the ratio of sales to total assets. Higher Z-score is
interpreted as an indicator of a ”safer” or, in other words, more financially healthy
firm, while lower Z-score indicates high level of distress of the firm (see summary
statistics in table 3).
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Table 3: Summary statistics
Variable Name Obs Mean Std.
Dev.
Min. Max.
Growth rate of loans
Total loans growth,
winsorised at 1%
∆ln(TL) 8061 10.81 16.18 -23.24 81.14
REML growth,
winsorised at 1%
∆ln(REML) 7935 12.08 24.45 -57.08 127.25
CIL growth,
winsorised at 1%
∆ln(CIL) 7487 11.79 40.24 -133.17 182.61
Balance sheet characteristics
Altman’s Z-score Zit 7079 0.30 0.13 -1.74 3.13
Capital ratio,
winsorised at 1%
TE
TA it
8567 10.25 4.28 3.05 31.80
MBS to total assets MBS
TA it
8225 9.38 9.82 0 74.25
TSM to total assets TSM
TA it
7504 6.78 7.26 0 58.61
Size Sizeit 8556 13.51 1.67 3.00 21.54
Individual demand sensitivity
Sensitivity to ∆GDP
per state
Sensit 11492 10.44 22.33 -29.33 110.16
Macroeconomic conditions
GDP growth ∆GDPt 10816 2.38 1.92 -3.12 4.71
Change in the Federal
Funds rate
∆INTt 10816 -0.34 1.70 -4.58 2.00
Other control variables
Crisis dummy Ct 12223 0.23 0.42 0 1
Bailout dummy Bi 11492 0.41 0.49 0 1
Repayment dummy Ri 4726 0.61 0.49 0 1
Bailout and crisis
dummy interaction
Bi ∗ Ct 11492 0.10 0.29 0 1
Repayment and crisis
dummy interaction
Ri ∗ Ct 4726 0.14 0.35 0 1
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Z-score includes information on bank’s liabilities, earnings etc. That is one of the key
determinants of the bank’s financial stability and, thus, the credit offer by the bank.
It allows to determine whether safer and more financially healthy banks supported the
supply of credit in the presence of the crisis. The safer banks might exhibit a lower
loan growth in normal times as they grant few risky and subprime loans. However,
in the crisis period such banks might have an easier access to external financing as
they possess a better collateral9 and exhibit a greater probability to satisfy the capital
requirements.
• Capital ratio
The level of capitalisation of each bank is measured through the equity to total assets
ratio. This ratio is the most broad measure of bank capital. It is preferred to total
capital and tier one-based capital ratios due to the data availability (there is less
information on risk-weighted assets than on total assets).
Besides, adequacy ratios are the targeted capital ratios due to the bank capital re-
quirements. Thus, banks tend to adjust their level of exposure to risky assets which
in large part is based on altering the composition of the bank’s loan portfolio. In that
case the probability of endogeneity between the capital ratio and dependent variable
is rising, making it more difficult to obtain the unbiased parameter estimates.
The equity-to-assets ratio is winsorised at 1% level. After winsorization procedure the
average capital ratio is around 10.25% (table 3). It is expected that better capitalised
banks provide more loans during hard times (crisis period). Indeed, the correlation
between the growth rates of total loans and captial ratio is postive (0.13, table 4).
Moreover, more capitalised banks, in case they were bailed out, are expected to exhibit
higher loan growth rates than non-bailed banks.
• Size
Bank size is measured as a logarithm of the bank’s total assets. On one hand, larger
banks tend to be more resilient to shocks as they own a more diversified portfolio of
assets. Besides, larger banks might be less sensitive to the changes in credit demand
and withdrawal of deposits as they are considered ”too big to fail”. By the same
token larger banks receive more support in terms of recapitalisation funds (see Isyuk,
2013a). On the other hand, the losses of larger banks might be more significant than
9That argument is in line with the logics of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) model where they highlight the
role of collateral for the access to credit market.
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Table 4: Correlation coefficients for within-transformed dependent and main explanatory variables with no interactions
Var ∆ln
(TL)it
∆ln
(REML)it
∆ln
(CIL)it
∆ln
(TL)it−1
∆ln
(REML)it−1
∆ln
(CIL)it−1
Zit−1
TE
TA it−1
Sizeit−1
MBS
TA it−1
TSM
TA it−1
Sensit−1 Ct Bi BiCt Ri RiCt GDPt−1 FFt−1 Beta
∆ln(TL)it 1.00
∆ln
(REML)it
0.67 1.00
∆ln
(CIL)it
0.35 -0.10 1.00
∆ln
(TL)it−1
0.44 0.31 0.13 1.00
∆ln
(REML)it−1
0.30 0.14 0.13 0.68 1.00
∆ln
(CIL)it−1
0.19 0.17 -0.01 0.36 -0.08 1.00
Zit−1 0.28 0.20 0.13 0.16 0.11 0.09 1.00
TE
TA it−1
0.13 0.08 0.09 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.48 1.00
Sizeit−1 -0.30 -0.20 -0.15 -0.14 -0.08 -0.10 -0.23 -0.13 1.00
MBS
TA it−1
-0.03 -0.03 -0.00 -0.14 -0.08 -0.05 -0.10 -0.01 0.14 1.00
TSM
TA it−1
0.13 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.05 0.05 0.10 -0.00 -0.26 -0.24 1.00
Sensit−1 0.26 0.15 0.14 0.22 0.15 0.12 0.21 0.17 -0.29 -0.06 0.05 1.00
Ct -0.23 -0.14 -0.12 -0.11 -0.07 -0.07 -0.13 -0.04 0.42 -0.03 -0.15 -0.38 1.00
Bi 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.02 -0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.06 -0.16 -0.04 -0.08 0.00 1.00
BiCt -0.13 -0.07 -0.08 -0.05 -0.03 -0.06 -0.13 -0.02 0.34 -0.05 -0.12 -0.25 0.64 0.44 1.00
Ri 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.04 0.05 0.02 -0.05 0.02 -0.03 0.70 0.27 1.00
RiCt -0.09 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 -0.04 -0.10 0.03 0.28 -0.03 -0.11 -0.17 0.48 0.33 0.76 0.48 1.00
GDPt−1 0.32 0.20 0.16 0.25 0.15 0.14 0.31 0.10 -0.41 -0.11 0.17 0.38 -0.62 -
0.01
-
0.41
0.02 -
0.32
1.00
FFt−1 0.23 0.14 0.11 0.20 0.11 0.12 0.28 0.06 -0.15 -0.11 0.08 0.50 -0.38 -
0.01
-
0.26
-
0.00
-
0.20
0.84 1.00
Betai,2002−20070.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.07 0.41 -0.05 -0.10 0.09 -0.05 0.32 0.10 0.37 0.16 0.05 0.04 1.00
This table reports the correlation coefficients for within-transformed variables.
The correlation coefficients between dependent and explanatory variables smaller than 0.1 in their absolute values are highlighted in grey.
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those of smaller banks during the crisis due to their greater exposure to the market of
derivatives.
• Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS)
There are two proxies for the level of liquidity that are considered in this model.
Both are included in the liquidity indicator proposed by the Moody’s RiskCalc v3.1
U.S. Banks model (Dwyer et al., 2006). However, here it is suggested to distinguish
between mortgage-backed securities and treasury and municipal securities due to their
different positions during the recent crisis.
Moody’s RiskCalc v3.1 U.S. Banks model (Dwyer et al., 2006) and Basel II regula-
tion classified mortgage-backed securities (MBS) as safe and liquid holdings. That was
indeed the case at the time, MBSs also included government mortgages provided by
Government National Mortgage Association or other U.S. Federal agencies. In normal
times MBS were highly liquid assets that were widely traded, while with accelerat-
ing speed of subprime defaults and consequential foreclosures significant part of them
became highly risky or even ”toxic”.
Mortgage-backed securities in levels are normalised by total assets and are expected to
positively affect loan growth rates before 2008 but negatively during the crisis. After
2008 MBS are expected to become a financial burden on the balance sheet of the banks
that might lead to the scarce credit offer by such banks.
The correlation tables 4, 5 and 6, however, suggest only a weak correlation between
the share of MBS in total assets and loan growth rates (-0.03, table 4). Thus, when
choosing between MBS and the share of Treasury securities in the bank portfolio, the
latter one is selected for the inclusion in final regressions.
• Treasury and Municipal Securities (TSM) include the loans made to federal,
state and/or municipal government. As they represent the government debt issued
by the U.S. Treasury, that type of securities remained the most liquid and secure
during the crisis. The ”flight to security” that occurred due to the turbulence at the
financial markets only strengthened the position of government-issued debt. Thus, the
banks with larger amounts of Treasury and municipal securities in their asset portfolios
had stronger and more liquid positions during the crisis, that could be translated
into the more intensive lending activity. The correlation coefficients from tables 4, 5
and 6 between dependent variables and the shares of Treasury securities confirm that
argument. Correlation with growth rates of total loans reaches 0.13 in normal times,
0.15 in crisis period and 0.11 for the bailed-out banks (tables 4, 5 and 6 respectively).
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Table 5: Correlation coefficients for within-transformed dependent and main explanatory variables interacted with crisis dummy
Var ∆ln
(TL)it
∆ln
(REML)it
∆ln
(CIL)it
Zit−1 ∗
C
TE
TA it−1
∗
C
Sizeit−1∗
C
MBS
TA it−1
∗
C
TSM
TA it−1
∗
C
Sensit−1∗
C
Ct Bi BiCt Ri RiCt GDPt−1FFt−1
∆ln
(TL)it
1.00
∆ln
(REML)it
0.68 1.00
∆ln
(CIL)it
0.37 -0.07 1.00
Zit−1 ∗ C 0.25 0.18 0.11 1.00
TE
TA it−1
∗ C 0.13 0.08 0.09 0.49 1.00
Sizeit−1 ∗ C -0.28 -0.20 -0.14 -0.29 -0.07 1.00
MBS
TA it−1
∗C -0.04 -0.05 -0.00 -0.12 0.02 0.13 1.00
TSM
TA it−1
∗C 0.15 0.10 0.07 0.17 -0.07 -0.38 -0.23 1.00
Sensit−1 ∗ C 0.21 0.12 0.12 0.21 0.23 -0.38 -0.04 0.09 1.00
Ct -0.23 -0.14 -0.12 -0.09 -0.07 0.46 0.00 -0.28 -0.37 1.00
Bi 0.04 0.01 0.02 -0.06 0.03 0.09 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 0.01 1.00
BiCt -0.13 -0.07 -0.09 -0.12 -0.02 0.37 -0.03 -0.21 -0.25 0.64 0.44 1.00
Ri 0.05 0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.10 0.06 -0.01 -0.04 0.02 -0.02 0.70 0.27 1.00
RiCt -0.09 -0.05 -0.06 -0.09 0.05 0.31 -0.03 -0.18 -0.16 0.49 0.33 0.76 0.48 1.00
GDPt−1 0.31 0.20 0.16 0.30 0.10 -0.52 -0.10 0.29 0.49 -0.62 -0.01 -0.41 0.01 -0.32 1.00
FFt−1 0.22 0.13 0.11 0.29 0.09 -0.39 -0.10 0.21 0.46 -0.38 -0.01 -0.26 -0.00 -0.20 0.84 1.00
The correlation coefficients between dependent and explanatory variables smaller than 0.1 in their absolute values are highlighted in grey.
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Table 6: Correlation coefficients for within-transformed dependent and main explanatory variables interacted with bailout
dummy
Var ∆ln
(TL)it
∆ln
(REML)it
∆ln
(CIL)it
Zit−1 ∗
B
TE
TA it−1
∗
B
Sizeit−1∗
B
MBS
TA it−1
∗
B
TSM
TA it−1
∗
B
Sensit−1∗
B
Ct Bi BiCt Ri RiCt GDPt−1FFt−1
∆ln
(TL)it
1.00
∆ln
(REML)it
0.68 1.00
∆ln
(CIL)it
0.37 -0.07 1.00
Zit−1 ∗ B 0.22 0.16 0.10 1.00
TE
TA it−1
∗ B 0.10 0.06 0.08 0.46 1.00
Sizeit−1 ∗ B -0.24 -0.16 -0.11 -0.24 -0.07 1.00
MBS
TA it−1
∗B -0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.14 -0.02 0.13 1.00
TSM
TA it−1
∗B 0.11 0.07 0.04 0.15 0.05 -0.38 -0.22 1.00
Sensit−1 ∗ B 0.19 0.10 0.11 0.23 0.12 -0.32 -0.04 0.10 1.00
Ct -0.23 -0.14 -0.12 -0.13 -0.03 0.30 -0.06 -0.12 -0.28 1.00
Bi 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.05 -0.02 0.32 0.01 -0.24 -0.11 0.00 1.00
BiCt -0.13 -0.07 -0.09 -0.15 -0.05 0.52 -0.07 -0.25 -0.40 0.64 0.44 1.00
Ri 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.25 0.02 -0.20 -0.05 -0.02 0.70 0.27 1.00
RiCt -0.09 -0.05 -0.06 -0.11 0.03 0.42 -0.05 -0.22 -0.28 0.49 0.33 0.76 0.48 1.00
GDPt−1 0.31 0.20 0.16 0.26 0.04 -0.30 -0.07 0.13 0.44 -0.62 -0.01 -0.41 0.01 -0.32 1.00
FFt−1 0.22 0.13 0.11 0.22 0.00 -0.12 -0.08 0.05 0.38 -0.38 -0.01 -0.26 -0.00 -0.20 0.84 1.00
The correlation coefficients between dependent and explanatory variables smaller than 0.1 in their absolute values are highlighted in grey.
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3.3.2 Sensitivity to demand shock on bank products
Most of the literature on bank lending including Brei et al. (2011); Berrospide and Edge
(2010) focuses on the financial determinants of the bank credit supply. Demand factors are
mostly captured via inclusion of the GDP growth rate, inflation and interest rates and other
aggregate macroeconomic characteristics. In this article one of the core determinants of the
credit supply are heterogeneous reactions of financial institutions to the shock on aggregate
demand. These individual bank sensitivities allow to gauge the impact of decline in demand
for credits on the bank loan growth.
First the cross-sectional demand sensitivities are constructed following Claessens et al.
(2012). Each bank’s net income growth is regressed on the change in real GDP of the state
where the bank is headquartered (in the period between 1990 and 2006):
∆NIi,1990−2006 = αi + βi∆ ln(RGDPST,1990−2006) + ǫi,1990−2006 (10)
where βi = ǫGDP = ǫ ∆NIi,1990−2006
∆RGDPST,1990−2006
is the slope or sensitivity of change in bank’s net income
to real GDP growth in the state where the bank is headquartered. The alternative measure
of this index contains the data on personal income instead of real GDP.
The idea beyond the first step is to estimate the impact of an increase in real GDP on
bank revenues during 16 years prior to crisis. Secondly, the cross-sectional sensitivity is
converted into individual bank sensitivity by multiplying the βi
10 estimated from Equation
10 by annual real GDP growth of the state where the bank is headquartered ∆ ln(GDPST,t).
The correlation coefficients from table 4 confirm that sensitivity to demand shock is
highly and positively correlated with growth rates of TL, REML and CIL (the coefficients
are 0.26, 0.15 and 0.14, respectively, table 4).
3.4 Dummies and macroeconomic variables
• Dummies
– Crisis dummy is the dummy that takes on a value of 1 in the period from 2008
until 2011. It is longer than the conventional view on the crisis mostly suggests
(between 2008-2009). Nevertheless, here the period is extended in order to capture
the post-crisis period with sluggish economic growth during which the banks were
supposed to recover and to support the credit offer to enterprises and individuals.
Each bank-specific variable is interacted with the crisis dummy and both bailout
10βi basically represents the change in net income of the bank when GDP rises by one unit.
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and crisis dummy (or repayment and crisis dummy for Model 2). The dummy
itself and its interactions with other dummies are also included in the regressions.
– Bailout dummy is the dummy that takes on two values, 0 and 1 (see table 2)
to distinguish between the banks that did not receive CPP funds and those that
did. Banks that have finally received CPP funds applied for Capital Purchase
Program (CPP), have been approved for funding and then accepted the funds.
Out of around 600 banks in the sample approximately 318 banks did not receive
the CPP funds, while around 278 banks did.
– Repayment dummy is the binary variable that is equal to 1 if the bailed-out
bank had repurchased its stake from the U.S. Treasury by July 2012; 0 otherwise.
Regressions with repayment dummy and interactions of the bank-specific variables
with that dummy are only run on the limited sample of bailed-out banks. 169
banks out of 278 banks (more than 60%) which received the CPP funds have
reimbursed it by July 2012.
• Macroeconomic variables
– Real annual GDP growth accounts for time-fixed effects in the sample. The lending
activity of the banks is expected to expand in the years with higher rates of
production growth reflecting increasing population wealth and improvement of
the state of economy in general.
– Change in 3-months London Interbank Overnight Rate (LIBOR) reflects the ten-
dencies and changes in macroeconomic policies that are spilled over to the inter-
bank markets. It is a principal component of the bank lending channel literature
that discusses the short-term effects of monetary policies on the changes in bank
lending. Banks borrowing from the central bank or from the interbank markets, in
case of abundant capital and low interest rates, tend to lower the interest rates on
credits that in turn leads to higher investments and more intensive bank lending
activity. The effect is the opposite in case of a rise of the interest rates.
However, these two macroeconomic variables cannot be included simultaneously in the
regressions due to the high correlation between them (it reaches 0.84, table 4). That
correlation arises due to the countercyclical nature of monetary policy: the central
bank tends to increase the interest rates in the periods of intensive growth and to lower
the interest rates during the recession. Hence, most of the regressions are conducted
including only GDP growth.
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4 Results
4.1 Mundlak-Krishnakumar Estimator
In this section Models 1 and 2 are estimated using Mundlak-Krishnakumar estimator.
It allows, first of all, to obtain the estimators for time-invariant variables (such as bailout
dummy and repayment dummy) and, second, to distinguish between endogenous and exoge-
nous variables through the estimated parameters β̂B − β̂W (see Equation 7).
Results for two groups of regressions 1 and 2 with robust standard errors are reported
in tables 7 and 8 respectively. Recall that the first group of regressions is run on the full
sample of banks and distinguishes between bailed-out and non-bailed banks in normal and
crisis times. The second group of regressions is run on the subsample of bailed-out banks
separating the banks that repaid CPP funds and from those that did not pay anything by
July, 2012, both in crisis and normal times.
Variables for which the estimated parameter β̂B − β̂W (thus, coefficient for respective
means of the variables) is small and t-statistic is close to zero (here parameters with t-
statistic smaller than one are chosen) are highlighted in gray in tables 7 and 8 and used then
as instrumental variables in Hausman and Taylor (1981) model.
In general the coefficients for main variables as well as for interactions of main variables
with crisis dummy reported in both tables 7 and 8 are less significant than those obtained in
fixed effect regression in the previous section. However, the signs of the coefficients remain
similar.
Table 7: Mundlak-Krishnakumar Estimator - The effects of CPP funds disbursement and
crisis on bank lending activity (without autoregressive component)
Var ∆TL ∆TL ∆REML ∆REML ∆CIL ∆CIL
Time-fixed Macro var Time-fixed Macro var Time-fixed Macro var
Individual bank characteristics: non-bailed banks, normal times (δ)
Zit−1 -0.94 -0.93 -1.82* -1.62 1.34 1.34
(-1.20) (-1.28) (-1.65) (-1.60) (0.80) (0.76)
TE
TA it−1
3.65*** 4.17*** 4.51*** 5.11*** 7.09*** 7.82***
(5.55) (6.15) (4.72) (5.18) (3.55) (3.86)
TSM
TA it−1
0.28 0.56 0.14 0.35 0.98 1.40
(0.59) (1.18) (0.19) (0.55) (0.87) (1.13)
Sizeit−1 -19.38*** -18.53*** -19.52*** -18.38*** -18.07*** -18.14***
(8.63) (8.62) (5.92) (5.76) (3.74) (3.49)
Sensit−1 4.08*** 4.08*** 3.87** 3.65** 5.37** 5.16**
(4.63) (4.87) (2.33) (2.36) (2.07) (1.98)
Individual bank characteristics: non-bailed banks, crisis (δ∗, δ + δ∗ in square brackets)
Zit−1 ∗ Ct 4.72*** [3.78] 3.74*** [2.81] 6.32*** [ 4.51] 5.41*** [3.78] -0.39 [0.95] -0.99 [0.36]
(3.75) (3.02) (3.31) (2.93) (-0.11) (-0.28)
TE
TA it−1
∗ Ct -0.21 [3.44] 0.82 [4.98] -1.80 [2.71] -0.86[4.25] 7.39* [14.48] 8.08* [15.90]
(-0.13) (0.54) (-0.85) (-0.41) (1.67) (1.86)
TSM
TA it−1
∗ Ct 1.54* [1.82] 0.91 [1.47] 0.91 [1.05] 0.28 [0.63] 2.10 [3.08] 1.40 [2.80]
Continued on next page
32
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2014.62
Table 7 – Continued from previous page
Var ∆TL ∆TL ∆REML ∆REML ∆CIL ∆CIL
Time-fixed Macro var Time-fixed Macro var Time-fixed Macro var
(1.89) (1.11) (0.78) (0.24) (0.82) (0.54)
Sizeit−1 ∗ Ct -1.61* [-20.99] -0.94 [-19.47] -3.53***[-23.06] -2.91**[-21.30] 1.45 [-16.63] 1.95 [-16.19]
(-1.70) (-0.97) (-2.67) (-2.17) (0.54) (0.73)
Sensit−1 ∗ Ct -3.01**[1.07] -2.36* [1.72] -4.08* [-0.21] -3.44 [0.21] 1.72 [7.09] 2.15 [7.31]
(-2.19) (-1.74) (-1.86) (-1.63) (0.38) (0.49)
Individual bank characteristics: bailed-out banks, normal times (ω, δ + ω in square brackets)
Zit−1 ∗Bi 1.56 [0.62] 0.50 [0.58] 3.32** [ 1.51] 3.18* [1.56] 0.16 [1.50] -0.07 [1.27]
(1.29) (1.25) (1.97) (1.89) (0.06) (-0.02)
TE
TA it−1
∗Bi -1.03 [2.62] -2.36** [ 1.80] -3.22** [1.29] -4.73***[ 0.39] 0.43*[7.52] -0.99 [6.83]
(-1.01) (-2.22) (-1.98) (-2.72) (0.15) (-0.33)
TSM
TA it−1
∗Bi 1.12* [1.40] 0.91 [1.47] 1.68* [1.82] 1.47 [1.82] -2.52 [-1.54] -3.01 [-1.61]
(1.66) (1.37) (1.78) (1.50) (-1.41) (-1.61)
Sizeit−1 ∗Bi -1.94 [-21.31] -3.21 [-21.74] -2.69 [-22.21] -3.08 [-21.46] 1.43 [-16.64] 0.70 [-17.44]
(-0.75) (-1.22) (-0.70) (-0.79) (0.25) (0.11)
Sensit−1 ∗Bi 1.72 [5.80] 1.50 [5.59] 1.29 [5.16] 1.29 [4.94] -0.43 [ 4.94] -0.64 [4.51]
(1.33) (1.20) (0.56) (0.57) (-0.12) (-0.17)
Individual bank characteristics: bailed-out banks, crisis (ω∗, δ + δ∗ + ω + ω∗ in square brackets)
Zit−1 ∗Bi ∗ Ct -2.12 [3.22] -0.78 [3.53] -1.71 [6.12] -0.42 [6.54] -1.56 [-0.44] -0.83 [-0.55]
(-1.27) (-0.46) (-0.68) (-0.17) (-0.37) (-0.20)
TE
TA it−1
2.36 [4.77] 2.62* [5.24] 3.65 [3.14] 3.74 [3.27] -4.00 [10.91] -3.09 [11.82]
∗Bi ∗ Ct (1.08) (1.20) (1.16) (1.21) (-0.69) (-0.54)
TSM
TA it−1
-1.75 [1.19] -0.70 [1.68] -3.43** [-0.70] -2.31 [-0.21] 1.40 [ 1.96] 2.52 [2.31]
Bi ∗ Ct (-1.57) (-0.69) (-1.90) (-1.23) (0.11) (0.43)
Sizeit−1 -0.12 [-22.64] -1.29 [-23.99] 0.02 [-25.01] -1.19 [-25.75] -1.40 [-16.74] -3.12 [-19.19]
∗Bi ∗ Ct (0.49) (-0.81) (0.24) (-0.54) (-0.25) (-0.68)
Sensit−1 -2.58 [0.21] -2.58 [0.64] -1.29 [-0.21] -1.50 [0.00] -6.02 [0.64] -6.45 [0.21]
∗Bi ∗ Ct (-1.46) (-1.38) (-0.49) (-0.58) (-1.14) (-1.16)
Macroeconomic conditions
Ct -11.24*** -7.77*** -13.08*** -9.03*** -8.57*** -6.31***
(-11.03) (-10.17) (-7.99) (-8.54) (-2.70) (-3.05)
Bi 1.07 1.21* -0.26 -0.12 2.85** 2.59*
(1.57) (1.73) (-0.30) (-0.14) (2.07) (1.81)
Bi ∗ Ct 1.45 1.05 3.26** 2.78** -2.74 -2.61
(1.57) (1.10) (2.48) (2.09) (-1.08) (-1.02)
∆GDPt−1 1.23*** 1.05*** 1.83***
(12.14) (5.08) (4.99)
Means
Mean Zit−1 -48.79*** -43.71*** -50.90*** -48.53*** -69.21*** -65.96**
(-4.31) (-3.36) (-4.11) (-3.67) (-2.86) (-2.55)
Mean TE
TA it−1
-0.06 -0.22 -0.17 -0.33 0.16 -0.02
(-0.19) (-0.66) (-0.49) (-0.92) (0.25) (-0.04)
Mean Sizeit−1 12.13*** 11.49*** 11.37*** 10.68*** 11.59*** 11.51***
(8.63) (8.62) (5.92) (5.76) (3.74) (3.49)
TSM
TA it−1
-0.14 -0.17 -0.07 -0.10 -0.48** -0.54**
(-1.19) (-1.42) (-0.45) (-0.69) (-2.33) (-2.57)
Mean -0.08 -0.07 0.05 0.06 -0.28* -0.27*
Sensit−1 (-1.29) (-1.08) (0.57) (0.71) (-1.92) (-1.80)
Mean Zit−1 ∗Ct 7.87 4.35 9.58 7.80 35.12 31.06
(0.45) (0.24) (0.46) (0.38) (1.04) (0.89)
Mean 2.52*** 2.18** 2.52** 2.11* -0.38 -0.60
TE
TA it−1
∗ Ct (2.73) (2.35) (2.28) (1.92) (-0.18) (-0.28)
Mean 2.56 3.25 6.34 6.15 3.74 4.53
Sizeit−1 ∗ Ct (0.94) (1.19) (1.62) (1.58) (0.61) (0.73)
Mean -0.77 -0.63 -0.44 -0.23 -1.44 -1.26
TSM
TA it−1
∗ Ct (-1.63) (-1.34) (-0.74) (-0.38) (-1.55) (-1.34)
Mean 1.38 1.27 -1.41 -1.51 1.91 1.82
Continued on next page
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Table 7 – Continued from previous page
Var ∆TL ∆TL ∆REML ∆REML ∆CIL ∆CIL
Time-fixed Macro var Time-fixed Macro var Time-fixed Macro var
Sensit−1 ∗ Ct (1.27) (1.15) (-1.13) (-1.19) (0.75) (0.67)
Mean 7.73 2.93 -0.62 -4.51 46.67 49.33
Zit−1 ∗Bi (0.48) (0.17) (-0.03) (-0.23) (1.45) (1.46)
Mean 0.45 0.82 0.98* 1.39** -0.24 0.01
TE
TA it−1
∗Bi (0.91) (1.63) (1.69) (2.31) (-0.27) (0.01)
Mean -0.03 0.95 0.53 1.03 -3.72 -3.08
Sizeit−1 ∗Bi (-0.02) (0.50) (0.20) (0.39) (-1.01) (-0.77)
Mean 0.18 0.18 0.07 0.09 0.57* 0.63**
TSM
TA it−1
∗Bi (1.15) (1.09) (0.35) (0.45) (1.81) (1.97)
Mean 0.02 0.02 -0.08 -0.09 0.15 0.16
Sensit−1 ∗Bi (0.32) (0.23) (-0.69) (-0.80) (0.88) (0.90)
Mean 26.44 30.05 -0.01 4.24 31.52 33.56
Zit−1 ∗Bi ∗ Ct (0.80) (0.91) (-0.00) (0.10) (0.64) (0.67)
Mean -3.81** -4.09*** -3.58** -3.74** -1.57 -1.89
TE
TA it−1
∗Bi ∗Ct (-2.54) (-2.78) (-2.02) (-2.14) (-0.54) (-0.64)
Mean 3.88 3.89 6.35 6.05 8.00 7.64
Sizeit−1∗Bi∗Ct (0.90) (0.88) (1.06) (1.01) (1.00) (0.93)
Mean -1.88** -2.03** -1.66* -1.98** -0.68 -0.94
TSM
TA it−1
∗ Bi ∗
Ct
(-2.26) (-2.46) (-1.70) (-1.99) (-0.50) (-0.68)
Mean -0.17 -0.09 2.91 2.97 0.10 0.28
Sensit−1 ∗ Bi ∗
Ct
(-0.11) (-0.06) (1.52) (1.49) (0.04) (0.09)
Constant 11.03*** 9.87*** 13.33*** 12.08*** 11.07*** 9.14***
(16.29) (15.73) (12.86) (13.62) (5.99) (6.24)
Overall R2 0.35 0.32 0.18 0.15 0.11 0.10
Obs 5637 5495 5619 5478 5344 5218
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses; ***, ** and* denote p-value less than 0.1%, 1% and 5% respectively.
In normal times higher capitalisation of the bank is associated with higher growth rates
of lending both for non-bailed and bailed-out banks. A one percentage point increase in the
bank capital ratio leads to a 3.6-4.2% increase (columns 2 and 3, section ”non-bailed banks,
normal times”, table 7) in total lending for non-bailed banks and to a 1.8-2.6% rise (columns
2 and 3, section ”bailed-out banks, normal times”, table 7) in total lending for bailed-out
banks.
During the crisis more capitalised bailed-out banks tend to increase lending to a slightly
larger extent than non-bailed banks. A one percentage point increase in bank capital is
associated with a 4.8-5.2% faster total loans growth (columns 2 and 3, section ”bailed-out
banks, crisis”, table 7) for the average bailed-out bank during the crisis comparing to that
of 3.4-5.0% (columns 2 and 3, section ”non-bailed banks, crisis”, table 7) for the average
non-bailed bank.
The same pattern is recognised for the growth rates of mortgage and commercial and
industrial lending. During the crisis non-bailed banks tend to increase mortgage lending by
2.7-4.2% (columns 4 and 5, section ”non-bailed banks, crisis”, table 7) with one percentage
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point rise in bank capital ratio relative to a 4.5-5.1% rise (columns 4 and 5, section ”non-
bailed banks, normal times”, table 7) in normal times. During the crisis bailed-out banks
increase mortgage lending by 3.1-3.3% (columns 4 and 5, section ”bailed-out banks, crisis”,
table 7) with one percentage point rise in bank’s level of capitalisation comparing to a 0.4-
1.3% rise (columns 4 and 5, section ”bailed-out banks, normal times”, table 7) in normal
times.
Results also suggest that in the period before 2007 bailed-out banks are reluctant to
translate additional capital into new mortgage loans preferring instead to support commercial
and industrial lending. Recall that in Isyuk, 2013a it was found that the growth rates of real
estate mortgage loans are highly and negatively correlated to the growth rates of commercial
and industrial loans. This fact was interpreted as a ”specialisation” of the bank according
to the dominant loan types in the bank’s portfolio. That interpretation suggests that during
the crisis the banks specialised in commercial and industrial lending with an additional
unit of capital tend to offer more loans than the banks specialised in mortgage lending.
Moreover, it also shows that obtained results are in line with those from Isyuk, 2013a. In
the latter one it was reported that banks that specialised in commercial and industrial loans
were more likely to be bailed out, while at the same time they tended to exhibit a higher
probability of repurchasing their shares from the Treasury than other banks. In that sense
it is not surprising that these banks were more likely to expand the lines of commercial and
industrial loans.
Demand factor has a positive impact on growth rates of loans in normal times, while it
almost totally disappears for the bailed-out banks during the crisis. A one point increase in
sensitivity to demand shock leads to a 4.1% (columns 2 and 3, section ”non-bailed banks,
normal times”, table 7) faster total loans growth for non-bailed banks in normal times
relatively to a 1.1-1.7% rise (columns 2 and 3, section ”non-bailed banks, crisis”, table 7)
during the crisis. The same increase in demand sensitivity for bailed-out banks is associated
with a 5.6-5.8% rise (columns 2 and 3, section ”bailed-out banks, normal times”, table 7) in
total lending in normal times, while only with a 0.2-0.6% increase in growth rates of total
loans during the crisis (columns 2 and 3, section ”bailed-out banks, crisis”, table 7).
This result means that while more capitalised bailed-out banks exhibited higher growth
rates of loans, demand for loans at bailed-out banks declined more that that at non-bailed
banks. The explanation may be related to the unwillingness of the borrowers to take loans at
bailed-out banks. It can be due to the expectations of CPP funds repayments and uncertainty
concerning the bank’s future. It seems that the fact of the bank’s bailout (especially for
smaller banks) was considered by the borrowers a bad sign regarding the bank’s financial
situation, and they preferred to get their credits at other banks.
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Similar to the results of fixed effects regression, size of the bank has a negative impact
on credit offer. Larger banks provide less loans in normal times and this effect is amplified
during the crisis.
When analysing separately the banks that repaid CPP funds and the banks that did not
repay anything by July 2012, it looks like well capitalised banks that did not repay CPP
funds lend more than the banks that repaid CPP funds, both in normal times and during
the crisis. Banks that did not repurchase their stakes from the U.S. Treasury by July 2012
increase their lending by 2.1-2.6% (columns 2 and 3, section ”bank that did not repay CPP
funds, normal times”, table 8) in normal times and by 4.8-6.1% (columns 2 and 3, section
”bank that did not repay CPP funds, crisis”, table 8) during the crisis with one percentage
point increase in capital ratio. Banks that repaid CPP funds with one percentage point
increase in capitalisation raise their total lending by 0.9-1.4% (columns 2 and 3, section
”bank that repaid CPP funds, normal times”, table 8) in normal times compared to 2.4-3%
(columns 2 and 3, section ”bank that repaid CPP funds, crisis”, table 8) during the crisis.
The same trend is found for mortgage and commercial loans growth rates.
Drop in consumer’s demand has a negative impact on growth rates of loans, especially
during the crisis. For the average bank that repaid CPP funds a one point increase in
sensitivity to demand shock leads to a 0.2-0.4% (columns 2 and 3, section ”bank that repaid
CPP funds, crisis”, table 8) lower growth rate of total lending during the crisis and to a
3.9-4.5% (columns 4 and 5, section ”bank that repaid CPP funds, crisis”, table 8) lower
growth rates of mortgage lending. For the banks that did not repurchase their stakes from
the Treasury the impact of demand factor is also smaller comparing to normal times but it
stays overall positive (except for the growth rates of commercial and industrial loans). A
one percentage point increase in the sensitivity to demand shock leads to a 3.9% (columns
2 and 3, section ”bank that did not repay CPP funds, normal times”, table 8) rise of total
loans growth at the average bank that did not repay CPP funds in normal times and to a
0.2-0.4% (columns 2 and 3, section ”bank that did not repay CPP funds, crisis”, table 8)
rise during the crisis.
This evidence suggests that the banks that repaid CPP funds suffered from a drop in
consumer’s demand during the crisis more than the banks that did not repay CPP funds.
Thus, the fact of the bailout repayment did not contribute to the higher aggregate demand
for the bank’s products and services.
As highlighted in section 2.3, the lagged value of dependent variable was not included
in the baseline regressions. The theory on Mundlak-Krishnakumar estimator does not yet
provide the proof of its adequacy in the presence of autoregressive variables. The results for
supplementary regressions including autoregressive component are presented in Appendices
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C and D. It can be noted that the signs of the coefficients remain the same while their size
and significance change for some variables (such as capital ratio, see tables C and 38).
Table 8: Mundlak-Krishnakumar Estimator - The effects of CPP funds repayment and crisis
on bank lending activity. Subsample of bailed-out banks. Regressions without autoregressive
variables.
Var ∆TL ∆TL ∆REML ∆REML ∆CIL ∆CIL
Time-fixed Macro var Time-fixed Macro var Time-fixed Macro var
Individual bank characteristics: banks that did not repay CPP funds, normal times (γ)
Zit−1 0.05 -0.16 0.99 0.90 -1.73 -2.51
(0.05) (-0.16) (0.66) (0.56) (-0.48) (-0.75)
TE
TA it−1
2.62*** 2.06** 2.36* 1.59 10.96*** 11.82***
(3.31) (2.52) (1.89) (1.11) (3.84) (3.61)
TSM
TA it−1
-0.32 -0.58 0.52 0.13 -2.90 -2.90
(-0.41) (-0.78) (0.44) (0.10) (-1.17) (-1.14)
Sizeit−1 -27.65*** -25.25*** -30.65*** -25.83*** -10.97 -11.19
(-8.46) (-7.38) (-6.17) (-4.81) (-1.43) (-1.40)
Sensit−1 3.87*** 3.87*** 4.94*** 5.16*** -0.43 -0.64
(3.51) (3.41) (2.93) (2.89) (-0.13) (-0.20)
Individual bank characteristics: banks that did not repay CPP funds, crisis (γ∗, γ + γ∗ in square brackets)
Zit−1 ∗ Ct 2.27** [2.32] 3.03*** [ 2.87] 3.59* [4.57] 4.66** [5.56] -2.26 [-3.99] -2.44 [-4.95]
(2.18) (2.58) (1.89) (2.36) (-0.83) (-0.91)
TE
TA it−1
∗ Ct 2.22** [4.85] 4.02***[6.08] 2.29 [4.65] 3.82** [5.41] 3.45 [14.41] 5.68 [17.50]
(1.96) (3.72) (1.20) (2.03) (0.94) (1.53)
TSM
TA it−1
∗ Ct 0.79 [0.92] 1.68 [1.72] -0.27 [-0.06] 0.55 [0.52] 4.95 [1.16] 6.04* [2.23]
(0.70) (1.45) (-0.13) (0.26) (1.44) (1.74)
Sizeit−1 ∗ Ct -2.68**[-30.34] -3.89***[-29.13] -5.38***[-36.03] -6.43***[-32.25] 0.88 [-10.09] -0.68 [-11.87]
(-2.41) (-3.14) (-3.61) (-4.15) (0.33) (-0.26)
Sensit−1 ∗ Ct -3.65***[0.21] -3.44** [0.43] -2.79 [2.15] -2.79 [2.36] -3.44 [-3.87] -3.22 [-3.87]
(-2.64) (-2.04) (-1.56) (-1.35) (-0.91) (-0.85)
Individual bank characteristics: banks that repaid CPP funds, normal times (κ, γ + κ in square brackets)
Zit−1 ∗Ri 0.88 [0.93] 0.99 [0.83] 0.12 [1.10] 0.13 [1.03] 5.68 [3.95] 6.38* [3.87]
(0.61) (0.65) (0.05) (0.06) (1.46) (1.69)
TE
TA it−1
∗Ri -1.26 [1.36] -1.16 [ 0.90] -2.26 [0.10] -1.96 [ -0.37] -8.86***[2.09] -10.22***[1.59]
(-1.04) (-0.90) (-1.17) (-0.92) (-2.68) (-2.78)
TSM
TA it−1
∗Ri 2.26** [1.94] 2.77*** [2.19] 1.74 [2.26] 2.39* [2.52] 2.65 [-0.26] 2.19 [-0.71]
(2.43) (2.90) (1.21) (1.65) (0.93) (0.77)
Sizeit−1 ∗Ri 5.53 [-22.12] 3.08 [-22.16] 7.68 [-22.96] 5.06 [-20.77] -5.73 [-16.70] -8.94 [-20.13]
(1.42) (0.74) (1.33) (0.79) (-0.66) (-0.97)
Sensit−1 ∗Ri 3.87**[7.74] 3.44** [7.31] -0.21 [4.73] -0.43 [4.73] 12.68***[12.25] 12.04***[11.39]
(2.50) (2.38) (-0.07) (-0.18) (3.18) (3.09)
Individual bank characteristics: banks that repaid CPP funds, crisis (κ∗, γ + γ∗ + κ + κ∗ in square brackets)
Zit−1 ∗Ri ∗ Ct -0.57 [2.63] -1.11 [2.75] 0.45 [5.14] -0.42 [5.47] -1.14 [0.55] -0.84 [0.59]
(-0.39) (-0.71) (0.19) (-0.17) (-0.35) (-0.26)
TE
TA it−1
-0.60 [2.99] -2.52**[2.39] -1.20 [1.20] -3.09 [0.37] 1.13 [6.67] -0.60 [6.67]
∗Ri ∗ Ct (-0.46) (-1.96) (-0.60) (-1.56) (0.32) (-0.17)
TSM
TA it−1
-1.87* [1.48] -2.52**[0.52] -3.35**[-0.26] -3.81**[-1.03] -2.39 [-0.71] -3.16 [-2.58]
R ∗ Ct (-1.88) (-2.21) (-2.12) (-2.26) (-0.78) (-0.98)
Sizeit−1 2.04 [-22.76] 2.54* [-23.51] 2.25 [-26.10] 2.57 [-24.62] -0.02 [-15.84] 0.99 [-19.82]
∗Ri ∗ Ct (1.46) (1.74) (1.08) (1.22) (-0.01) (0.42)
Sensit−1 -4.51*** [-0.43] -4.08** [-0.21] -6.45***[-4.51] -5.80**[-3.87] -2.36 [6.45] -1.50 [6.66]
∗Ri ∗ Ct (-2.77) (-2.31) (-2.66) (-2.38) (-0.81) (-0.52)
Macroeconomic conditions
Ct -13.18*** -7.72*** -15.78*** -8.76*** -7.98** -6.76***
(-8.87) (-9.83) (-7.12) (-7.16) (-2.12) (-3.39)
Continued on next page
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Table 8 – Continued from previous page
Var ∆TL ∆TL ∆REML ∆REML ∆CIL ∆CIL
Time-fixed Macro var Time-fixed Macro var Time-fixed Macro var
Ri 3.45*** 2.81*** 3.02** 2.01 2.27 3.02
(3.59) (3.04) (2.19) (1.54) (1.11) (1.56)
Ri ∗ Ct -2.12* 0.27 -2.04 1.47 -0.40 -1.10
(-1.77) (0.37) (-1.07) (1.05) (-0.13) (-0.56)
∆GDPt−1 1.02*** 0.35 2.41***
(6.26) (1.20) (4.88)
Means
Mean -53.29*** -48.49*** -63.16*** -60.62** 8.85 26.44
Zit−1 (-3.11) (-2.69) (-2.78) (-2.54) (0.21) (0.61)
Mean 1.32** 1.44*** 1.51** 1.71** -0.57 -0.94
TE
TA it−1
(2.42) (2.59) (2.00) (2.20) (-0.51) (-0.76)
Mean 14.50*** 13.41*** 15.70*** 13.56*** 4.90 4.79
Sizeit−1 (7.27) (6.45) (5.38) (4.41) (1.12) (1.04)
Mean 0.47** 0.49** 0.52 0.55* -0.17 -0.23
TSM
TA it−1
(2.24) (2.41) (1.56) (1.66) (-0.37) (-0.47)
Mean 0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.12 0.16
Sensit−1 (0.39) (0.18) (0.04) (-0.31) (0.83) (1.07)
Mean 78.66** 65.85* 59.95 46.68 57.37 44.62
Zit−1 ∗ Ct (2.42) (1.96) (1.31) (1.00) (0.89) (0.66)
Mean -6.96*** -7.70*** -7.12*** -7.87*** -6.91** -8.04**
TE
TA it−1
∗ Ct (-3.99) (-4.32) (-3.03) (-3.32) (-2.00) (-2.19)
Mean 10.24** 9.70** 17.38*** 15.07** 9.64 11.02
Sizeit−1 ∗ Ct (2.21) (2.05) (2.73) (2.31) (1.00) (1.08)
Mean -4.16*** -4.30*** -4.85*** -4.96*** 0.58 0.10
TSM
TA it−1
∗ Ct (-3.84) (-3.81) (-3.55) (-3.46) (0.31) (0.05)
Mean 0.79 0.82 0.88 1.01 0.80 0.37
Sensit−1 ∗ Ct (0.64) (0.65) (0.47) (0.52) (0.45) (0.18)
Mean 28.51 22.82 29.37 25.08 -55.16 -70.05
Zit−1 ∗Ri (1.28) (0.98) (0.96) (0.78) (-1.18) (-1.47)
Mean -1.81** -1.72** -1.34 -1.33 0.95 1.28
TE
TA it−1
∗Ri (-2.36) (-2.19) (-1.33) (-1.30) (0.66) (0.84)
Mean -5.39** -4.46 -7.32** -6.54* 0.68 3.11
Sizeit−1 ∗Ri (-2.02) (-1.58) (-1.99) (-1.68) (0.13) (0.56)
Mean -0.67*** -0.73*** -0.82** -0.89** 0.32 0.38
TSM
TA it−1
∗Ri (-2.78) (-3.07) (-2.24) (-2.40) (0.59) (0.69)
Mean -0.17 -0.15 -0.05 -0.00 -0.64** -0.66**
Sensit−1 ∗Ri (-1.25) (-1.05) (-0.23) (-0.01) (-2.57) (-2.48)
Mean -32.30 -16.39 -39.69 -21.60 46.26 58.89
Zit−1 ∗Ri ∗ Ct (-0.84) (-0.41) (-0.77) (-0.41) (0.73) (0.90)
Mean 6.94*** 7.36*** 7.10*** 7.59*** 5.52 6.40*
TE
TA it−1
∗Ri ∗Ct (4.25) (4.45) (3.23) (3.45) (1.64) (1.89)
Mean 1.79 3.47 3.07 5.81 4.20 1.90
Sizeit−1∗Ri∗Ct (0.33) (0.64) (0.43) (0.81) (0.43) (0.18)
Mean 1.82* 1.97* 3.40*** 3.44*** -2.85* -2.40
TSM
TA it−1
∗ Ri ∗
Ct
(1.81) (1.89) (2.77) (2.69) (-1.70) (-1.34)
Mean 1.32 1.31 1.34 1.00 1.71 2.20
Sensit−1 ∗ Ri ∗
Ct
(0.80) (0.77) (0.44) (0.32) (0.62) (0.73)
Constant 12.88*** 10.05*** 14.83*** 12.65*** 12.15*** 7.94***
(11.41) (10.67) (9.08) (9.95) (4.17) (3.90)
Overall R2 0.36 0.32 0.18 0.16 0.11 0.10
Observations 2786 2711 2777 2703 2679 2611
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses; ***, ** and* denote p-value less than 0.1%, 1% and 5% respectively.
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4.2 System GMM estimator
4.2.1 The effects of CPP funds disbursement and crisis on bank lending activity
One of the advantages of system GMM estimator is the possibility to include time-
invariant variables and their interactions with bank-specific variables in the regressions. In
this section the full specifications of models 1 and 2 are estimated which allow for systemically
differential behaviour across bailed-out and non-bailed banks.
Results are presented in a similar to the previous sections way. Regressions include year
dummies or macroeconomic variables as controls. Table 9 reports individual coefficients for
bank-specific variables and for their interactions with dummies (such as δ, δ∗, ω and ω∗) as
well as the resulting coefficients that show the full impact of an increase in the underlying
variable on credit growth rates of bailed-out or non-bailed banks before and during the crisis
(in square brackets).
Table 9: Two-step system robust GMM estimator - The effects of CPP funds disbursement
and crisis on bank lending activity
Var ∆TL ∆TL ∆REML ∆REML ∆CIL ∆CIL
Time-fixed Macro var Time-fixed Macro var Time-fixed Macro var
Lagged values
∆ln(TLit−1) 0.263*** 0.285***
(11.76) (13.14)
∆ln(REMLit−1) 0.066** 0.066**
(2.91) (2.85)
∆ln(CILit−1) 0.001 -0.002
(0.05) (-0.09)
Individual bank characteristics: non-bailed banks, normal times (δ)
Zit−1 -1.91* -4.26*** -3.20** -7.92*** -5.03* -8.69**
(-1.95) (-3.10) (-2.06) (-3.25) (-1.68) (-2.53)
TE
TA it−1
2.27*** 3.96*** 2.74** 5.77*** 6.53*** 9.44***
(2.87) (4.04) (2.40) (4.20) (2.61) (3.97)
Sizeit−1 1.59** 2.14** 0.30 1.51 2.20 3.93*
(2.19) (2.18) (0.26) (1.53) (0.94) (1.82)
Sensit−1 2.55*** 2.15*** 4.36*** 3.23*** 1.57 -0.11
(4.07) (2.94) (4.70) (3.32) (1.07) (-0.07)
Individual bank characteristics: non-bailed banks, crisis (δ∗, δ + δ∗ in square brackets)
Zit−1 ∗ Ct 5.36***[3.44] 6.09***[1.83] 7.32***[4.12] 11.79***[3.86] 10.79***[5.76] 14.40***[5.71]
(5.23) (4.22) (3.65) (4.15) (2.72) (3.79)
TE
TA it−1
∗ Ct -0.74 [1.53] -1.47 [2.48] -2.21 [0.54] -4.30* [1.47] -4.82 [1.71] -7.85** [1.58]
(-0.69) (-1.18) (-1.09) (-1.78) (-1.24) (-2.26)
Sizeit−1 ∗ Ct -1.99**[-0.40] -1.90* [0.24] -2.22* [-1.82] -2.79**[-1.28] -1.10 [1.10] -1.88 [2.05]
(-2.21) (-1.73) (-1.65) (-2.36) (-0.38) (-0.70)
Sensit−1 ∗ Ct -0.47 [2.08] -0.09 [2.06] -4.10*[0.26] -3.27 [-0.04] 10.20*[11.77] 14.52**[14.41]
(-0.31) (-0.07) (-1.84) (-1.46) (1.92) (2.55)
Individual bank characteristics: bailed-out banks, normal times (ω, δ + ω in square brackets)
Zit−1 ∗Bi 1.61 [-0.30] 5.24*** [0.98] 2.13 [-1.07] 7.79*** [-0.13] 7.22 [2.19] 8.66 [-0.02]
(1.14) (2.73) (0.90) (2.59) (1.60) (1.58)
Continued on next page
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Table 9 – Continued from previous page
Var ∆TL ∆TL ∆REML ∆REML ∆CIL ∆CIL
Time-fixed Macro var Time-fixed Macro var Time-fixed Macro var
TE
TA it−1
∗Bi -0.48 [1.79] -3.73** [0.22] 0.60 [3.34] -4.97** [0.80] -2.97 [3.56] -6.41 [3.03]
(-0.33) (-2.39) (0.25) (-2.17) (-0.74) (-1.43)
Sizeit−1 ∗Bi -2.08**[-0.49] -2.32**[-0.18] -0.46 [-0.16] -1.57 [-0.06] -2.47 [-0.26] -2.94 [0.99]
(-2.20) (-2.14) (-0.29) (-1.36) (-0.98) (-1.23)
Sensit−1 ∗Bi -0.19 [2.36] 0.45 [2.59] -0.06 [4.29] 1.30 [4.53] 1.00 [2.57] 1.66 [1.55]
(-0.20) (0.45) (-0.05) (0.88) (0.47) (0.74)
Individual bank characteristics: bailed-out banks, crisis (ω∗, δ + δ∗ + ω + ω∗ in square brackets)
Zit−1 ∗Bi ∗ Ct -2.87** [2.18] -4.80** [2.27] -1.54[4.71] -6.36* [5.29] -10.02* [2.95] -11.89** [2.48]
(-1.98) (-2.39) (-0.56) (-1.85) (-1.94) (-2.08)
TE
TA it−1
2.90 [3.95] 5.63*** [4.38] 0.61 [1.75] 6.43* [2.93] 4.76 [3.50] 10.87* [6.05]
∗Bi ∗ Ct (1.34) (2.83) (0.18) (1.95) (0.87) (1.87)
Sizeit−1 1.84* [-0.64] 1.06 [-1.02] 0.46 [-1.82] 0.18 [-2.67] 3.30 [1.93] 1.68 [0.79]
∗Bi ∗ Ct (1.66) (0.83) (0.29) (0.13) (1.03) (0.55)
Sensit−1 -2.38 [-0.49] -2.98* [-0.47] -0.62[-0.43] -1.53 [-0.28] -13.47**[-0.70] -16.58***[-0.51]
∗Bi ∗ Ct (-1.34) (-1.91) (-0.22) (-0.58) (-2.22) (-2.60)
Macroeconomic conditions
Ct -6.40*** -4.63*** -10.22*** -8.87*** -9.95*** -6.70***
(-5.67) (-5.11) (-5.77) (-7.08) (-3.26) (-3.18)
Bi 2.48** 1.31 3.42** 2.73 4.58** 2.15
(2.44) (1.03) (2.38) (1.60) (2.32) (0.92)
Bi ∗ Ct -0.75 -0.78 -0.75 2.71 -2.58 -2.40
(-0.69) (-0.65) (-0.47) (1.53) (-1.02) (-0.80)
∆GDPt−1 0.93*** 1.13*** 1.83***
(7.56) (5.27) (5.08)
Constant 5.91*** 5.43*** 9.81*** 9.02*** 9.35*** 7.00***
(7.91) (6.91) (8.49) (8.00) (4.84) (4.21)
Hansen test
(p-val)
0.11 0.15 0.20 0.17 0.38 0.16
Kleibergen-
Paap LM test
(p-val)
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Kleibergen-
Paap rk Wald
F (stat)
30.03 30.80 29.24 28.84 41.64 42.01
AR(1) (p-val) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AR(2) (p-val) 0.14 0.13 0.19 0.15 0.72 0.55
Obs 5512 5382 5482 5353 5185 5067
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses; ***, ** and* denote p-value less than 0.1%, 1% and 5% respectively.
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values: 20.27 (5% maximal IV relative bias); 10.77 (10% maximal IV relative bias);
4.17 (30% maximal IV relative bias)
The same results are presented in a more summarised way in table 10. The arrows in
this table present the direction of the marginal changes in loan growth rates caused by the
rise of the underlying variable by one unit. The sign of the resulting change in credit growth
rates (positive or negative) is then shown in brackets.
As in the previous sections, all bank-specific variables are demeaned before entering the
regressions, while the parameter estimates for the bank-specific variables are multiplied by
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Table 10: Summarized results for the effects of one unit increase in bank-specific variables
on loan growth rates for bailed-out/non-bailed banks in normal times/during the crisis
Var-s No bailout/
No crisis
No Bailout/ Crisis Bailout/ No
Crisis
Bailout/ Cri-
sis
Zit−1 − ↑ (+) ↑ (+/−) ↓ (+)
TE
TA it−1
+ ↓ (+) ↓ (+) ↑ (+)
TSM
TA it−1
− ↑ (+) ↑ (+);CIL(−) ↓ (−);CIL(+)
Sizeit−1 + ↓ (−);CIL(+) ↓ (−) ↑ (−);CIL(+)
Sensit−1 + TL ≈ (+); REML ↓
(0); CIL ↑ (+)
↑ (+) ↓ (−)
their standard deviations. Thus, the resulting coefficients show the change in the growth
rate of loans when the underlying variable increases by one unit.
The test of overidentifying restrictions (Hansen’s J test) provides the evidence that the
instrument set, in general, is appropriate. The null hypothesis of overall valid instruments
could not be rejected. The Arellano-Bond test of autocorrelation suggests that there is no
autocorrelation in differences of the second order. Regressions are also tested for underiden-
tification (Kleibergen-Paap LM test) and weak instruments (Kleibergen-Paap Wald test).
The results show that regressions are identified, instruments are not weak and that they
remove a substantial portion of OLS bias.
Similar to the results of the previous section, the crisis dummy has a significant negative
effect on the growth rate of both types of loans as well as on that of total loans. The total
loan growth rates drop by at least 5-6% (columns 2 and 3, table 9) between 2008 and 2011
for the average commercial bank when controlled for the rest of the factors. The REML
growth rates decline by 9-10% (columns 4 and 5, table 9) during the crisis, which is not
surprising considering the scale of the collapse in housing markets. These results correspond
well to the preceding observations made from figures 1, 2 and 3.
Figures 1, 2 and 3 suggest that prior to crisis bailed-out banks were expanding their credit
lines on a larger scale than non-bailed banks. Indeed, the bailout dummy has a positive
coefficient, even though its effect becomes insignificant if the GDP growth is controlled for.
Thus, if model 1 is estimated with system GMM, the resulting coefficients for the bailout
dummy are less significant than in IV or Hausman-Taylor regressions, but they seem to be
more realistic.
However, the interaction between the bailout dummy and the crisis dummy is not signifi-
cant for explaining the loans growth rates contrastingly to the results of Brei et al. (2011)11.
11Brei et al. (2011) find that during the crisis period loan growth rate at a rescued bank is around 8%
41
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2014.62
Thus, there is no evidence of the fact that the bank-recipient of CPP funds tend to lend
less than non-bailed bank between 2008 and 2011 after controlling for bank-specific and
macroeconomic conditions.
Let me now move to the bank-specific factors and analyse which of them have contributed
to the loans growth and the following slowdown of the loans growth after 2007. Recall
that the two ”core” factors discussed in this paper are demand factor and bank’s capital
constraint12.
The level of capitalisation is confirmed to have a significant positive effect on banks’
credit offers both in normal times and during the crisis. In normal times a one percent
rise in the capital ratio leads to a 2.3-4% rise (columns 2 and 3, section ”non-bailed banks,
normal times”, table 9) in growth rate of total loans for the average non-bailed bank. This
effect remains positive but declines during the crisis time leading to only 1.5-2.5% (columns
2 and 3, section ”non-bailed banks, crisis”, table 9) increase in total loans growth rate.
Hence, during the crisis more capital is required for the non-bailed banks to sustain the
growth of credit supply on a pre-crisis level. This finding provides support to the idea that
during the crisis additional capital is not that easily translated into extended credit offer by
the banks which did not benefit from the CPP program as they prefer to keep a substantial
part of it for their internal needs.
Brei et al. (2011) find the same trend for the impact of regulatory capital ratio (total
capital over risk-weighted assets) on bank lending in normal times against the crisis pe-
riod. Nevertheless, the authors report estimates that are notably smaller than the estimates
obtained in this article. For their sample of 108 large international banks from 14 major
advanced economies a one percentage point increase in regulatory capital ratio raises lending
by around 0.9% in normal times against 0.4% during the crisis.
For the bailed-out banks the rise in equity-to-assets ratio is not as significant for ex-
panding the credit offer during normal times as for the non-bailed banks. On the contrary,
during the crisis the positive impact of greater capitalisation on credit growth is higher. A
one percent rise in capital ratio of the average bailed-out bank is associated with 0.22-1.8%
increase (columns 2 and 3, section ”bailed-out banks, normal times”, table 9) in total loans
growth rate in normal times against 4-4.4% rise (columns 2 and 3, section ”bailed-out banks,
crisis”, table 9) during the crisis.
These results in a generalised way are also reported in table 10. The table suggests that
for any bank in any year an increase in capital ratio has a positive effect on the growth rate
lower than at non-rescued banks.
12The latter one is often referred to in the literature as the ”credit crunch” or the ”capital crunch”, see
Bernanke and Lown, 1991.
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of total loans, REML and CIL (positive sign in brackets) but it has an increasing positive
effect on the bailed-out banks during the crisis (upward arrow in column 5, table 10).
This means that liquidity provisions to the banks during the recent crisis supported bank
lending in the aftermath of the crisis. The last result is particularly interesting because it
provides the evidence that bailed-out banks display higher growth rates of loans during the
crisis than in normal times (before 2008) as well as higher growth rates relative to those of
non-bailed banks during the crisis, with a one percentage point increase in the capital ratio.
Another conclusion that can be made from it is that during the crisis more capital is needed
to sustain the same credit growth rates as before the crisis.
This result differs from that of Brei et al. (2011) who find that, first of all, in normal times
the positive impact of capitalisation is more pronounced for rescued (bailed-out) banks. Sec-
ondly, they find that capital injections to rescued banks with very low levels of capitalisation
do not produce greater lending during the crisis. More capital is only turned into greater
lending when a certain capital ratio (10% in a crisis period) is restored.
Bernanke and Lown (1991) analyse the relationship between the credit crunch and bank
lending during the recession of 1990. They argue that capital shortage have contributed to
the slowdown in bank lending both on the state and bank level13. In their bank-by-bank
regressions a 1% increase in the equity capital ratio results in a 2 percentage points increase
in loan growth for the full sample and in a 2.5 percentage points increase for their sample
of 90 small New Jersey banks. Their results in terms of sensitivity of bank loans to equity
capital seem to be closer to the results of this article.
Berrospide and Edge (2010) employ several capital ratios as well as the capital sur-
plus/shortfall measure to estimate the effect of capital shocks on loan growth rates. For
the sample of 165 large bank holding companies in the U.S. they find rather small effect of
capital on bank lending. According to their results a one percentage point rise in the capital
ratio leads to a long-run increase14 in annualised bank holding company loan growth between
0.7 and 1.2 percentage points.
In general the effect of capital on bank lending always remains positive, however, quanti-
tative results differ from sample to sample which is often attributed to the sizes of the banks
in that sample. Large banks are often said to be less sensitive to capital shocks than smaller
banks (Bernanke and Lown, 1991).
The growth rates of REML and CIL are affected in a similar way by the rise in the
13The authors use the data on 50 U.S. states and District of Columbia for the first group of regressions.
For the bank-by-bank regressions they use the data on 111 New Jersey banks among which 90 are considered
small.
14Recall that a long-run impact of the bank-specific variables can be obtained from the short-run estimates
by taking into account the implied value of the adjustment speed (1− η).
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capitalisation level. The effect of an increase in capital ratio on the growth rates of these
types of loans declines during the crisis. Again, it seems that the banks more exposed to
commercial and industrial lending (the ones that also exhibit higher probability of receiving
CPP funds, Isyuk, 2013a with an additional unit of capital tend to increase the growth
rates of CIL more than the banks exposed to REML, especially during the crisis. With one
percentage point increase in capital ratio, the bailed-out bank tend to raise its REML growth
rates by 1.7-2.9% (columns 4 and 5, section ”bailed-out banks, crisis”, table 9) during the
crisis, while CIL growth rates by 3.5-6% (columns 6 and 7, section ”bailed-out banks, crisis”,
table 9).
When it is distinguished between the banks that received the CPP funds and those that
did not, the impact of Z-score changes between the normal times and during the crisis. In
the results for fixed effects and first difference estimators an increase by one point in Z-
score (thus, increase in financial ”safety” of the bank) was associated with respectively small
positive or no effect during normal times and positive and significant effect during the crisis.
The results for system GMM show that in normal times safer non-bailed banks expand their
credit lines at a lower pace than the non-bailed banks with smaller Z-score.
However, during the crisis the situation changes and safer non-bailed banks contribute
more to the rise in credit supply. Among the banks-recipients of CPP funds the impact of Z-
score is not very significant in normal times while it is positive during the crisis (even though
slightly smaller than for non-bailed banks). Thus, the degree of the financial ”safety”15 of
the bank is particularly important for sustaining the growth rates of loans in difficult times.
The proxy for demand factor – sensitivity of the bank net revenues to the changes in
GDP – is also significant for explaining banks’ lending. In normal times the banks (both
the recipients and non-recipients of CPP funds) with higher sensitivity to the increase in
consumer’s demand exhibit higher loan growth rates: a one unit increase in demand sensi-
tivity is associated with 2.15-2.55% rise (columns 2 and 3, section ”non-bailed banks, normal
times”, table 9) in total loans growth rate for the average non-bailed bank. Hence, the rise
in demand for bank products contributed to the increase in bank lending in good times.
However, during the crisis the situation changes, especially for the different types of
loans. For instance, after 2007 demand factor has no impact on the growth rates of REML
for non-bailed banks. With the collapse in housing markets and generally unstable economic
situation consumers were less willing to take new mortgages. In that case demand factor did
not contribute to the rise in REML.
In contrast, increased demand seems to be one of the main reasons for the rise in the
growth rates of CIL at the banks which did not participate in the CPP program during the
15Altman’s Z-score defines the financial ”safety” of the bank mostly based on the earnings and revenues.
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crisis. A one unit rise in bank’s sensitivity to the changes in GDP is associated with 11.8-
14.4% higher growth rates of CIL during the crisis. This effect totally disappears in case of
bailed-out banks in the same period: banks with one unit higher demand sensitivity exhibit
0.5-0.7% (columns 6 and 7, section ”bailed-out banks, crisis”, table 9) smaller growth rates
of CIL loans than the average bailed-out bank. That may be caused by the preferences of
individuals and businesses to take loans at the banks that experienced less financial troubles
during the crisis (in other words, more reliable banks) what implies that the latter ones
did not need to participate in the government recapitalisation schemes to continue their
operations.
Besides, for bailed-out banks demand factor has a negative impact on the growth rates
of REML as well as that of total loans during the crisis. A one unit increase in demand
sensitivity of the average bank-recipient of CPP funds leads to a 0.5% (columns 2 and 3,
section ”bailed-out banks, crisis”, table 9) lower total loans growth rate during the crisis.
Thus, demand dropped in general for any kind of credit products offered by the bailed-out
banks during the crisis.
The significance of bank size changes significantly for the bailed-out and non-bailed banks.
While in the results from the previous sections larger banks were always associated with
smaller growth rates of loans both in normal times and during the crisis, here the impact
of size even becomes positive but only for non-bailed banks in normal times. However, that
positive effect mostly disappears during the crisis. These are smaller non-bailed banks that
contributed more to the growth of REML during the crisis, while larger banks continued to
expand CIL. For the growth rates of total loans the size of the bank does not matter. In case
of the bailed-out banks larger banks tended to lend less both in normal times and during
the crisis.
4.2.2 The effects of CPP funds repayment and crisis on bank lending activity
The link between bank-specific variables and bank lending during the recent recession
relative to the period before 2007 is now analysed for a smaller sample of 252 banks which
received the CPP funds in 2008-2009. This group of regressions allows to study whether the
factors affecting the bank lending (and particularly its slowdown between 2008 and 2011)
are different for the banks that repaid the CPP funds and the banks that did not.
Regressions are run in the similar to the previous sections way. Results are reported
in table 11. Bank-specific variables are now interacted with repayment dummy as well as
with crisis dummy. Hansen test cannot reject the hypothesis of validity of the instruments
(p-values reported at the end of table 11 are larger than 0.05). Besides, no autocorrelation
is detected in levels what suggests that the instruments are not endogenous. The test for
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underidentification reports that all regressions are identified, while Kleibergen-Paap Wald
test shows that the instrument set is not weak.
Table 11: Two-step system robust GMM estimator - The effects of CPP funds repayments
and crisis on bank lending activity
Var ∆TL ∆TL ∆REML ∆REML ∆CIL ∆CIL
Time-fixed Macro var Time-fixed Macro var Time-fixed Macro var
Lagged values
∆ln(TLit−1) 0.22*** 0.24***
(7.25) (8.97)
∆ln(REMLit−1) 0.01 0.03
(0.25) (1.05)
∆ln(CILit−1) -0.06* -0.07**
(-1.76) (-2.05)
Individual bank characteristics: banks that did not repay CPP funds, normal times (γ)
Zit−1 -1.82 -1.50 -2.07 -1.73 -6.82 -8.00
(-1.45) (-1.24) (-1.17) (-0.93) (-1.05) (-1.44)
TE
TA it−1
2.56** 1.83** 2.12 1.50 13.03*** 13.64***
(2.07) (2.05) (1.43) (0.98) (2.65) (2.78)
Sizeit−1 -0.80 -1.43 0.73 -0.09 4.98 5.02
(-0.83) (-1.49) (0.55) (-0.06) (1.51) (1.51)
Sensit−1 1.79 1.36 3.62** 3.16** 0.62 0.31
(1.49) (1.12) (2.42) (2.06) (0.24) (0.12)
Individual bank characteristics: banks that did not repay CPP funds, crisis (γ∗, γ + γ∗ in square brackets)
Zit−1 ∗ Ct 5.12***[3.30] 5.28***[3.78] 7.44***[5.38] 8.37***[6.65] 7.08 [0.26] 8.49 [0.49]
(3.02) (3.39) (3.58) (3.89) (1.01) (1.33)
TE
TA it−1
∗ Ct -2.03 [0.53] -1.04 [0.79] -2.21 [-0.08] -1.43 [0.07] -8.02 [5.02] -7.23 [6.41]
(-1.18) (-0.61) (-1.09) (-0.71) (-1.32) (-1.12)
Sizeit−1 ∗ Ct 0.25 [-0.55] 1.26 [-0.18] -3.79**[-3.06] -2.47**[-2.56] 0.92 [5.90] 1.51 [6.53]
(0.208) (1.05) (-2.02) (-2.13) (0.17) (0.27)
Sensit−1 ∗ Ct -2.61*[-0.82] -2.32*[-0.96] -2.92*[0.70] -2.59* [0.57] -3.61 [-2.99] -3.35 [-3.04]
(-1.91) (-1.89) (-1.85) (-1.91) (-0.88) (-0.78)
Individual bank characteristics: banks that repaid CPP funds, normal times (γ, γ + κ in square brackets)
Zit−1 ∗Ri 1.30 [-0.52] 1.20 [-0.40] 0.97 [-1.10] 1.33 [-0.40] 5.74 [-1.08] 6.52 [-1.48]
(0.72) (0.62) (0.41) (0.57) (0.77) (1.08)
TE
TA it−1
∗Ri -2.20 [0.36] -2.17 [-0.34] -0.56 [1.56] -1.16 [0.34] -11.79**[1.25] -13.04**[0.60]
(-1.28) (-1.27) (-0.24) (-0.50) (-2.14) (-2.43)
Sizeit−1 ∗Ri 0.64 [-0.16] 1.87 [0.43] -1.49 [-0.76] -0.15 [-0.23] -5.29 [-0.31] -4.24 [0.78]
(0.54) (1.54) (-0.95) (-0.09) (-1.48) (-1.21)
Sensit−1 ∗Ri 0.64 [2.42] 1.17 [2.53] 0.26 [3.88] 0.91 [4.07] 2.23 [2.85] 2.28 [2.59]
(0.47) (0.84) (0.14) (0.50) (0.75) (0.82)
Individual bank characteristics: banks that repaid CPP funds, crisis (κ∗, γ + γ∗ + κ+ κ∗ in square brackets)
Zit−1 ∗Ri ∗ Ct -2.39 [2.21] -2.90 [1.99] -2.62 [3.73] -4.58 [3.39] -3.67 [2.34] -5.10 [1.91]
(-1.11) (-1.45) (-0.89) (-1.60) (-0.45) (-0.74)
TE
TA it−1
6.05**[4.38] 5.93**[4.55] 4.09 [3.45] 4.38 [3.29] 14.18* [7.41] 14.72**[8.08]
∗Ri ∗ Ct (2.50) (2.54) (1.24) (1.28) (1.90) (2.03)
Sizeit−1 -2.96**[-2.87] -4.58***[-2.89] 1.94 [-2.62] -1.25 [-3.96] -1.50 [-0.89] -3.76 [-1.47]
∗Ri ∗ Ct (-2.19) (-3.02) (0.86) (-0.53) (-0.27) (-0.65)
Sensit−1 0.26 [0.07] -0.09 [0.12] -3.78[-2.82] -3.50 [-2.03] 6.44 [5.69] 7.35 [6.60]
∗Ri ∗ Ct (0.14) (-0.05) (-1.30) (-1.18) (1.12) (1.26)
Macroeconomic conditions
Continued on next page
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Table 11 – Continued from previous page
Var ∆TL ∆TL ∆REML ∆REML ∆CIL ∆CIL
Time-fixed Macro var Time-fixed Macro var Time-fixed Macro var
Ct -9.85*** -8.43*** -14.53*** -10.54*** -8.95* -6.50*
(-6.45) (-6.99) (-6.29) (-5.58) (-1.96) (-1.89)
Ri -0.96 -1.62 0.89 -0.70 1.41 1.37
(-0.70) (-1.21) (0.48) (-0.35) (0.35) (0.32)
Ri ∗ Ct 3.23** 3.86** 2.06 3.82 -0.86 -1.75
(2.18) (2.33) (0.86) (1.54) (-0.18) (-0.33)
∆GDPt−1 0.84*** 0.68*** 2.51***
(4.98) (2.64) (5.25)
Constant 9.27*** 8.73*** 12.44*** 12.84*** 12.60*** 8.19**
(8.22) (8.00) (7.02) (8.01) (3.58) (2.26)
Hansen test
(p-val)
0.71 0.74 0.77 0.45 0.88 0.75
Kleibergen-
Paap LM test
(p-val)
0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Kleibergen-
Paap rk Wald
F (stat)
23.12 22.57 26.11 27.94 30.00 31.09
AR(1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AR(2) 0.11 0.19 0.16 0.18 0.72 0.76
Obs 2734 2665 2971 2897 2615 2552
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses; ***, ** and* denote p-value less than 0.1%, 1% and 5% respectively.
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values: 20.27 (5% maximal IV relative bias); 10.77 (10% maximal IV relative bias);
4.17 (30% maximal IV relative bias)
Figures 1, 2 and 3 as well as summary statistics presented in table 2 suggest that the
banks that repaid the CPP funds on average exhibited higher growth rates of loans in crisis
period. It is indeed confirmed by the parameter estimates from table 11. Interaction between
repayment dummy and crisis dummy has a positive and significant influence on the total
loans growth rate. It may be explained by the fact that the banks that reimbursed CPP
funds totally by July 2012 had received enough additional capital to support their operations
during the crisis and to continue providing credits to enterprises and individuals.
Among bank-specific variables it is the capitalisation level that plays an important role
in explaining the growth rate of loans. For the banks that did not redeem their stock issued
under the CPP an increase in capital ratio by one percentage point leads to a 1.8-2.6%
(columns 2 and 3, section ”banks that did not repay CPP funds, normal times”, table 11)
higher growth rates of total loans in normal times. The impact is particularly large for the
growth rates of CIL; the same rise in capital ratio is associated with 13-13.6% (columns 6
and 7, section ”banks that did not repay CPP funds, normal times”, table 11) higher growth
rates of CIL.
The banks that repaid CPP funds are less sensitive to higher capitalisation in normal
times. The impact of capital on total lending is close to zero, while the growth rates of CIL
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rise by 0.6-1.2% (columns 6 and 7, section ”banks that repaid CPP funds, normal times”,
table 11) with one percentage point increase in bank capitalisation. The situation changes
during the crisis period. The banks that repaid CPP funds with one percentage point increase
in capitalisation raised their total lending by 4.4-4.55% (columns 2 and 3, section ”banks
that repaid CPP funds, crisis”, table 11). This effect is a lot smaller for the banks that did
not repay the CPP funds.
These results again provide support to the idea that the banks that redeemed their stake
from the Treasury had obtained enough additional capital to refinance their activities and
to contribute to the higher credit offer during the crisis.
It is also in line with the results of Brei et al. (2011), who argue that the banks-recipients
of CPP funds start to translate additional capital into greater lending during the crisis once
their capitalisation exceeds a critical threshold. That critical threshold should also account
for the commitment to reimburse the CPP funds. The bank that is not capable to repurchase
its stake form the Treasury cannot be expected to expand the credit offer to the enterprises
and individuals. It is more probable that such bank is going to adjust its assets portfolio to
meet the capital requirements by cutting the number of new-issued loans.
The growth rates of REML of the banks that did not repay CPP funds are partly ex-
plained by demand factor. An increase in sensitivity to the shocks on aggregate demand by
one percentage point is associated with a 3.2-3.6% rise (columns 4 and 5, section ”banks that
did not repay CPP funds, normal times”, table 11) in REML growth rates. As expected,
the effect almost disappears in the crisis period. A one unit increase in demand sensitivity
leads to a 0.8-1.0% (columns 2 and 3, section ”banks that did not repay CPP funds, crisis”,
table 11) lower growth rates of total loans during the crisis while REML still rise but only
by 0.6-0.7% (columns 4 and 5, section ”banks that did not repay CPP funds, crisis”, table
11), with the same increase in capitalisation.
For the banks that repaid CPP funds the coefficients for demand factor are positive in
normal times and close to zero or negative during the crisis. The size is not that significant
for predicting bank lending when controlled for the other bank-specific variables and the fact
of CPP funds repayment/non-repayment. In general larger bank that did not repay CPP
funds exhibit smaller growth rates of REML during the crisis (the effect on total loans is
close to zero). Larger banks that repaid CPP funds also tend to lend less during the crisis.
4.3 Summary results
The resulting coefficients from the various estimations are summarised in tables 12, 13
and 14 for the growth rates of total loans, real estate mortgage loans and commercial and
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industrial loans, respectively. The presented coefficients are taken from the regressions after
controlling for real GDP growth for the following five samples of banks: (i) non-bailed-out
banks (NB in tables); (ii) bailed-out banks (B); (iii) bailed-out banks that repurchased their
stakes from the U.S. Treasury (B-R); (iv) bailed-out banks that did not repurchase their
stakes from the U.S. Treasury (B-NR); and (v) the full sample of banks.
The estimated parameters are reported for three balance sheet characteristics: Altman’s
Z-score, the capital ratio and sensitivity to changes in consumer demand (see detailed results
for each estimator in Chapter 4, Isyuk, 2013b). The share of Treasury securities to total
assets is omitted because of its low significance, while the size coefficients are not reported
as they are confirmed to be similar across different estimations, periods of time and samples
of banks16. The coefficients are presented in the format ”normal times/during the crisis”
to allow for the results to be compared across different estimations, samples of banks and
periods of time.
The coefficients obtained from the different estimations are rather similar. The parame-
ters estimated for Altman’s Z-score show that while in the period prior to 2007 the financial
stability of banks did not affect the growth rates of loans (and even affected loan growth
negatively in the case of non-bailed-out banks), this factor became crucial during the crisis
period. Financially healthy banks extended their credit lines more than other banks during
tough times.
The impact of additional capital on the growth rates of loans changes depending on the
sample of banks, period of time and estimation. In general, a higher level of capitalisation
is associated with higher growth rates of loans. Bailed-out banks (both those that repaid
CPP funds and those that did not) significantly increased the loans offered during the crisis
relative to normal times for every additional unit of capital. Moreover, for non-bailed-out
banks, higher capitalisation had less impact on the growth rates of loans during the crisis
relative to normal times: the sensitivity of loan growth to capital remained the same or
changed insignificantly. Thus, it seems as though CPP funds were distributed in order to
provide liquidity to banks for which extra capital was crucial for sustaining loan supply
during the crisis.
The effectiveness of additional capital for bailed-out banks that did not repay CPP funds
to the U.S. Treasury is unclear. The results from the system GMM suggest that these banks
barely increased loan supply during the crisis for every additional unit of capital, whereas the
results from the other estimations suggest that they significantly increased loan supply-and
did so to an even larger extent than those banks that repaid CPP funds17. The first reason
16Larger banks are associated with lower growth rates of loans both in normal times and during the crisis
for all subsamples of banks.
17Models based on GMM are expected to avoid several endogeneity biases as described in section 2.2 and
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for the ambiguity of these results is the small size of that subsample that, moreover, includes
those banks that had the worst financial position during the crisis and that experienced
the most difficulties repurchasing their stakes from the Treasury. Secondly, these results
might be related to the conclusions drawn by Brei et al. (2011): banks only started to
translate additional capital into larger loan offers if their capitalisation level reached a certain
threshold. In that sense, banks that did not repay CPP funds may not have reached this
threshold. Further, as shown in graphs 1, 2 and 3, the difference in sustaining loan supply
across the subsamples of banks starts around 2009, which means that the time period to
capture these differences only contains three years (i.e. 2009-2011).
The growth rates of commercial and industrial loans are more sensitive to the rise of
bank capital than other types of loans. This finding is also in line with those presented in
Isyuk, 2013a: banks that specialised in commercial and industrial lending were more likely
to be bailed out and thus they were more likely to increase commercial and industrial loan
offers after receiving CPP funds from the Treasury.
Capital was less effective during the crisis than in normal times for the growth rates
of mortgage loans at non-bailed-out banks. Thus, during the crisis non-bailed-out banks
did not support mortgage lending as much as before the crisis, for every additional unit of
capital. For bailed-out banks (both those that repaid CPP funds and those that did not), a
higher capitalisation level led to higher growth rates of mortgage loans during the crisis.
Across all subsamples of banks, the higher sensitivity of a bank’s income to GDP growth
is positively related to the growth rates of loans in normal times. However, during the crisis
more sensitive banks suffered to a larger extent from the drop in consumer demand for bank
products. Thus, shrinking consumer demand also contributed to the collapse of the growth
rates of total loans as well as those of mortgage and commercial and industrial loans.
5 Conclusion
Resuming the banks’ loan supply to enterprises and individuals was not a primary goal
of the CPP. However, restoring the U.S. financial system involved recovering banks’ in-
termediation capacity including loans provision. Two factors that influence bank lending
are analysed: a financial shock that affects banks’ willingness to lend and the contraction
of aggregate demand due to the overall decline in economic activity. This paper uses the
methodology of Brei et al. (2011) in order to estimate the impact of bank capital, other
balance sheet characteristics and sensitivity to demand shocks on bank lending. This frame-
work allows us to introduce structural changes in parameter estimates for the period of the
to provide more consistent coefficients.
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Table 12: Summary results - ∆TL
Var Estimator NB B B-R B-NR ALL
Growth rates of total loans
Z-score Fixed Ef (full spec.) -0.73/3.07 1.96/2.52 -0.34/4.55 -0.14/3.10
Fixed Ef (ind) -0.77/3.50 1.72/2.22 -0.28/3.89
Fixed Ef in dif-ces 0.44/2.46
Mundlak -0.93/2.81 0.58/3.53 0.83/2.75 -0.16/2.87
Hausman -0.71/3.15 0.75/3.41 1.77/2.76 -0.10/2.66
IV -1.27/3.62 0.65/4.22
Difference GMM -0.01/2.45
System GMM -4.26/1.83 0.98/2.27 -0.40/1.99 -1.50/3.78
Capital ratio Fixed Ef (full spec.) 4.00/5.11 0.64/4.43 2.23/5.50 3.18/5.07
Fixed Ef (ind) 4.57/5.75 0.45/3.09 1.94/5.02
Fixed Ef in dif-ces -1.00/1.98
Mundlak 4.17/4.98 1.80/5.24 0.90/2.39 2.06/6.08
Hausman 4.00/5.03 1.76/5.41 0.46/2.16 1.93/6.14
IV 4.90/4.77 2.62/3.01
Difference GMM 5.16/8.59
System GMM 3.96/2.48 0.22/4.38 -0.34/4.55 1.83/0.79
Sensitivity Fixed Ef (full spec.) 4.08/1.29 7.09/2.79 4.94/-0.43 4.73/0.86
to ∆GDP Fixed Ef (ind) 0.93/0.29 4.83/1.81 4.51/-0.41
Fixed Ef in dif-ces 0.12/0.24
Mundlak 4.08/1.72 5.59/0.64 7.31/-0.21 3.87/0.43
Hausman 3.87/1.07 4.32/-1.05 7.52/-0.64 4.51/0.86
IV 4.51/1.50 6.87/-0.01
Difference GMM 2.15/0.21
System GMM 2.15/2.06 2.59/-0.47 2.53/0.12 1.36/-0.96
NB stands for non-bailed banks; B for bailed-out banks; B-R for bailed out banks that repaid CPP funds;
and B-NR for bailed-out banks that did not repay CPP funds.
Coefficients are presented in the format ”A/B” where A refers to those estimated for in normal times, while B to those during the crisis period.
Fixed Ef (full spec.) are results from fixed effects model for the full sample of banks; Fixed Ef (ind) are results from estimation by bank subsamples e.g. bailed out banks in normal vs crisis perio
Fixed Ef in dif-ces are results from fixed effects regressions with bank-specific characteristics in first differences.
Other results can be found in the respective sections with identical name.
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Table 13: Summary results - ∆REML
Var Estimator NB B B-R B-NR ALL
Growth rates of REML
Z-score Fixed Ef (full spec.) -1.32/4.62 4.33/5.65 -0.50/8.04 -0.06/5.38
Fixed Ef (ind) -1.37/5.55 3.79/4.99 -0.42/6.87
Fixed Ef in dif-ces 0.31/4.05
Mundlak -1.62/3.78 1.56/6.54 1.03/5.47 0.90/5.56
Hausman -1.31/4.80 1.83/6.60 3.41/5.65 0.30/5.20
IV -3.59/4.53 -0.48/6.06
Difference GMM -1.51/5.07
System GMM -7.92/3.86 -0.13/5.29 -0.40/3.39 -1.73/6.65
Capital ratio Fixed Ef (full spec.) 4.73/4.00 -2.62/1.37 2.88/4.12 3.14/3.39
Fixed Ef (ind) 5.26/4.18 -2.01/0.93 2.44/3.84
Fixed Ef in dif-ces -1.03/1.06
Mundlak 5.11/4.25 0.39/3.27 -0.37/0.37 1.59/5.41
Hausman 4.64/3.74 0.26/3.44 -1.83/-0.37 1.96/5.94
IV 4.86/1.47 3.10/1.26
Difference GMM 4.48/3.57
System GMM 5.77/1.47 0.80/2.93 0.34/3.29 1.50/0.07
Sensitivity Fixed Ef (full spec.) 2.79/-0.43 4.51/-1.93 5.59/1.93 3.65/-0.21
to ∆GDP Fixed Ef (ind) 0.64/-0.10 2.87/-1.81 5.33/1.84
Fixed Ef in dif-ces -0.48/-0.12
Mundlak 3.65/0.21 4.94/0.00 4.73/-3.87 5.16/2.36
Hausman 2.79/-0.43 4.11/-0.84 4.94/-6.02 5.37/3.22
IV 4.30/0.65 6.88/-0.64
Difference GMM 1.72/0.00
System GMM 3.23/-0.04 4.53/-0.28 4.07/-2.03 3.16/0.57
NB stands for non-bailed banks; B for bailed-out banks; B-R for bailed out banks that repaid CPP funds;
and B-NR for bailed-out banks that did not repay CPP funds.
Coefficients are presented in the format ”A/B” where A refers to those estimated for in normal times, while B to those during the crisis period.
Fixed Ef (full spec.) are results from fixed effects model for the full sample of banks; Fixed Ef (ind) are results from estimation by bank subsamples e.g. bailed out banks in normal vs crisis perio
Fixed Ef in dif-ces are results from fixed effects regressions with bank-specific characteristics in first differences.
Other results can be found in the respective sections with identical name.
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Table 14: Summary results - ∆CIL
Var Estimator NB B B-R B-NR ALL
Growth rates of CIL
Z-score Fixed Ef (full spec.) 1.80/0.77 3.68/0.14 -1.53/-5.05 1.27/-0.27
Fixed Ef (ind) 1.92/0.38 3.25/0.10 -1.31/-4.38
Fixed Ef in dif-ces 0.66/-1.68
Mundlak 1.34/0.36 1.27/-0.55 3.87/0.59 -2.51/-4.95
Hausman 1.44/1.98 1.49/-0.40 3.99/1.03 -2.89/-4.68
IV -0.57/1.86 1.36/1.01
Difference GMM -0.14/-2.04
System GMM -8.69/5.71 -0.02/2.48 -1.48/1.91 -8.00/0.49
Capital ratio Fixed Ef (full spec.) 8.55/16.84 3.18/11.21 14.14/21.87 7.91/15.08
Fixed Ef (ind) 9.87/19.70 2.34/7.86 12.75/19.14
Fixed Ef in dif-ces -0.98/6.55
Mundlak 7.82/15.90 6.83/11.82 1.59/6.67 11.82/17.50
Hausman 8.46/14.82 7.61/12.33 2.06/6.27 12.08/16.33
IV 6.79/13.36 7.99/9.49
Difference GMM 10.40/24.92
System GMM 9.44/1.58 3.03/6.05 0.60/8.08 13.64/6.41
Sensitivity Fixed Ef (full spec.) 6.02/4.73 10.75/7.74 -0.86/-4.30 5.37/2.79
to ∆GDP Fixed Ef (ind) 1.38/1.03 7.69/5.43 -0.82/-4.30
Fixed Ef in dif-ces 1.31/0.36
Mundlak 5.16/7.31 4.51/0.21 11.39/6.66 -0.64/-3.87
Hausman 4.94/4.94 6.62/2.32 10.96/6.88 -0.86/-4.08
IV 3.44/3.23 3.23/0.01
Difference GMM 3.01/1.29
System GMM -0.11/14.41 1.55/-0.51 2.59/6.60 0.31/-3.04
NB stands for non-bailed banks; B for bailed-out banks; B-R for bailed out banks that repaid CPP funds;
and B-NR for bailed-out banks that did not repay CPP funds.
Coefficients are presented in the format ”A/B” where A refers to those estimated for in normal times, while B to those during the crisis period.
Fixed Ef (full spec.) are results from fixed effects model for the full sample of banks; Fixed Ef (ind) are results from estimation by bank subsamples e.g. bailed out banks in normal vs crisis perio
Fixed Ef in dif-ces are results from fixed effects regressions with bank-specific characteristics in first differences.
Other results can be found in the respective sections with identical name.
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crisis as well as for normal times for bailed-out and non-bailed-out banks.
First, the results of the estimations suggest that bailed-out banks displayed higher growth
rates for all types of loans than non-bailed-out banks both in normal times and during the
crisis. Moreover, for every one percentage point increase in the capital ratio, bailed-out
banks displayed higher growth rates of loans during the crisis than in normal times as well
as higher growth rates than those of non-bailed-out banks during the crisis. In addition,
bailed-out banks that repurchased their shares from the U.S. Treasury provided more loans
during the crisis than those banks that did not. These results provide evidence that (i)
in general, the CPP was efficient in terms of supporting loan growth during the crisis and
(ii) banks that did not repay CPP funds experienced severe financial problems and did not
translate additional capital into new loans to enterprises and individuals.
This empirical evidence on the effects of capital shortages supports the theory. Banks that
have higher levels of capitalisation tended to lend more both during the crisis and in normal
times. In tough times, additional capital was not easily translated into extended credit
offers by banks that did not benefit from the CPP, as they preferred to keep a substantial
proportion of it for their internal needs.
Moreover, the positive shock on aggregate demand had a positive effect on bank lending
in good times, while that effect disappeared during the crisis. Banks (both the recipients
and non-recipients of CPP funds) that have higher sensitivity to increases in consumer
demand displayed higher loan growth rates. However, during the crisis the situation changed,
especially in the case of mortgage lending. With the collapse of housing markets and the
generally unstable economic situation, consumers were less willing to take on new mortgages,
which negatively affected the growth rates of bank loans.
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Appendices
A Correlation tables
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Table 15: Correlation coefficients for within-transformed dependent and main explanatory variables interacted with both bailout
and crisis dummy
Var ∆ln
(TL)it
∆ln
(REML)it
∆ln
(CIL)it
Zit−1 ∗
B ∗ C
TE
TA it−1
∗
B ∗ C
Sizeit−1∗
B ∗ C
MBS
TA it−1
∗
B ∗ C
TSM
TA it−1
∗
B ∗ C
Sensit−1∗
B ∗ C
Ct Bi BiCt Ri RiCt GDPt−1FFt−1
∆ln
(TL)it
1.00
∆ln
(REML)it
0.68 1.00
∆ln
(CIL)it
0.37 -0.07 1.00
Zit−1 ∗B ∗ C 0.22 0.16 0.09 1.00
TE
TA it−1
∗B ∗
C
0.08 0.04 0.06 0.43 1.00
Sizeit−1 ∗B∗
C
-0.20 -0.14 -0.09 -0.35 0.04 1.00
MBS
TA it−1
∗
B ∗ C
-0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.22 -0.04 0.13 1.00
TSM
TA it−1
∗
B ∗ C
0.12 0.09 0.05 0.29 -0.07 -0.49 -0.23 1.00
Sensit−1∗B∗
C
0.15 0.08 0.08 0.24 0.15 -0.42 -0.04 0.16 1.00
Ct -0.23 -0.14 -0.12 -0.09 -0.05 0.32 -0.03 -0.21 -0.27 1.00
Bi 0.04 0.00 0.02 -0.15 -0.02 0.36 0.04 -0.22 -0.19 0.00 1.00
BiCt -0.13 -0.07 -0.09 -0.18 -0.07 0.56 -0.03 -0.37 -0.43 0.64 0.44 1.00
Ri 0.05 0.02 0.03 -0.08 0.09 0.25 0.03 -0.17 -0.10 -0.02 0.70 0.27 1.00
RiCt -0.09 -0.05 -0.06 -0.14 0.05 0.45 -0.02 -0.31 -0.29 0.48 0.33 0.76 0.48 1.00
GDPt−1 0.31 0.20 0.16 0.25 0.03 -0.37 -0.07 0.22 0.37 -0.62 -0.01 -0.41 0.01 -0.32 1.00
FFt−1 0.22 0.13 0.11 0.24 0.03 -0.28 -0.07 0.17 0.35 -0.38 -0.01 -0.26 -0.00 -0.20 0.84 1.00
The correlation coefficients between dependent and explanatory variables smaller than 0.1 in their absolute values are highlighted in grey.
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Table 16: Correlation coefficients for within-transformed dependent and main explanatory variables interacted with repayment
dummy
Var ∆ln
(TL)it
∆ln
(REML)it
∆ln
(CIL)it
Zit−1 ∗
R
TE
TA it−1
∗
R
Sizeit−1∗
R
MBS
TA it−1
∗
R
TSM
TA it−1
∗
R
Sensit−1∗
R
Ct Bi BiCt Ri RiCt GDPt−1FFt−1
∆ln
(TL)it
1.00
∆ln
(REML)it
0.68 1.00
∆ln
(CIL)it
0.37 -0.07 1.00
Zit−1 ∗ R 0.15 0.10 0.07 1.00
TE
TA it−1
∗ R 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.44 1.00
Sizeit−1 ∗ R -0.17 -0.10 -0.07 -0.19 0.08 1.00
MBS
TA it−1
∗R -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.11 -0.01 0.16 1.00
TSM
TA it−1
∗R 0.09 0.06 0.03 0.14 0.03 -0.43 -0.22 1.00
Sensit−1 ∗ R 0.16 0.07 0.10 0.27 0.03 -0.40 -0.03 0.12 1.00
Ct -0.23 -0.14 -0.12 -0.11 0.01 0.22 -0.05 -0.09 -0.24 1.00
Bi 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.26 0.01 -0.20 -0.08 0.00 1.00
BiCt -0.13 -0.07 -0.09 -0.12 0.02 0.39 -0.05 -0.20 -0.34 0.64 0.44 1.00
Ri 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.38 0.02 -0.29 -0.12 -0.02 0.70 0.27 1.00
RiCt -0.09 -0.05 -0.06 -0.14 0.03 0.54 -0.06 -0.28 -0.43 0.49 0.33 0.76 0.48 1.00
GDPt−1 0.31 0.20 0.16 0.20 -0.02 -0.23 -0.04 0.10 0.38 -0.62 -0.01 -0.41 0.01 -0.32 1.00
FFt−1 0.22 0.13 0.11 0.16 -0.04 -0.09 -0.05 0.04 0.32 -0.38 -0.01 -0.26 -0.00 -0.20 0.84 1.00
The correlation coefficients between dependent and explanatory variables smaller than 0.1 in their absolute values are highlighted in grey.
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Table 17: Correlation coefficients for within-transformed dependent and main explanatory variables interacted with repayment
and crisis dummies
Var ∆ln
(TL)it
∆ln
(REML)it
∆ln
(CIL)it
Zit−1 ∗
R ∗ C
TE
TA it−1
∗
R ∗ C
Sizeit−1∗
R ∗ C
MBS
TA it−1
∗
R ∗ C
TSM
TA it−1
∗
R ∗ C
Sensit−1∗
R ∗ C
Ct Bi BiCt Ri RiCt GDPt−1FFt−1
∆ln
(TL)it
1.00
∆ln
(REML)it
0.68 1.00
∆ln
(CIL)it
0.37 -0.07 1.00
Zit−1 ∗ R ∗ C 0.14 0.11 0.07 1.00
TE
TA it−1
∗R ∗
C
0.03 0.00 0.03 0.36 1.00
Sizeit−1 ∗R∗
C
-0.13 -0.09 -0.06 -0.32 0.26 1.00
MBS
TA it−1
∗
R ∗ C
0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.19 0.03 0.14 1.00
TSM
TA it−1
∗
R ∗ C
0.09 0.07 0.03 0.28 -0.15 -0.55 -0.21 1.00
Sensit−1∗R∗
C
0.12 0.05 0.08 0.31 -0.00 -0.44 -0.01 0.21 1.00
Ct -0.23 -0.14 -0.12 -0.08 0.01 0.24 -0.03 -0.17 -0.23 1.00
Bi 0.04 0.01 0.02 -0.11 0.04 0.28 0.03 -0.18 -0.16 0.00 1.00
BiCt -0.13 -0.07 -0.09 -0.15 0.03 0.43 -0.02 -0.29 -0.36 0.64 0.44 1.00
Ri 0.05 0.01 0.03 -0.16 0.06 0.40 0.05 -0.26 -0.23 -0.02 0.70 0.27 1.00
RiCt -0.09 -0.05 -0.06 -0.21 0.04 0.58 -0.02 -0.40 -0.48 0.48 0.33 0.76 0.48 1.00
GDPt−1 0.31 0.20 0.16 0.18 -0.05 -0.28 -0.04 0.18 0.31 -0.62 -0.01 -0.41 0.01 -0.32 1.00
FFt−1 0.22 0.13 0.11 0.17 -0.05 -0.21 -0.05 0.13 0.30 -0.38 -0.01 -0.26 -0.00 -0.20 0.84 1.00
The correlation coefficients between dependent and explanatory variables smaller than 0.1 in their absolute values are highlighted in grey.
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Table 18: Correlation coefficients between the instruments and the variables from first difference equation
Var ∆ln
TL
∆ln
REML
∆ln
CIL
L.∆ln
TL
L.∆ln
REML
L.∆ln
CIL
L2.∆ln
TL
L2.∆ln
REML
L2.∆ln
CIL
L3.∆ln
(TL)it
L3.∆ln
REML
L3.∆ln
CIL
L4.∆ln
TL
L4.∆ln
REML
L4.∆ln
CIL
D.L.∆ln
TL
D.L.∆
REML
D.L.∆
CIL
∆lnTL 1.00
∆ln
REML
0.65 1.00
∆ln
CIL
0.37 -0.12 1.00
L.∆ln
TL
0.40 0.27 0.13 1.00
L.∆ln
REML
0.24 0.11 0.10 0.65 1.00
L.∆ln
CIL
0.17 0.15 -0.01 0.36 -0.13 1.00
L2.∆ln
TL
0.23 0.16 0.05 0.36 0.24 0.11 1.00
L2.∆ln
REML
0.17 0.08 0.06 0.23 0.09 0.09 0.66 1.00
L2.∆ln
CIL
0.09 0.07 -0.02 0.15 0.14 -0.01 0.34 -0.12 1.00
L3.∆ln
TL
0.15 0.10 0.03 0.21 0.14 0.06 0.35 0.24 0.08 1.00
L3.∆ln
REML
0.08 0.04 0.04 0.16 0.09 0.08 0.23 0.10 0.09 0.67 1.00
L3.∆ln
CIL
0.07 0.07 -0.03 0.06 0.04 -0.03 0.12 0.10 -0.05 0.31 -0.13 1.00
L4.∆ln
TL
0.16 0.11 0.02 0.18 0.13 0.04 0.26 0.18 0.07 0.42 0.29 0.09 1.00
L4.∆ln
REML
0.09 0.04 0.04 0.10 0.07 0.05 0.20 0.12 0.07 0.30 0.14 0.11 0.70 1.00
L4.∆ln
CIL
0.06 0.05 0.02 0.09 0.07 -0.01 0.09 0.08 -0.01 0.19 0.15 -0.03 0.36 -0.04 1.00
D.L.∆ln
TL
0.14 0.10 0.07 0.56 0.36 0.22 -0.57 -0.39 -0.17 -0.12 -0.06 -0.05 -0.07 -0.08 -0.00 1.00
D.L.∆ln
REML
0.05 0.01 0.02 0.31 0.67 -0.17 -0.32 -0.68 0.19 -0.07 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.00 0.55 1.00
D.L.∆ln
CIL
0.05 0.06 0.01 0.14 -0.19 0.71 -0.16 0.15 -0.71 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.00 0.27 -0.25 1.00
D. in this table stands for first difference, L. stands for the lagged value.
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B Selection of lags of the instrumenting variables used
in first-difference and level equations
Table 36: Lags for generated GMM-style instruments in difference and system GMM
Var Name Diff eq Level eq Diff eq Level eq Dif eq Level eq
TL growth TL growth REML
growth
REML
growth
CIL
growth
CIL
growth
Dependent variables
TL growth ∆ln(TL) lag(3 .)* lag(2 .)*
REML growth ∆ln(REML) lag(3 .)* lag(3 .)*
CIL growth ∆ln(CIL) lag(2 .)* lag(2 .)*
Individual bank characteristics: no bailout, normal times (δ)
Altman’s Z-
score
Zit lag(2 2) lag(2 2) lag(2 2) lag(2 2) lag(2 2) lag(3 3)
Capital ratio TE
TA it
lag(3 3) lag(3 3) lag(3 3) lag(3 3) lag(2 2) lag(2 2)
Size Sizeit lag(3 3) lag(3 3) lag(3 3) lag(3 3) lag(2 2) lag(2 2)
Sensitivity to
∆GDP
Sensit lag(2 3) lag(2 3) lag(2 3) lag(2 3) lag(2 2) lag(2 2)
Individual bank characteristics: no bailout, crisis (δ∗)
Altman’s Z-
score
Zit ∗ C lag(2 2) lag(2 2) lag(2 2) lag(2 2) lag(2 2) lag(2 2)
Capital ratio TE
TA it
∗ C lag(3 3) lag(3 3) lag(2 3) lag(3 3)
Size Sizeit ∗ C lag(3 3) lag(3 3) lag(3 3) lag(3 3) lag(3 3) lag(3 3)
Sensitivity to
∆GDP
Sensit ∗ C lag(3 3) lag(3 3) lag(3 3) lag(3 3) lag(3 3) lag(3 3)
Individual bank characteristics: bailout, no repayment, no crisis (ω)
Altman’s Z-
score
Zit ∗B lag(2 2) lag(2 2) lag(2 2) lag(2 2) lag(2 2) lag(2 2)
Capital ratio TE
TA it
∗B lag(2 2) lag(3 3) lag(3 3) lag(3 3) lag(2 2) lag(2 2)
Size Sizeit ∗B lag(2 2) lag(3 3) lag(2 2) lag(2 2) lag(2 2) lag(2 2)
Sensitivity to
∆GDP
Sensit ∗B lag(2 3) lag(3 3) lag(2 3) lag(2 3) lag(2 2) lag(2 2)
Individual bank characteristics: bailout, no repayment, crisis (ω∗)
Altman’s Z-
score
Zit ∗B ∗ C lag(3 3) lag(3 3) lag(3 3) lag(3 3) lag(3 3) lag(3 3)
Capital ratio TE
TA it
∗B ∗ C lag(3 3) lag(3 3) lag(2 2) lag(2 3) lag(2 3) lag(2 3)
Size Sizeit ∗B ∗ C lag(3 3) lag(3 3) lag(3 3) lag(3 3) lag(3 3) lag(3 3)
Sensitivity to
∆GDP
Sensit ∗B ∗ C lag(2 3) lag(2 3) lag(2 2) lag(2 2) lag(2 2) lag(2 2)
Individual bank characteristics: bailout, repayment, no crisis (κ)
Altman’s Z-
score
Zit ∗R lag(3 3) lag(3 3) lag(2 2) lag(2 2) lag(2 2) lag(2 2)
Capital ratio TE
TA it
∗B ∗ C lag(3 3) lag(3 3) lag(3 3) lag(2 2) lag(2 2) lag(2 2)
Size Sizeit ∗R lag(3 3) lag(3 3) lag(3 3) lag(3 3) lag(3 3) lag(3 3)
Sensitivity to
∆GDP
Sensit ∗R lag(2 2) lag(2 2) lag(2 2) lag(2 2) lag(2 2) lag(2 2)
Individual bank characteristics: bailout, repayment, crisis (κ∗)
Altman’s Z-
score
Zit ∗R ∗ C lag(2 2) lag(2 2) lag(2 2) lag(2 2) lag(2 2) lag(2 2)
Capital ratio TE
TA it
∗B ∗ C lag(3 3) lag(3 3) lag(2 2) lag(2 2) lag(2 2) lag(2 2)
Continued on next page
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Table 36 – Continued from previous page
Var Name Diff eq Level eq Diff eq Level eq Dif eq Level eq
TL growth TL growth REML
growth
REML
growth
CIL
growth
CIL
growth
Size Sizeit ∗R ∗ C lag(3 3) lag(3 3) lag(3 3) lag(3 3) lag(3 3) lag(3 3)
Sensitivity to
∆GDP
Sensit ∗R ∗ C lag(2 2) lag(2 2) lag(2 2) lag(2 2) lag(2 2) lag(2 2)
Star (*) indicates the use of ”collapse” option in Stata
C Mundlak estimator. The effects of CPP funds dis-
bursement and crisis on bank lending activity. Re-
gression with autoregressive component
Table 37: Mundlak-Krishnakumar Estimator - The effects of CPP funds disbursement and
crisis on bank lending activity (with autoregressive component)
Var ∆TL ∆TL ∆REML ∆REML ∆CIL ∆CIL
Time-fixed Macro var Time-fixed Macro var Time-fixed Macro var
Lagged values
∆ln(TLit−1) 0.16*** 0.17***
(9.41) (10.99)
∆ln(REMLit−1) -0.05** -0.04*
(-2.48) (-1.83)
∆ln(CILit−1) -0.12*** -0.12***
(-5.37) (-5.53)
Individual bank characteristics: non-bailed banks, normal times (δ)
Zit−1 0.63 0.68 -1.32 -1.03 1.93 1.91
(1.03) (1.30) (-1.28) (-1.17) (1.23) (1.16)
TE
TA it−1
1.49* 1.79** 3.24*** 3.48*** 2.54 2.94
(1.96) (2.39) (2.97) (3.26) (1.34) (1.53)
TSM
TA it−1
0.02 0.33 -0.22 0.04 0.01 0.44
(0.06) (0.79) (-0.30) (0.06) (0.01) (0.35)
Sizeit−1 -17.52*** -16.22*** -18.25*** -16.80*** -18.43*** -18.01***
(-8.88) (-8.45) (-6.19) (-6.07) (-3.66) (-3.28)
Sensit−1 1.70** 1.71** 2.62** 2.41* 3.20 3.16
(2.19) (2.24) (1.97) (1.88) (1.29) (1.23)
Individual bank characteristics: non-bailed banks, crisis (δ∗, δ + δ∗ in square brackets)
Zit−1 ∗ Ct 3.71*** [4.35] 2.89*** [ 3.57] 7.71*** [ 6.39] 6.73*** [ 5.70] 1.49 [ 3.42] 0.65 [ 2.56]
(3.89) (3.12) (4.89) (4.35) (0.44) (0.19)
TE
TA it−1
∗ Ct 0.36 [1.85] 1.15 [2.94] -2.43 [0.81] -1.25[2.22] 5.17 [ 7.71] 6.40 [ 9.35]
(0.28) (0.92) (-1.35) (-0.70) (1.28) (1.61)
TSM
TA it−1
∗ Ct 1.18 [1.21] 0.65 [0.98] 0.77 [0.56] 0.06 [0.10] 3.14 [3.16] 2.30 [2.74]
(1.55) (0.84) (0.64) (0.05) (1.16) (0.86)
Sizeit−1 ∗ Ct -0.78 [-18.30] -0.33 [-16.55] -2.86** [-21.12] -2.42* [-19.23] 2.12 [-16.31] 2.84 [-15.16]
(-0.90) (-0.37) (-2.17) (-1.81) (0.72) (0.97)
Sensit−1 ∗ Ct 0.22 [1.93] 0.63 [2.35] -1.74 [0.88] -0.85 [1.56] 3.98 [7.18] 4.69 [7.85]
(0.13) (0.36) (-0.75) (-0.36) (0.82) (0.92)
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Var ∆TL ∆TL ∆REML ∆REML ∆CIL ∆CIL
Time-fixed Macro var Time-fixed Macro var Time-fixed Macro var
Individual bank characteristics: bailed-out banks, normal times (ω, δ + ω in square brackets)
Zit−1 ∗Bi 1.16 [1.79] 0.91 [3.81] 3.11* [ 10.82] 2.67* [9.40] 0.82 [2.32] 0.48 [1.13]
(1.03) (0.85) (1.84) (1.67) (0.28) (0.16)
TE
TA it−1
∗Bi 0.11 [1.60] -0.49 [ 1.30] -2.70 [0.55] -3.38* [ 0.10] 5.15* [7.69] 4.46 [7.40]
(0.10) (-0.42) (-1.47) (-1.85) (1.73) (1.46)
TSM
TA it−1
∗Bi 1.51** [1.54] 1.29** [1.62] 1.98* [1.77] 1.79* [1.84] -1.56 [-1.55] -2.00 [-1.56]
(2.43) (2.01) (1.88) (1.65) (-0.85) (-1.04)
Sizeit−1 ∗Bi -4.22* [-21.74] -6.15**[-22.37] -3.92 [-22.17] -5.33 [-22.14] 0.97 [-17.46] -0.90 [-18.91]
(-1.71) (-2.45) (-1.00) (-1.37) (0.16) (-0.13)
Sensit−1 ∗Bi 2.43**[4.13] 2.17** [3.88] 3.40* [6.02] 3.20* [5.61] 2.69 [ 5.89] 2.28 [5.44]
(2.27) (2.04) (1.86) (1.79) (0.76) (0.64)
Individual bank characteristics: bailed-out banks, crisis (ω∗, δ + δ∗ + ω + ω∗ in square brackets)
Zit−1 ∗Bi ∗ Ct -2.83** [2.67] -1.72 [2.77] -3.27 [6.23] -1.85 [6.52] -4.38 [-0.14] -3.18 [-0.14]
(-2.01) (-1.22) (-1.42) (-0.81) (-1.02) (-0.74)
TE
TA it−1
3.13 [5.09] 3.36* [5.81] 4.78 [2.90] 4.58 [3.42] -1.38 [11.48] -1.21 [12.59]
∗Bi ∗ Ct (1.60) (1.75) (1.61) (1.57) (-0.24) (-0.21)
TSM
TA it−1
-1.60 [1.13] -0.74 [1.53] -3.25* [-0.71] -2.12 [-0.22] 0.43 [ 2.02] 1.70 [2.45]
B ∗ Ct (-1.57) (-0.69) (-1.90) (-1.23) (0.11) (0.43)
Sizeit−1 -0.12 [-22.64] -1.29 [-23.99] 0.02 [-25.01] -1.19 [-25.75] -1.40 [-16.74] -3.12 [-19.19]
∗Bi ∗ Ct (-0.12) (-1.27) (0.01) (-0.77) (-0.41) (-0.93)
Sensit−1 -4.41** [-0.05] -4.34** [0.17] -4.67* [-0.39] -4.69* [0.07] -9.12 [0.75] -9.16 [0.97]
∗Bi ∗ Ct (-2.22) (-2.07) (-1.73) (-1.67) (-1.58) (-1.52)
Macroeconomic conditions
Ct -8.48*** -6.51*** -13.27*** -9.02*** -11.80*** -7.70***
(-8.75) (-10.15) (-8.28) (-8.96) (-3.55) (-3.72)
Bi 0.71* 0.94** -0.00 0.17 4.92*** 4.98***
(1.79) (2.34) (-0.01) (0.26) (3.95) (3.84)
Bi ∗ Ct 0.99 0.66 2.28* 1.88 -2.00 -2.10
(1.25) (0.82) (1.84) (1.49) (-0.77) (-0.80)
∆GDPt−1 0.99*** 1.10*** 2.06***
(9.69) (5.34) (5.65)
Means
Mean 0.79*** 0.79***
∆ln(TLit−1) (20.69) (20.44)
Mean 0.87*** 0.86***
∆ln(REMLit−1) (21.13) (20.64)
Mean 0.75*** 0.75***
∆ln(CILit−1) (13.69) (13.10)
Mean Zit−1 -15.06** -9.68 -7.91 -3.58 -32.14* -26.48
(-2.48) (-1.60) (-0.68) (-0.33) (-1.72) (-1.27)
Mean TE
TA it−1
-0.18 -0.29 -0.63* -0.72** 0.05 -0.10
(-0.80) (-1.26) (-1.95) (-2.22) (0.09) (-0.19)
Mean 0.03 0.00 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.04
TSM
TA it−1
(0.39) (0.04) (0.66) (0.45) (0.44) (0.20)
Mean Sizeit−1 11.40*** 10.60*** 11.44*** 10.54*** 11.39*** 11.04***
(9.34) (9.05) (6.16) (6.06) (3.76) (3.38)
Mean -0.11** -0.10** -0.08 -0.07 -0.12 -0.10
Sensit−1 (-2.29) (-2.16) (-1.01) (-0.89) (-0.85) (-0.71)
Mean Zit−1 ∗ Ct 5.20 3.12 -6.58 -11.41 13.65 8.75
(0.35) (0.21) (-0.35) (-0.63) (0.40) (0.25)
Mean 0.17 -0.25 1.03 0.46 -1.20 -1.65
TE
TA it−1
∗ Ct (0.17) (-0.25) (0.85) (0.38) (-0.49) (-0.68)
Mean -0.29 -0.22 -0.39 -0.23 -0.28 -0.11
TSM
TA it−1
∗ Ct (-1.35) (-1.00) (-1.16) (-0.66) (-0.38) (-0.14)
Mean -1.51 -1.48 -0.43 -0.01 2.24 2.89
Sizeit−1 ∗ Ct (-0.81) (-0.77) (-0.15) (-0.00) (0.38) (0.48)
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Var ∆TL ∆TL ∆REML ∆REML ∆CIL ∆CIL
Time-fixed Macro var Time-fixed Macro var Time-fixed Macro var
Mean -0.06 -0.21 -0.83 -0.91 -2.56 -2.89
Sensit−1 ∗ Ct (-0.11) (-0.41) (-0.64) (-0.69) (-0.92) (-0.99)
Mean Zit−1 ∗Bi 10.80 7.31 -0.64 -3.82 22.85 22.51
(1.09) (0.75) (-0.04) (-0.26) (0.84) (0.79)
Mean -0.38 -0.19 0.38 0.59 -1.55* -1.35
TE
TA it−1
∗Bi (-1.11) (-0.57) (0.75) (1.19) (-1.84) (-1.55)
Mean -0.16* -0.16* -0.19 -0.19 0.08 0.12
TSM
TA it−1
∗Bi (-1.66) (-1.66) (-1.22) (-1.20) (0.28) (0.40)
Mean 1.43 2.59* 1.32 2.24 -0.49 0.81
Sizeit−1 ∗Bi (0.95) (1.71) (0.55) (0.93) (-0.13) (0.20)
Mean -0.08 -0.08 -0.19* -0.18* -0.08 -0.06
Sensit−1 ∗Bi (-1.44) (-1.43) (-1.89) (-1.86) (-0.44) (-0.34)
Mean -15.67 -14.54 -22.74 -17.96 8.93 14.82
Zit−1 ∗Bi ∗ Ct (-0.82) (-0.76) (-0.86) (-0.68) (0.18) (0.30)
Mean -0.54 -0.65 -0.79 -0.83 0.58 0.32
TE
TA it−1
∗Bi ∗ Ct (-0.49) (-0.58) (-0.52) (-0.56) (0.19) (0.10)
Mean 0.00 -0.07 0.21 0.02 -1.03 -1.29
TSM
TA it−1
∗Bi∗Ct (0.01) (-0.23) (0.39) (0.03) (-0.93) (-1.12)
Mean 3.97* 4.87* 6.25* 6.62* -3.97 -3.73
Sizeit−1 ∗Bi ∗Ct (1.67) (1.95) (1.68) (1.74) (-0.56) (-0.51)
Mean 1.84*** 1.83*** 2.68* 2.45 4.82 4.92
Sensit−1 ∗Bi ∗Ct (2.69) (2.77) (1.80) (1.59) (1.61) (1.56)
Constant -0.55 -1.57*** 1.70 0.63 0.97 -2.07
(-0.85) (-2.93) (1.47) (0.67) (0.48) (-1.21)
Overall R2 0.43 0.41 0.21 0.20 0.12 0.11
Obs 5512 5382 5482 5353 5185 5067
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses; ***, ** and* denote p-value less than 0.1%, 1% and 5% respectively.
D Mundlak estimator. The effects of CPP funds re-
payment and crisis on bank lending activity. Re-
gression with autoregressive component
Table 38: Mundlak-Krishnakumar Estimator - The effects of CPP funds repayment and crisis
on bank lending activity. Subsample of bailed-out banks. Regressions with autoregressive
component
Var ∆TL ∆TL ∆REML ∆REML ∆CIL ∆CIL
Time-fixed Macro var Time-fixed Macro var Time-fixed Macro var
Lagged values
∆ln(TLit−1) 0.11*** 0.13***
(5.08) (6.53)
∆ln(REMLit−1) -0.09*** -0.07***
(-3.15) (-2.48)
∆ln(CILit−1) -0.15*** -0.15***
(-4.40) (-4.67)
Continued on next page
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Var ∆TL ∆TL ∆REML ∆REML ∆CIL ∆CIL
Time-fixed Macro var Time-fixed Macro var Time-fixed Macro var
Individual bank characteristics: banks that did not repay CPP funds, normal times (γ)
Zit−1 0.90 0.51 0.96 0.58 1.26 -0.07
(0.95) (0.52) (0.56) (0.33) (0.36) (-0.02)
TE
TA it−1
2.29** 2.17** 1.82 1.65 14.78*** 15.78***
(2.20) (2.03) (0.97) (0.86) (4.27) (4.47)
TSM
TA it−1
0.13 0.04 0.21 -0.03 -3.79 -3.81
(0.15) (0.04) (0.15) (-0.02) (-1.55) (-1.50)
Sizeit−1 -25.46*** -24.03*** -27.05*** -23.66*** -14.68** -14.20**
(-11.61) (-10.59) (-6.84) (-5.82) (-2.16) (-2.05)
Sensit−1 3.22*** 3.01*** 6.28*** 6.06*** 1.44 1.35
(3.63) (3.31) (3.91) (3.73) (0.54) (0.50)
Individual bank characteristics: banks that did not repay CPP funds, crisis (γ∗, γ + γ∗ in square brackets)
Zit−1 ∗ Ct 1.73 [2.63] 2.27* [ 2.78] 5.26** [ 6.22] 6.46*** [ 7.04] -5.27 [-4.01] -4.77 [-4.84]
(1.50) (1.92) (2.54) (3.07) (-1.43) (-1.28)
TE
TA it−1
∗ Ct 2.99** [5.28] 5.31*** [7.48] 2.29 [4.11] 4.39* [6.05] 5.75 [20.53] 8.60** [24.38]
(2.06) (3.65) (0.88) (1.68) (1.30) (1.96)
TSM
TA it−1
∗ Ct 0.79 [0.92] 1.68 [1.72] -0.27 [-0.06] 0.55 [0.52] 4.95 [1.16] 6.04* [2.23]
(0.70) (1.45) (-0.13) (0.26) (1.44) (1.74)
Sizeit−1 ∗ Ct -2.15***[-27.61] -3.26***[-27.29] -4.84***[-31.88] -5.95***[-29.61] 0.78 [-13.90] -0.67 [-14.87]
(-2.99) (-4.49) (-3.72) (-4.57) (0.36) (-0.31)
Sensit−1 ∗ Ct -2.75** [0.47] -2.32* [0.69] -3.50 [2.77] -2.92 [3.14] -4.19 [-2.75] -3.93 [-2.58]
(-2.06) (-1.70) (-1.45) (-1.19) (-1.05) (-0.98)
Individual bank characteristics: banks that repaid CPP funds, normal times (κ, γ + κ in square brackets)
Zit−1 ∗Ri 1.18 [2.09] 1.60 [2.11] 1.29 [2.25] 1.66 [2.24] 1.59 [2.85] 2.83 [2.76]
(0.92) (1.21) (0.55) (0.70) (0.37) (0.64)
TE
TA it−1
∗Ri -1.03 [1.25] -1.32 [ 0.85] -1.92 [-0.10] -2.44 [ -0.79] -10.15** [4.63] -11.56** [4.22]
(-0.75) (-0.93) (-0.77) (-0.96) (-2.31) (-2.57)
TSM
TA it−1
∗Ri 2.04** [2.17] 2.29** [2.33] 2.24 [2.45] 2.71 [2.68] 3.46 [-0.32] 3.25 [-0.55]
(2.14) (2.28) (1.30) (1.50) (1.19) (1.08)
Sizeit−1 ∗Ri 3.94 [-21.51] 2.10 [-21.93] 4.03 [-23.02] 1.05 [-22.61] -0.04 [-14.72] -3.63 [-17.83]
(1.51) (0.76) (0.85) (0.21) (-0.00) (-0.43)
Sensit−1 ∗Ri 2.79**[6.02] 2.64** [5.65] -0.17 [6.11] -0.39 [5.68] 11.18***[12.62] 10.58*** [11.93]
(2.168) (2.01) (-0.07) (-0.16) (2.86) (2.68)
Individual bank characteristics: banks that repaid CPP funds, crisis (κ∗, γ + γ∗ + κ + κ∗ in square brackets)
Zit−1 ∗Ri ∗ Ct -1.24 [2.58] -1.80 [2.58] -1.47 [6.04] -2.57 [6.13] 2.89 [0.47] 2.69 [0.68]
(-0.86) (-1.22) (-0.56) (-0.97) (0.64) (0.59)
TE
TA it−1
0.12 [4.37] -2.34 [3.82] -1.01 [1.18] -3.46 [0.14] -0.85 [9.53] -3.73 [9.09]
∗Ri ∗ Ct (0.07) (-1.39) (-0.33) (-1.14) (-0.16) (-0.74)
TSM
TA it−1
-2.16* [0.80] -2.91** [1.10] -3.91* [-1.72] -4.42* [-1.18] -2.82 [ 1.80] -3.75 [1.73]
R ∗ Ct (-1.72) (-2.26) (-1.72) (-1.91) (-0.74) (-0.97)
Sizeit−1 1.83** [-21.84] 2.37*** [-22.81] 2.88** [-24.97] 3.28** [-25.28] -0.30 [-14.23] 0.42 [-18.08]
∗Ri ∗ Ct (2.31) (2.95) (2.02) (2.28) (-0.12) (0.17)
Sensit−1 -4.62*** [-1.35] -4.34** [-1.01] -9.07*** [-6.47] -8.34*** [-5.59] -1.66 [6.77] -0.97 [7.03]
∗Ri ∗ Ct (-2.79) (-2.57) (-3.00) (-2.73) (-0.33) (-0.19)
Macroeconomic conditions
Ct -11.48*** -7.23*** -17.49*** -10.65*** -11.10*** -7.76***
(-8.25) (-9.86) (-7.06) (-8.17) (-2.68) (-3.60)
Ri 0.99 0.62 1.78 0.900 2.30 2.56
(1.42) (0.91) (1.41) (0.74) (1.07) (1.25)
Ri ∗ Ct -1.71 -0.17 -1.67 1.338 -1.075 -0.47
(-1.61) (-0.21) (-0.87) (0.96) (-0.33) (-0.20)
∆GDPt−1 0.78*** 0.40 2.75***
(4.73) (1.36) (5.61)
Means
Mean 0.86*** 0.86***
∆ln(TLit−1) (21.76) (21.09)
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Var ∆TL ∆TL ∆REML ∆REML ∆CIL ∆CIL
Time-fixed Macro var Time-fixed Macro var Time-fixed Macro var
Mean 0.98*** 0.97***
∆ln(REMLit−1) (14.58) (14.19)
Mean 0.97*** 0.97***
∆ln(CILit−1) (11.38) (11.26)
Mean 5.58 11.19 1.46 6.23 14.12 33.47
Zit−1 (0.56) (1.03) (0.09) (0.36) (0.32) (0.78)
Mean -0.61 -0.64* -0.53 -0.49 -2.98*** -3.15***
TE
TA it−1
(-1.63) (-1.71) (-0.82) (-0.78) (-2.41) (-2.52)
Mean 14.810*** 14.01*** 16.12*** 14.43*** 9.19* 8.94*
Sizeit−1 (10.74) (9.66) (6.73) (5.67) (1.91) (1.82)
Mean 0.08 0.05 0.16 0.15 0.20 0.27
TSM
TA it−1
(0.53) (0.33) (0.73) (0.72) (0.37) (0.50)
Mean -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.36*** -0.36*** 0.06 0.10
Sensit−1 (-3.65) (-3.51) (-4.04) (-3.99) (0.40) (0.66)
Mean (-3.83) (-3.56) (-5.34) (-5.14) (0.35) (0.61)
Zit−1 ∗ Ct (-1.21) (-1.68) (-0.66) (-0.99) (-0.07) (-0.20)
Mean -0.52 -1.15 -1.15 -2.01 -2.62 -4.26
TE
TA it−1
∗ Ct (-0.43) (-0.91) (-0.51) (-0.88) (-0.71) (-1.15)
Mean 5.98* 6.13** 7.44 5.96 1.18 1.93
Sizeit−1 ∗ Ct (1.96) (1.97) (1.34) (1.06) (0.13) (0.20)
Mean -0.443 -0.48 -1.11 -1.12 -0.37 -0.94
TSM
TA it−1
∗ Ct (-0.63) (-0.66) (-0.87) (-0.85) (-0.17) (-0.43)
Mean 2.30** 2.07** 3.53** 3.24* -0.22 -0.87
Sensit−1 ∗ Ct (2.56) (2.24) (2.16) (1.95) (-0.08) (-0.31)
Mean -13.71 -20.72 -10.41 -16.90 -27.35 -44.59
Zit−1 ∗Ri (-0.86) (-1.26) (-0.36) (-0.57) (-0.55) (-0.878)
Mean 0.10 0.32 0.36 0.56 1.71 1.86
TE
TA it−1
∗Ri (0.19) (0.60) (0.39) (0.58) (1.10) (1.18)
Mean -1.60 -0.61 -2.35 -1.01 0.26 2.20
Sizeit−1 ∗Ri (-0.91) (-0.33) (-0.74) (-0.30) (0.05) (0.39)
Mean -0.31* -0.30 -0.42 -0.45 -0.07 -0.13
TSM
TA it−1
∗Ri (-1.65) (-1.57) (-1.25) (-1.30) (-0.12) (-0.23)
Mean -0.06 -0.05 0.18 0.21 -0.82** -0.88***
Sensit−1 ∗Ri (-0.53) (-0.44) (0.90) (1.02) (-2.52) (-2.63)
Mean 16.50 31.53 -3.99 14.46 28.43 36.41
Zit−1 ∗Ri ∗ Ct (0.67) (1.25) (-0.09) (0.31) (0.38) (0.48)
Mean 0.116 0.33 1.70 2.08 2.34 3.73
TE
TA it−1
∗Ri ∗ Ct (0.10) (0.26) (0.77) (0.93) (0.66) (1.03)
Mean -5.43* -4.85 -4.50 -2.35 -4.44 -3.40
Sizeit−1 ∗Ri ∗Ct (-1.65) (-1.44) (-0.75) (-0.38) (-0.44) (-0.34)
Mean 0.318 0.39 1.42 1.44 -0.77 -0.21
TSM
TA it−1
∗Ri∗Ct (0.48) (0.57) (1.18) (1.16) (-0.37) (-0.10)
Mean -0.10 0.08 -0.02 -0.12 4.94 5.87
Sensit−1 ∗Ri ∗Ct (-0.07) (0.05) (-0.01) (-0.04) (1.13) (1.33)
Constant 1.83 -0.35 3.07 2.06 2.46 -3.05
(1.63) (-0.41) (1.55) (1.42) (0.76) (-1.31)
Overall R2 0.44 0.41 0.23 0.21 0.15 0.14
Observations 2734 2665 2718 2650 2615 2552
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses; ***, ** and* denote p-value less than 0.1%, 1% and 5% respectively.
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Table 19: Correlation coefficients between the instruments and the variables from first difference equation. Continued (2)
Var L2.∆ln
TL
L2.∆ln
REML
L2.∆ln
CIL
L3.∆ln
TL
L3.∆ln
REML
L3.∆ln
CIL
L4.∆ln
TL
L4.∆ln
REML
L4.∆ln
CIL
D.L.Z D.L.
TE
TA
D.L.
Size
D.L.
TSM
TA
D.L.
Sens
D.L.
Z ∗ C
D.L.
TE
TA
∗C
D.L.
Size∗C
D.L.
TSM
TA
∗
C
D.L.
Sens ∗
C
L2.∆ln
TL
1.00
L2.∆ln
REML
0.66 1.00
L2.∆ln
CIL
0.32 -0.15 1.00
L3.∆ln
TL
0.32 0.22 0.06 1.00
L3.∆ln
REML
0.20 0.08 0.08 0.67 1.00
L3.∆ln
CIL
0.11 0.11 -0.05 0.32 -0.12 1.00
L4.∆ln
TL
0.23 0.16 0.05 0.38 0.26 0.08 1.00
L4.∆ln
REML
0.17 0.09 0.07 0.26 0.12 0.11 0.69 1.00
L4.∆ln
CIL
0.08 0.07 -0.00 0.16 0.14 -0.02 0.35 -0.07 1.00
D.L.Z 0.06 0.05 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 0.01 1.00
D.L.TE
TA
0.00 -0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.47 1.00
D.L.Size 0.27 0.18 0.10 0.19 0.15 0.03 0.16 0.08 0.07 -0.05 -0.10 1.00
D.L.TSM
TA
-0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.00 1.00
D.L.Sens -0.02 -0.00 0.00 -0.11 -0.08 -0.05 -0.09 -0.08 -0.02 0.08 0.01 0.04 -0.01 1.00
D.L.
Z ∗ C
0.00 0.00 0.02 -0.07 -0.04 -0.02 -0.08 -0.09 0.01 0.64 0.36 0.07 0.00 0.15 1.00
D.L.
TE
TA
∗ C
0.02 -0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.00 0.01 -0.03 -0.03 0.03 0.30 0.39 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.56 1.00
D.L.
Size ∗ C
0.03 0.03 0.01 -0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.08 0.08 0.01 0.06 -0.00 -0.03 1.00
D.L.
TSM
TA
∗C
-0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 -0.03 -0.04 0.08 0.03 0.00 0.25 0.05 0.10 -0.01 -0.06 1.00
D.L.
Sens ∗ C
-0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.06 -0.04 -0.04 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.82 0.05 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 1.00
D. in this table stands for first difference, L. stands for the lagged value.
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Table 20: Correlation coefficients between the instruments and the variables from first difference equation. Continued (3)
Var L2.∆ln
TL
L2.∆ln
REML
L2.∆ln
CIL
L3.∆ln
(TL)it
L3.∆ln
REML
L3.∆ln
CIL
L4.∆ln
TL
L4.∆ln
REML
L4.∆ln
CIL
D.L.
Z ∗ B
D.L.
TE
TA
∗B
D.L.
Size ∗
B
D.L.
TSM
TA
∗
B
D.L.
Sens ∗
B
D.L.
Z ∗B ∗
C
D.L.
TE
TA
∗
B ∗ C
D.L.
Size ∗
B ∗ C
D.L.
TSM
TA
∗
B ∗ C
D.L.
Sens ∗
B ∗ C
L2.∆ln
TL
1.00
L2.∆ln
REML
0.66 1.00
L2.∆ln
CIL
0.32 -0.15 1.00
L3.∆ln
TL
0.32 0.22 0.06 1.00
L3.∆ln
REML
0.20 0.08 0.08 0.67 1.00
L3.∆ln
CIL
0.11 0.11 -0.05 0.32 -0.12 1.00
L4.∆ln
TL
0.23 0.16 0.05 0.38 0.26 0.08 1.00
L4.∆ln
REML
0.17 0.09 0.07 0.26 0.12 0.11 0.69 1.00
L4.∆ln
CIL
0.08 0.07 -0.00 0.16 0.14 -0.02 0.35 -0.07 1.00
D.L.Z∗B 0.07 0.05 0.01 -0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 1.00
D.L.
TE
TA
∗ B
-0.00 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.51 1.00
D.L.
Size ∗ B
0.18 0.12 0.08 0.12 0.12 0.01 0.10 0.04 0.04 -0.07 -0.09 1.00
D.L.
TSM
TA
∗B
-0.01 -0.00 -0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.00 0.03 0.01 0.04 -0.03 1.00
D.L.
Sens ∗ B
-0.03 -0.01 -0.00 -0.10 -0.08 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.00 -0.03 0.02 -0.01 1.00
D.L.
Z ∗B ∗ C
0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 0.01 0.76 0.35 0.06 0.00 0.03 1.00
D.L.
TE
TA
∗ B ∗
C
0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.02 -0.02 0.03 0.32 0.50 -0.03 0.01 -0.08 0.47 1.00
D.L.
Size∗B ∗
C
0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.14 0.07 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.05 1.00
D.L.
TSM
TA
∗
B ∗ C
-0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 0.05 -0.00 -0.02 0.23 -0.01 0.07 0.02 -0.10 1.00
D.L.
Sens∗B∗
C
-0.01 0.08 0.00 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.07 -0.01 -0.03 0.85 -0.03 -0.09 0.01 -0.05 1.00
D. in this table stands for first difference, L. stands for the lagged value.
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Table 21: Correlation coefficients between the instruments and the variables from first difference equation. Continued (4)
Var L2.Z L2.
TE
TA
L2.
Size
L2.
TSM
TA
L2.
Sens
L2.
Z ∗ C
L2.
TE
TA
∗ C
L2.
Size∗C
L2.
TSM
TA
∗
C
L2.
Sens∗
C
D.L.Z D.L.
TE
TA
D.L.
Size
D.L.
TSM
TA
D.L.
Sens
Bi Ri B∗C R∗C
L2.Z 1.00
L2.TE
TA
0.56 1.00
L2.Size 0.05 -0.22 1.00
L2.TSM
TA
-0.01 -0.04 -0.01 1.00
L2.Sens -0.16 0.06 -0.12 -0.06 1.00
L2.Z ∗ C 0.45 0.22 -0.01 0.04 0.05 1.00
L2.
TE
TA
∗ C
0.26 0.38 -0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.57 1.00
L2.
Size ∗ C
-0.00 -0.03 0.37 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.07 1.00
L2.
TSM
TA
∗C
0.06 -0.02 -0.03 0.29 0.03 0.13 -0.05 -0.07 1.00
L2.
Sens ∗ C
0.11 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.19 0.25 0.06 0.01 0.16 1.00
D.L.Z -0.44 -0.19 0.01 0.03 -0.01 -0.06 -0.05 0.03 0.04 0.02 1.00
D.L.
TE
TA
-0.14 -0.45 0.14 0.04 -0.13 -0.00 -0.15 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.46 1.00
D.L.
Size
-0.08 0.11 -0.08 -0.06 0.21 0.06 0.08 -0.04 -0.00 0.03 0.05 -0.17 1.00
D.L.
TSM
TA
0.07 -0.02 -0.01 -0.32 -0.00 0.02 0.02 -0.02 -0.04 0.01 -0.06 0.03 0.02 1.00
D.L.Sens 0.01 -0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.42 -0.10 0.01 -0.04 -0.05 -0.55 0.05 0.01 0.02 -0.00 1.00
Bi -0.10 -0.14 0.25 -0.09 -0.02 -0.08 -0.04 0.10 -0.06 -0.02 0.01 0.07 0.04 -0.01 0.01 1.00
Ri -0.03 -0.09 0.33 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 0.14 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.08 0.04 -0.00 0.00 0.70 1.00
B ∗ C -0.07 -0.06 0.07 -0.05 0.03 -0.07 -0.05 0.18 -0.08 -0.03 -0.01 0.08 -0.07 -0.00 -0.00 0.45 0.28 1.00
R ∗ C -0.02 -0.06 0.14 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.11 -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.10 -0.04 -0.00 0.01 0.34 0.49 0.54 1.00
D. in this table stands for first difference, L. stands for the lagged value.
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Table 22: Correlation coefficients between the instruments and the variables from first difference equation. Continued (5)
Var L2.Z∗
B
L2.TE
TA
∗
B
L2.Size∗
B
L2.
TSM
TA
∗
B
L2.
Sens ∗
B
L2.Z ∗
B ∗ C
L2.TE
TA
∗
B ∗ C
L2.Size∗
B ∗ C
L2.TSM
TA
∗
B ∗ C
L2.Sens∗
B ∗ C
D.L.Z D.L.TE
TA
D.L.Size D.L.TSM
TA
D.L.Sens Bi Ri B∗C R∗C
L2.Z ∗ B 1.00
L2.TE
TA
∗
B
0.48 1.00
L2.Size ∗
B
0.12 -0.19 1.00
L2.TSM
TA
∗
B
0.03 0.05 -0.11 1.00
L2.Sens∗
B
-0.09 0.14 -0.14 -0.05 1.00
L2.Z∗B∗
C
0.45 0.16 0.03 0.05 0.04 1.00
L2.TE
TA
∗
B ∗ C
0.21 0.36 0.03 0.01 -0.00 0.46 1.00
L2.Size ∗
B ∗ C
0.03 0.04 0.38 -0.03 0.01 0.06 0.07 1.00
L2.TSM
TA
∗
B ∗ C
0.08 0.01 -0.04 0.28 0.02 0.18 0.04 -0.12 1.00
L2.Sens∗
B ∗ C
0.09 -0.00 0.01 0.03 0.21 0.21 0.00 0.02 0.10 1.00
D.L.Z -0.32 -0.15 0.03 0.01 -0.01 -0.06 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.01 1.00
D.L.TE
TA
-0.05 -0.29 0.10 0.01 -0.08 0.01 -0.06 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.46 1.00
D.L.Size 0.05 0.08 -0.02 -0.03 0.11 0.06 0.08 -0.05 0.01 0.03 0.05 -0.17 1.00
D.L.TSM
TA
0.10 -0.02 -0.01 -0.20 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.06 0.03 0.02 1.00
D.L.Sens 0.00 -0.03 0.01 0.00 -0.29 -0.06 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.38 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.00 1.00
Bi -0.05 -0.19 0.25 -0.08 -0.08 -0.03 -0.04 0.09 -0.04 -0.02 0.01 0.07 0.04 0.00 0.01 1.00
Ri 0.03 -0.13 0.37 0.00 -0.10 0.04 0.04 0.14 0.01 -0.00 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.70 1.00
B ∗ C -0.06 -0.07 0.07 -0.04 0.02 -0.07 -0.08 0.19 -0.09 -0.04 -0.01 0.08 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.45 0.29 1.00
R ∗ C -0.00 -0.08 0.15 -0.00 0.01 -0.00 -0.01 0.12 -0.00 0.02 0.03 0.10 -0.04 0.00 0.01 0.34 0.49 0.54 1.00
D. in this table stands for first difference, L. stands for the lagged value.
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Table 23: Correlation coefficients between the instruments and the variables from first difference equation. Continued (6)
Var L2.Z ∗
R
L2.TE
TA
∗
R
L2.Size∗
R
L2.TSM
TA
∗
R
L2.Sens∗
R
L2.Z ∗
R ∗ C
L2.TE
TA
∗
R ∗ C
L2.Size∗
R ∗ C
L2.TSM
TA
∗
R ∗ C
L2.Sens∗
R ∗ C
D.L.Z D.L.TE
TA
D.L.Size D.L.TSM
TA
D.L.Sens Bi Ri B∗C R∗C
L2.Z ∗ R 1.00
L2.TE
TA
∗
R
0.44 1.00
L2.Size ∗
R
0.12 -0.17 1.00
L2.TSM
TA
∗
R
0.02 0.08 -0.17 1.00
L2.Sens∗
R
-0.07 0.18 -0.17 -0.06 1.00
L2.Z∗R∗
C
0.46 0.12 0.06 0.04 0.02 1.00
L2.TE
TA
∗
R ∗ C
0.13 0.42 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.29 1.00
L2.Size ∗
R ∗ C
0.06 0.06 0.45 -0.06 0.00 0.12 0.10 1.00
L2.TSM
TA
∗
R ∗ C
0.05 -0.01 -0.05 0.23 0.02 0.11 -0.01 -0.12 1.00
L2.Sens∗
R ∗ C
0.08 -0.00 0.01 0.03 0.13 0.17 0.00 0.02 0.10 1.00
D.L.Z -0.32 -0.16 0.03 0.01 -0.02 -0.07 -0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01 1.00
D.L.TE
TA
-0.04 -0.22 0.08 -0.01 -0.06 0.00 -0.10 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.46 1.00
D.L.Size 0.06 0.04 0.00 -0.03 0.07 0.05 0.05 -0.04 0.01 0.03 0.05 -0.17 1.00
D.L.TSM
TA
0.11 -0.00 -0.00 -0.16 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.06 0.03 0.02 1.00
D.L.Sens 0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.00 -0.20 -0.00 -0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.38 0.05 0.01 -0.00 1.00
Bi 0.00 -0.16 0.30 -0.03 -0.03 -0.10 0.00 -0.03 0.13 -0.04 -0.02 0.01 0.07 0.04 -0.01 1.00
Ri 0.00 -0.23 0.42 -0.04 -0.15 0.00 -0.05 0.19 0.01 -0.00 0.02 0.08 0.04 -0.00 0.00 0.70 1.00
B ∗ C -0.00 -0.01 0.10 -0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.08 0.30 -0.09 -0.04 -0.01 0.08 -0.07 -0.00 -0.01 0.45 0.28 1.00
R ∗ C -0.02 -0.14 0.18 -0.02 0.00 -0.00 -0.03 0.15 0.24 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.10 -0.04 0.01 0.34 0.49 0.53 1.00
D. in this table stands for first difference, L. stands for the lagged value.
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Table 24: Correlation coefficients between the instruments and the variables from first difference equation. Continued (7)
Var L3.Z L3.TE
TA
L3.Size L3.TSM
TA
L3.Sens L3.Z ∗
C
L3.TE
TA
∗
C
L3.Size∗
C
L3.TSM
TA
∗
C
L3.Sens∗
C
D.L.Z D.L.TE
TA
D.L.Size D.L.TSM
TA
D.L.Sens Bi Ri B∗C R∗C
L3.Z 1.00
L3.TE
TA
0.56 1.00
L3.Size 0.05 -0.23 1.00
L3.TSM
TA
-0.03 -0.04 -0.02 1.00
L3.Sens -0.19 0.06 -0.13 -0.08 1.00
L3.Z ∗ C 0.31 0.16 -0.02 0.01 0.01 1.00
L3.TE
TA
∗
C
0.18 0.29 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 0.57 1.00
L3.Size ∗
C
-0.02 -0.02 0.27 -0.01 0.01 -0.05 -0.09 1.00
L3.TSM
TA
∗
C
0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.20 0.01 0.08 -0.10 -0.06 1.00
L3.Sens∗
C
0.08 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.25 0.13 0.10 0.15 1.00
D.L.Z -0.05 -0.12 0.04 0.04 -0.07 -0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 1.00
D.L.TE
TA
-0.15 -0.37 0.12 0.03 -0.09 -0.05 -0.10 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.50 1.00
D.L.Size -0.01 0.09 -0.03 -0.05 0.12 0.05 0.06 -0.03 0.00 0.01 -0.08 -0.20 1.00
D.L.TSM
TA
0.01 0.03 -0.02 -0.22 0.03 0.02 0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.02 -0.00 0.00 0.02 1.00
D.L.Sens -0.01 -0.08 0.02 0.00 -0.39 -0.18 -0.09 -0.04 -0.11 -0.65 0.06 0.02 0.01 -0.01 1.00
Bi -0.10 -0.15 0.25 -0.09 -0.01 -0.08 -0.05 0.07 -0.05 -0.01 0.02 0.07 0.06 -0.01 0.01 1.00
Ri -0.03 -0.11 0.33 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 0.10 -0.02 0.01 0.04 0.08 0.07 -0.01 0.00 0.70 1.00
B ∗ C -0.07 -0.08 0.07 -0.05 0.04 -0.07 -0.06 0.13 -0.05 0.02 -0.01 0.07 -0.07 -0.00 0.00 0.47 0.30 1.00
R ∗ C -0.02 -0.07 0.15 -0.02 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 0.03 0.11 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.36 0.51 0.54 1.00
D. in this table stands for first difference, L. stands for the lagged value.
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Table 25: Correlation coefficients between the instruments and the variables from first difference equation. Continued (8)
Var L3.Z ∗
B
L3.TE
TA
∗
B
L3.Size∗
B
L3.TSM
TA
∗
B
L3.Sens∗
B
L3.Z ∗
B ∗ C
L3.TE
TA
∗
B ∗ C
L3.Size∗
B ∗ C
L3.TSM
TA
∗
B ∗ C
L3.Sens∗
B ∗ C
D.L.Z D.L.TE
TA
D.L.Size D.L.TSM
TA
D.L.Sens Bi Ri B∗C R∗C
L3.Z ∗ B 1.00
L3.TE
TA
∗
B
0.47 1.00
L3.Size ∗
B
0.12 -0.21 1.00
L3.TSM
TA
∗
B
0.02 0.05 -0.12 1.00
L3.Sens∗
B
-0.12 0.15 -0.15 -0.06 1.00
L3.Z∗B∗
C
0.30 0.09 0.01 0.04 0.01 1.00
L3.TE
TA
∗
B ∗ C
0.11 0.25 0.03 0.01 -0.00 0.37 1.00
L3.Size ∗
B ∗ C
0.01 0.03 0.28 -0.02 0.01 0.02 0.06 1.00
L3.TSM
TA
∗
B ∗ C
0.06 0.01 -0.03 0.20 0.00 0.20 0.04 -0.11 1.00
L3.Sens∗
B ∗ C
0.07 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.22 -0.00 0.13 0.08 1.00
D.L.Z -0.05 -0.08 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.01 1.00
D.L.TE
TA
-0.08 -0.23 0.09 -0.01 -0.04 0.03 -0.02 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.50 1.00
D.L.Size 0.01 0.05 -0.00 -0.03 0.08 0.05 0.06 -0.03 0.00 0.02 -0.08 -0.20 1.00
D.L.TSM
TA
-0.01 -0.05 0.01 -0.17 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.00 0.02 -0.00 0.00 0.02 1.00
D.L.Sens -0.01 -0.06 0.01 0.00 -0.28 -0.13 -0.00 -0.04 -0.05 -0.46 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.00 1.00
Bi -0.05 -0.20 0.26 -0.07 -0.10 -0.03 -0.04 0.07 -0.03 -.02 0.02 0.07 0.06 -0.01 0.01 1.00
Ri 0.03 -0.15 0.38 0.01 -0.11 0.01 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.07 -0.01 0.00 0.70 1.00
B ∗ C -0.07 -0.12 0.07 -0.05 0.02 -0.06 -0.09 0.14 -0.06 0.04 -0.01 0.07 -0.07 -0.00 0.00 0.47 0.30 1.00
R ∗ C -0.01 -0.10 0.16 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.11 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.36 0.51 0.54 1.00
D. in this table stands for first difference, L. stands for the lagged value.
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Table 26: Correlation coefficients between the instruments and the variables from first difference equation. Continued (9)
Var L3.Z∗
R
L3.TE
TA
∗
R
L3.Size∗
R
L3.TSM
TA
∗
R
L3.Sens∗
R
L3.Z ∗
R ∗ C
L3.TE
TA
∗
R ∗ C
L3.Size∗
R ∗ C
L3.TSM
TA
∗
R ∗ C
L3.Sens∗
R ∗ C
D.L.Z D.L.TE
TA
D.L.Size D.L.TSM
TA
D.L.Sens Bi Ri B∗C R∗C
L3.Z ∗ R 1.00
L3.TE
TA
∗
R
0.45 1.00
L3.Size ∗
R
0.11 -0.20 1.00
L3.TSM
TA
∗
R
0.01 0.09 -0.18 1.00
L3.Sens∗
R
-0.10 0.18 -0.19 -0.08 1.00
L3.Z∗R∗
C
0.34 0.07 0.04 0.04 -0.02 1.00
L3.TE
TA
∗
R ∗ C
0.07 0.33 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.22 1.00
L3.Size ∗
R ∗ C
0.03 0.02 0.38 -0.06 -0.00 0.09 0.02 1.00
L3.TSM
TA
∗
R ∗ C
0.05 0.01 -0.08 0.27 -0.01 0.14 0.04 -0.21 1.00
L3.Sens∗
R ∗ C
-0.03 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.19 -0.08 0.08 -0.08 -0.05 1.00
D.L.Z -0.04 -0.09 0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 1.00
D.L.TE
TA
-0.06 -0.20 0.07 -0.01 -0.05 0.01 -0.06 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.50 1.00
D.L.Size 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.04 0.03 0.05 -0.06 0.00 -0.03 -0.08 -0.20 1.00
D.L.TSM
TA
-0.01 -0.05 0.01 -0.16 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.02 1.00
D.L.Sens -0.02 -0.06 0.01 0.00 -0.19 -0.07 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.13 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.01 1.00
Bi 0.00 -0.18 0.30 -0.02 -0.12 -0.01 -0.07 0.12 -0.01 -0.04 0.02 0.07 0.06 -0.01 0.01 1.00
Ri 0.00 -0.25 0.43 -0.03 -0.17 -0.01 -0.09 0.17 -0.02 -0.05 0.04 0.08 0.07 -0.01 0.00 0.70 1.00
B ∗ C -0.01 -0.07 0.10 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.14 0.25 -0.03 -0.08 -0.01 0.07 -0.07 -0.00 0.00 0.47 0.30 1.00
R ∗ C -0.01 -0.17 0.19 -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 -0.15 0.14 -0.03 -0.13 0.03 0.11 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.36 0.51 0.54 1.00
D. in this table stands for first difference, L. stands for the lagged value.
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Table 27: Correlation coefficients between the instruments and the variables from level equation (system GMM)
Var L2.D.Z L2.D.
TE
TA
L2.D.
Size
L2.D.
TSM
TA
L2.D.
Sens
L2.D.
Z ∗ C
L2.D.
TE
TA
∗C
L2.D.
Size ∗
C
L2.D.
TSM
TA
∗
C
L2.D.
Sens ∗
C
TL REML CIL L.TL L.REML L.CIL Bi Ri B∗C R∗C
L2.D.Z 1.00 L2.D.TE
TA
0.36 1.00
L2.D.Size -0.19 -0.32 1.00
L2.D.TSM
TA
-0.08 0.04 0.01 1.00
L2.D.Sens 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 1.00
L2.D.Z ∗
C
0.35 0.17 -0.00 0.01 0.15 1.00
L2.D.TE
TA
∗
C
0.13 0.18 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.56 1.00
L2.D.Size∗
C
-0.03 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.07 -0.02 -0.03 1.00
L2.D.TSM
TA
∗
C
0.05 -0.01 -0.02 0.13 0.11 0.09 -0.09 -0.05 1.00
L2.D.Sens∗
C
0.03 -0.05 0.08 0.02 0.49 0.10 -0.08 0.05 0.09 1.00
TL 0.01 -0.04 0.23 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.09 -0.02 -0.00 0.04 1.00
REML -0.01 -0.05 0.17 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.02 0.66 1.00
CIL 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.02 -0.00 0.08 0.07 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.35 -0.11 1.00
L.TL 0.00 -0.12 0.31 -0.01 0.01 0.07 0.08 -0.07 0.00 0.05 0.41 0.29 0.13 1.00
L.REML 0.01 -0.08 0.22 -0.02 -0.02 0.07 0.05 -0.04 -0.01 0.01 0.26 0.11 0.11 0.66 1.00
L.CIL -0.01 -0.05 0.10 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.03 0.05 0.15 0.14 -0.02 0.34 -0.12 1.00
Bi -0.01 0.07 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.06 0.00 0.07 -0.05 -0.01 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.02 1.00
Ri 0.00 0.08 0.04 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.04 0.10 -0.02 -0.01 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.70 1.00
B ∗ C -0.00 0.10 -0.06 -0.00 -0.00 -0.06 -0.02 0.12 -0.06 -0.03 -0.23 -0.14 -0.12 -0.17 -0.09 -0.10 0.47 0.29 1.00
R ∗ C 0.00 0.07 -0.05 -0.00 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.17 -0.01 0.01 -0.08 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 0.36 0.51 0.54 1.00
D. in this table stands for first difference, L. stands for the lagged value.
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Table 28: Correlation coefficients between the instruments and the variables from level equation (system GMM). Continued (1)
Var L2.D.Z∗
B
L2.D.
TE
TA
∗B
L2.D.
Size∗B
L2.D.
TSM
TA
∗
B
L2.D.
Sens ∗
B
L2.D.
Z ∗B ∗
C
L2.D.
TE
TA
∗
B ∗ C
L2.D.
Size ∗
B ∗ C
L2.D.
TSM
TA
∗
B ∗ C
L2.D.
Sens ∗
B ∗ C
TL REML CIL L.TL L.REML L.CIL Bi Ri B∗C R∗C
L2.D.Z ∗
B
1.00
L2.D.TE
TA
∗
B
0.35 1.00
L2.D.Size∗
B
-0.16 -0.22 1.00
L2.D.TSM
TA
∗
B
-0.15 0.05 -0.00 1.00
L2.D.Sens∗
B
0.02 0.06 0.00 0.00 1.00
L2.D.Z ∗
B ∗ C
0.44 0.26 0.03 0.02 0.08 1.00
L2.D.TE
TA
∗
B ∗ C
0.18 0.30 -0.02 0.01 -0.04 0.46 1.00
L2.D.Size∗
B ∗ C
-0.03 0.13 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.06 1.00
L2.D.TSM
TA
∗
B ∗ C
0.05 -0.01 -0.04 0.11 0.04 0.15 0.03 -0.08 1.00
L2.D.Sens∗
B ∗ C
-0.02 -0.03 0.06 0.00 0.50 -0.00 -0.07 0.05 0.01 1.00
TL 0.01 -0.02 0.15 0.01 -0.01 0.09 0.06 -0.03 0.03 0.01 1.00
REML 0.01 -0.04 0.12 -0.00 -0.01 0.04 0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.02 0.66 1.00
CIL -0.00 0.01 0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.06 0.03 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.35 -0.12 1.00
L.TL 0.04 -0.07 0.19 -0.03 0.02 0.08 0.04 -0.08 0.02 0.03 0.41 0.29 0.13 1.00
L.REML 0.04 -0.03 0.12 -0.01 -0.00 0.08 0.03 -0.05 -0.01 0.01 0.26 0.11 0.11 0.66 1.00
L.CIL 0.01 -0.03 0.05 -0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 -0.03 0.04 0.03 0.15 0.14 -0.02 0.34 -0.12 1.00
Bi -0.01 -0.02 0.17 -0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.06 -0.03 -0.02 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.02 1.00
Ri 0.01 0.03 0.13 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.05 0.10 0.01 -0.01 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.70 1.00
B ∗ C -0.00 0.10 -0.06 -0.00 -0.00 -0.06 -0.02 0.12 -0.06 -0.03 -0.23 -0.14 -0.12 -0.17 -0.09 -0.10 0.47 0.29 1.00
R ∗ C 0.00 0.07 -0.05 -0.00 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.17 -0.01 0.01 -0.08 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 0.36 0.51 0.54 1.00
D. in this table stands for first difference, L. stands for the lagged value.
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Table 29: Correlation coefficients between the instruments and the variables from level equation (system GMM). Continued (2)
Var L3.D.Z L3.D.
TE
TA
L3.D.
Size
L3.D.
TSM
TA
L3.D.
Sens
L3.D.
Z ∗ C
L3.D.
TE
TA
∗C
L3.D.
Size ∗
C
L3.D.
TSM
TA
∗
C
L3.D.
Sens ∗
C
TL REML CIL L.TL L.REML L.CIL Bi Ri B∗C R∗C
L3.D.Z 1.00
L3.D.TE
TA
0.41 1.00
L3.D.Size 0.03 -0.18 1.00
L3.D.TSM
TA
-0.08 0.04 0.01 1.00
L3.D.Sens 0.03 0.05 -0.01 0.00 1.00
L3.D.Z ∗
C
0.16 0.07 -0.02 -0.00 0.18 1.00
L3.D.TE
TA
∗
C
0.03 0.01 -0.00 -0.02 0.04 0.59 1.00
L3.D.Size∗
C
-0.03 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.06 -0.04 -0.02 1.00
L3.D.TSM
TA
∗
C
0.04 0.00 -0.03 0.03 0.11 0.08 -0.11 -0.08 1.00
L3.D.Sens∗
C
0.03 -0.00 0.05 -0.00 0.66 0.27 0.06 0.08 0.16 1.00
TL 0.03 -0.02 0.17 -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.08 0.00 0.01 0.04 1.00
REML 0.03 -0.01 0.13 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.08 -0.03 -0.02 0.02 0.66 1.00
CIL 0.02 -0.03 0.04 -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.04 -0.02 0.03 0.35 -0.13 1.00
L.TL 0.02 -0.04 0.24 0.02 -0.01 0.05 0.08 -0.04 -0.01 0.02 0.41 0.29 0.12 1.00
L.REML 0.01 -0.05 0.18 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.04 0.00 0.02 0.25 0.10 0.10 0.65 1.00
L.CIL 0.02 0.01 0.09 0.04 -0.01 0.08 0.08 -0.03 -0.02 -0.00 0.16 0.17 -0.04 0.35 -0.15 1.00
Bi -0.02 0.06 0.04 -0.00 -0.01 -0.08 -0.03 0.07 -0.06 -0.00 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.00 1.00
Ri -0.01 0.07 0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.04 0.00 0.10 -0.02 0.01 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.70 1.00
B ∗ C 0.00 0.07 -0.06 -0.00 -0.00 -0.06 -0.06 0.13 -0.05 0.01 -0.24 -0.15 -0.12 -0.18 -0.10 -0.11 0.49 0.30 1.00
R ∗ C -0.00 0.02 -0.05 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.01 -0.08 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 0.37 0.52 0.53 1.00
D. in this table stands for first difference, L. stands for the lagged value.
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Table 30: Correlation coefficients between the instruments and the variables from level equation (system GMM). Continued (3)
Var L3.D.Z∗
B
L3.D.
TE
TA
∗B
L3.D.
Size∗B
L3.D.
TSM
TA
∗
B
L3.D.
Sens ∗
B
L3.D.
Z ∗B ∗
C
L3.D.
TE
TA
∗
B ∗ C
L3.D.
Size ∗
B ∗ C
L3.D.
TSM
TA
∗
B ∗ C
L3.D.
Sens ∗
B ∗ C
TL REML CIL L.TL L.REML L.CIL Bi Ri B∗C R∗C
L3.D.
Z ∗ B
1.00
L3.D.
TE
TA
∗ B
0.31 1.00
L3.D.
Size ∗ B
-0.21 -0.23 1.00
L3.D.
TSM
TA
∗B
-0.18 0.04 -0.00 1.00
L3.D.
Sens ∗ B
0.03 0.07 -0.01 0.00 1.00
L3.D.
Z ∗B ∗ C
0.26 0.17 0.01 0.00 0.13 1.00
L3.D.
TE
TA
∗ B ∗
C
0.05 0.12 -0.01 -0.00 0.05 0.38 1.00
L3.D.
Size∗B ∗
C
-0.04 0.14 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.02 0.09 1.00
L3.D.
TSM
TA
∗
B ∗ C
0.04 -0.03 -0.04 0.03 0.05 0.17 0.00 -0.10 1.00
L3.D.
Sens∗B∗
C
0.03 0.02 0.07 0.03 0.67 0.20 -0.06 0.12 0.07 1.00
TL 0.00 -0.03 0.07 -0.00 0.00 0.03 0.08 -0.02 0.02 0.01 1.00
REML 0.03 -0.01 0.13 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.08 -0.03 -0.02 0.02 0.66 1.00
CIL 0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.04 -0.01 0.02 0.35 -0.13 1.00
L.TL -0.01 -0.03 0.14 0.01 -0.02 0.06 0.07 -0.04 0.02 0.00 0.41 0.29 0.12 1.00
L.REML -0.01 -0.05 0.11 -0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.03 0.01 0.02 0.25 0.10 0.00 0.65 1.00
L.CIL -0.02 -0.00 0.02 0.04 -0.02 0.06 0.04 -0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.16 0.17 -0.03 0.35 -0.15 1.00
Bi -0.01 -0.04 0.19 -0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.05 0.07 -0.02 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.00 1.00
Ri -0.00 0.01 0.14 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.10 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.70 1.00
B ∗ C 0.01 0.06 -0.02 -0.00 0.03 -0.04 -0.10 0.14 -0.05 0.02 -0.24 -0.15 -0.12 -0.18 -0.10 -0.11 0.49 0.30 1.00
R ∗ C 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.01 0.02 0.25 0.10 0.00 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.37 0.52 0.53 1.00
D. in this table stands for first difference, L. stands for the lagged value.
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Table 31: Correlation coefficients between the instruments and the variables from level equation (system GMM). Continued (4)
Var L2.D.Z∗
R
L2.D.
TE
TA
∗ R
L2.D.
Size∗R
L2.D.
TSM
TA
∗
R
L2.D.
Sens ∗
R
L2.D.
Z ∗R ∗
C
L2.D.
TE
TA
∗
R ∗ C
L2.D.
Size ∗
R ∗ C
L2.D.
TSM
TA
∗
R ∗ C
L2.D.
Sens ∗
R ∗ C
TL REML CIL L.TL L.REML L.CIL Bi Ri B∗C R∗C
L2.D.
Z ∗ R
1.00
L2.D.
TE
TA
∗ R
0.34 1.00
L2.D.
Size ∗ R
-0.21 -0.16 1.00
L2.D.
TSM
TA
∗R
-0.24 0.04 0.02 1.00
L2.D.
Sens ∗ R
0.02 0.07 -0.01 0.00 1.00
L2.D.
Z ∗ R ∗ C
0.45 0.27 0.02 0.02 0.06 1.00
L2.D.
TE
TA
∗ R ∗
C
0.18 0.41 -0.02 0.02 0.00 0.43 1.00
L2.D.
Size∗R∗
C
-0.03 -0.03 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.11 -0.10 1.00
L2.D.
TSM
TA
∗
R ∗ C
0.00 0.04 -0.02 0.14 0.02 0.01 0.08 -0.19 1.00
L2.D.
Sens∗R∗
C
-0.01 -0.02 0.05 0.00 0.34 0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.01 1.00
TL 0.02 -0.01 0.14 0.03 -0.01 0.03 0.01 -0.07 0.01 0.01 1.00
REML -0.04 -0.01 0.11 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 0.02 0.66 1.00
CIL 0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.02 -0.05 0.01 0.02 0.35 -0.11 1.00
L.TL 0.01 -0.03 0.15 0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.04 -0.01 0.04 -0.03 0.41 0.29 0.13 1.00
L.REML 0.02 -0.02 0.09 0.02 -0.03 0.05 -0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.00 0.25 0.11 0.11 0.66 1.00
L.CIL -0.00 -0.02 0.05 -0.01 0.03 -0.00 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.03 0.15 0.14 -0.02 0.34 -0.12 1.00
Bi 0.01 0.01 0.15 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.08 -0.01 -0.02 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.02 1.00
Ri 0.00 0.02 0.21 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.11 -0.01 -0.01 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.70 1.00
B ∗ C 0.03 0.13 -0.06 -0.00 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.17 -0.02 -0.04 -0.23 -0.14 -0.17 -0.09 -0.10 0.47 0.29 1.00
R ∗ C 0.01 0.07 -0.00 -0.00 0.06 -0.01 -0.04 0.22 -0.02 0.02 -0.08 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 0.36 0.51 0.54 1.00
D. in this table stands for first difference, L. stands for the lagged value.
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Table 32: Correlation coefficients between the instruments and the variables from level equation (system GMM). Continued (5)
Var L2.D.Z L2.D.
TE
TA
L2.D.
Size
L2.D.
TSM
TA
L2.D.
Sens
L2.D.
Z ∗ C
L2.D.
TE
TA
∗C
L2.D.
Size ∗
C
L2.D.
TSM
TA
∗
C
L2.D.
Sens ∗
C
L.Z L.TE
TA
L.Size L.TSM
TA
L.Sens L.Z∗C L.TE
TA
∗
C
L.Size∗
C
L2.D.
Z
1.00
L2.D.
TE
TA
0.43 1.00
L2.D.
Size
-0.03 -0.18 1.00
L2.D.
TSM
TA
-0.07 0.04 0.01 1.00
L2.D.
Sens
0.04 0.03 0.02 0.00 1.00
L2.D.
Z ∗ C
0.31 0.17 0.00 0.01 0.19 1.00
L2.D.
TE
TA
∗ C
0.12 0.15 -0.03 -0.02 0.03 0.58 1.00
L2.D.
Size ∗ C
-0.02 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.09 -0.03 -0.08 1.00
L2.D.
TSM
TA
∗C
0.05 0.01 -0.02 0.11 0.10 0.09 -0.08 -0.04 1.00
L2.D.
Sens ∗ C
0.04 -0.04 0.07 0.02 0.50 0.12 -0.05 0.05 0.08 1.00
L.Z 0.13 0.15 -0.10 0.01 0.20 0.35 0.20 0.02 0.08 0.14 1.00
L.TE
TA
0.06 0.10 -0.01 -0.00 0.07 0.20 0.26 0.01 -0.01 0.05 0.63 1.00
L.Size 0.00 0.12 0.03 -0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.27 -0.02 0.01 0.07 -0.12 1.00
L.TSM
TA
-0.01 0.05 -0.05 0.09 0.04 0.04 -0.00 -0.02 0.22 0.05 0.02 -0.01 -0.04 1.00
L.Sens 0.04 -0.07 0.24 -0.02 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.04 -0.17 -0.14 -0.04 -0.09 -0.07 1.00
L.Z ∗ C 0.18 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.24 0.49 0.28 0.03 0.11 0.20 0.71 0.36 0.01 0.07 0.01 1.00
L.TE
TA
∗C 0.09 0.06 0.00 -0.01 0.10 0.36 0.48 0.00 -0.01 0.10 0.45 0.55 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.64 1.00
L.Size ∗
C
-0.02 0.06 0.00 -0.01 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.57 -0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.48 -0.04 -0.00 0.03 0.00 1.00
D. in this table stands for first difference, L. stands for the lagged value.
79
 D
ocum
ents de Travail du Centre d'Econom
ie de la Sorbonne - 2014.62
Table 33: Correlation coefficients between the instruments and the variables from level equation (system GMM). Continued (6)
Var L2.D.Z∗
B
L2.D.
TE
TA
∗B
L2.D.
Size∗B
L2.D.
TSM
TA
∗
B
L2.D.
Sens ∗
B
L2.D.
Z ∗B ∗
C
L2.D.
TE
TA
∗
B ∗ C
L2.D.
Size ∗
B ∗ C
L2.D.
TSM
TA
∗
B ∗ C
L2.D.
Sens ∗
B ∗ C
L.Z L.TE
TA
L.Size L.TSM
TA
L.Sens L.Z∗C L.TE
TA
∗
C
L.Size∗
C
L2.D.
Z ∗ B
1.00
L2.D.
TE
TA
∗ B
0.35 1.00
L2.D.
Size ∗ B
-0.17 -0.21 1.00
L2.D.
TSM
TA
∗B
-0.16 0.06 0.00 1.00
L2.D.
Sens ∗ B
0.02 0.07 0.01 0.00 1.00
L2.D.
Z ∗B ∗ C
0.44 0.26 0.03 0.02 0.09 1.00
L2.D.
TE
TA
∗ B ∗
C
0.18 0.30 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.47 1.00
L2.D.
Size∗B ∗
C
-0.03 0.13 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.05 1.00
L2.D.
TSM
TA
∗
B ∗ C
0.05 0.00 -0.04 0.11 0.03 0.15 0.03 -0.10 1.00
L2.D.
Sens∗B∗
C
-0.00 -0.02 0.06 0.00 0.52 0.02 -0.05 0.04 0.00 1.00
L.Z 0.06 0.11 -0.03 0.03 0.09 0.19 0.11 0.02 0.04 0.08 1.00
L.TE
TA
-0.02 0.07 -0.03 0.02 0.01 0.08 0.14 0.03 -0.00 0.01 0.63 1.00
L.Size 0.02 0.09 0.07 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.22 -0.02 0.01 0.07 -0.12 1.00
L.TSM
TA
-0.03 0.05 -0.05 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.01 -0.02 0.15 0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.04 1.00
L.Sens 0.00 -0.04 0.12 0.01 0.03 0.02 -0.00 0.01 0.02 -0.11 -0.14 -0.04 -0.09 -0.07 1.00
L.Z ∗ C 0.12 0.11 0.01 0.01 0.10 0.27 0.16 0.03 0.06 0.11 0.71 0.36 0.01 0.07 0.01 1.00
L.TE
TA
∗C 0.06 0.08 0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.16 0.25 0.04 -0.00 0.03 0.45 0.55 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.64 1.00
L.Size ∗
C
-0.03 0.06 -0.00 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.48 -0.06 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.48 -0.04 -0.00 0.03 0.00 1.00
D. in this table stands for first difference, L. stands for the lagged value.
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Table 34: Correlation coefficients between the instruments and the variables from level equation (system GMM). Continued (7)
Var L3.D.Z L3.D.
TE
TA
L3.D.
Size
L3.D.
TSM
TA
L3.D.
Sens
L3.D.
Z ∗ C
L3.D.
TE
TA
∗C
L3.D.
Size ∗
C
L3.D.
TSM
TA
∗
C
L3.D.
Sens ∗
C
L.Z L.TE
TA
L.Size L.TSM
TA
L.Sens L.Z∗C L.TE
TA
∗
C
L.Size∗
C
L3.D.
Z
1.00
L3.D.
TE
TA
0.41 1.00
L3.D.
Size
0.04 -0.17 1.00
L3.D.
TSM
TA
-0.08 0.05 -0.01 1.00
L3.D.
Sens
0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 1.00
L3.D.
Z ∗ C
0.15 0.07 -0.02 -0.00 0.18 1.00
L3.D.
TE
TA
∗ C
0.03 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.04 0.60 1.00
L3.D.
Size ∗ C
-0.03 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.07 -0.06 -0.06 1.00
L3.D.
TSM
TA
∗C
0.04 0.00 -0.03 0.03 0.11 0.108 -0.11 -0.05 1.00
L3.D.
Sens ∗ C
0.03 0.00 0.05 -0.00 0.66 0.27 0.07 0.10 0.16 1.00
L.Z 0.08 0.08 -0.15 -0.01 0.17 0.29 0.15 0.01 0.06 0.13 1.00
L.TE
TA
0.04 0.07 -0.04 -0.02 0.08 0.19 0.24 0.01 -0.00 0.05 0.63 1.00
L.Size 0.00 0.12 0.04 0.00 0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.28 -0.02 0.03 0.07 -0.09 1.00
L.TSM
TA
-0.03 0.05 -0.05 0.04 0.05 0.03 -0.02 -0.03 0.22 0.04 0.01 -0.01 -0.05 1.00
L.Sens 0.05 -0.10 0.21 -0.06 -0.18 -0.10 -0.03 -0.03 -0.06 -0.36 -0.13 -0.05 -0.08 -0.08 1.00
L.Z ∗ C 0.12 0.11 0.01 0.01 0.10 0.27 0.16 0.03 0.06 0.11 0.71 0.36 0.01 0.07 0.01 1.00
L.TE
TA
∗C 0.06 0.06 0.00 -0.02 0.08 0.29 0.39 0.00 -0.01 0.08 0.49 0.61 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.64 1.00
L.Size ∗
C
-0.02 0.05 0.01 -0.00 0.06 -0.02 -0.02 0.56 -0.03 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.50 -0.04 -0.01 0.03 0.02 1.00
D. in this table stands for first difference, L. stands for the lagged value.
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Table 35: Correlation coefficients between the instruments and the variables from level equation (system GMM). Continued (8)
Var L3.D.Z∗
B
L3.D.
TE
TA
∗B
L3.D.
Size∗B
L3.D.
TSM
TA
∗
B
L3.D.
Sens ∗
B
L3.D.
Z ∗B ∗
C
L3.D.
TE
TA
∗
B ∗ C
L3.D.
Size ∗
B ∗ C
L3.D.
TSM
TA
∗
B ∗ C
L3.D.
Sens ∗
B ∗ C
L.Z L.TE
TA
L.Size L.TSM
TA
L.Sens L.Z∗C L.TE
TA
∗
C
L.Size∗
C
L3.D.
Z ∗ B
1.00
L3.D.
TE
TA
∗ B
0.32 1.00
L3.D.
Size ∗ B
-0.21 -0.22 1.00
L3.D.
TSM
TA
∗B
-0.18 0.04 -0.00 1.00
L3.D.
Sens ∗ B
0.03 0.08 0.01 0.00 1.00
L3.D.
Z ∗B ∗ C
0.26 0.18 0.00 0.01 0.14 1.00
L3.D.
TE
TA
∗ B ∗
C
0.07 0.12 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.40 1.00
L3.D.
Size∗B ∗
C
-0.04 0.13 0.02 0.03 0.10 0.01 0.08 1.00
L3.D.
TSM
TA
∗
B ∗ C
0.04 -0.03 -0.05 0.02 0.06 0.18 0.01 -0.10 1.00
L3.D.
Sens∗B∗
C
0.03 0.03 0.07 0.02 0.69 0.20 -0.04 0.14 0.09 1.00
L.Z 0.07 0.07 -0.07 0.00 0.08 0.21 0.09 0.02 0.07 0.06 1.00
L.TE
TA
-0.00 0.07 -0.04 0.01 0.03 0.09 0.12 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.63 1.00
L.Size 0.00 0.10 0.09 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.23 -0.02 0.03 0.07 -0.09 1.00
L.TSM
TA
-0.04 0.04 -0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 -0.00 -0.04 0.16 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.05 1.00
L.Sens -0.00 -0.06 0.06 -0.02 -0.14 -0.06 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 -0.25 -0.13 -0.05 -0.08 -0.08 1.00
L.Z ∗ C 0.07 0.06 -0.05 0.01 0.08 0.29 0.13 0.04 0.09 0.08 0.74 0.41 0.01 0.06 0.00 1.00
L.TE
TA
∗C 0.03 0.05 -0.00 0.01 0.02 0.16 0.23 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.49 0.60 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.66 1.00
L.Size ∗
C
-0.03 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.06 0.48 -0.05 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.50 -0.04 -0.00 0.03 0.02 1.00
D. in this table stands for first difference, L. stands for the lagged value.
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